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ABSTRACT 
 
Anndal Narayanan: Home from the Djebel: the making of Algerian War veterans in 
France, 1956-1974. 
(Under the direction of Donald Reid.)  
 
 
 This dissertation examines the return experiences of French veterans of the 
Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), focusing on the movement they created and 
its activism. Service in the Algerian War affected over one million Frenchmen during a 
period of rapid modernization in France, but these citizens would go unrecognized as 
veterans by their government for over a decade after the war’s end. Analyzing veterans’ 
return experiences, memory, and activism helps us understand the political consequences 
of the Algerian War in postcolonial French society—how the generation of soldiers who 
fought a “war without a name” brought the war back home. Drawing on state archives, 
veterans’ association archives, press coverage, and interviews and surveys of veterans, 
this dissertation finds that long before the French state deigned to recognize them or their 
war, veterans of Algeria were already politically active, as veterans and as citizens—both 
to promote their group interests, and to reshape French society based on lessons they 
drew from the war. Using perspectives of political history, military history, and memory, 
this dissertation presents a case study of how decolonization affected former colonizers, 
and the long-term consequences of sending citizens to fight in a controversial and 
unconventional war with changing war aims.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Topic and Rationale 
 Between 1954 and 1962, France deployed two million soldiers, over 1.2 million 
of them conscripts, in its effort to suppress the nationalist revolution in Algeria.1 By the 
advent of Algerian independence in 1962, veterans of the war composed well over ten 
percent of the active male population in France.2 Yet silence had been inscribed in 
France’s combat from the beginning; the state would not officially acknowledge these 
soldiers as veterans until 1974, nor that Algeria had even been a war until 1999.3 This 
silence resulted above all from administrative categories: since France had incorporated 
the settler colony of Algeria as an integral territory of France in 1848, and a century later, 
the colony contained over one million French citizens, the state could only acknowledge 
a local rebellion requiring ‘pacification,’ rather than a revolutionary war of independence. 
This convenient fiction allowed the French state to minimize the cause of the Algerian 
Front de libération nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN), and also to deny benefits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Découverte, 1989), 293, 
7; Jean-Charles Jauffret, Soldats en Algérie: expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent (Paris: 
Autrement, 2011), 88.   
 
2The number of conscripts deployed minus fatalities during the war (1,156,327) is provided by Jauffret, 88. 
The active male population according to the 1962 census (12.6 million) is found in Daniel Noin and Yvan 
Chauviré, La population de la France, 6th ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2002), 186.  	  	  
3Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 42. 	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to the soldiers who had fought against it. But the silence surrounding the Algerian War 
continued for decades, reinforced by political and memorial taboos.  
 The central political taboo was erected by the ultimate French architect of 
Algerian independence, Charles de Gaulle. Having returned to power on the heels of a 
coup in Algiers in 1958 that seemed to offer the promise to ‘save’ French Algeria, 
President de Gaulle and his loyalists strongly resisted acknowledging the “events” of 
Algeria as a war. In effect, “the Fifth Republic was ashamed of its birth.”4 Not only did 
the state seek to obscure its own foundation, but the very “conception and the conduct of 
the war were incompatible with the laws of the Republic,” since France had waged war 
against its own subjects, and oversaw the institutionalization of torture.5 But the state 
forgave itself, those who had acted in its name, and even those who had opposed it; 
successive layers of amnesties beginning in 1962 obscured the violence and crimes of the 
Algerian War in a “climate of indifference.”6  
 The Gaullist political taboo surrounding Algeria translated into a rejection of 
memory after the war’s end. President de Gaulle refused to commemorate the end of the 
Algerian War or the soldiers who died for France, all while cultivating the myth of the 
French people united in the Resistance in World War II, “as if to compensate for the loss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, 221.  
 
5Jacques Julliard, “Le mépris et la modernité,” 135-60 in dir. Jean-Pierre Rioux, La guerre d’Algérie et les 
Français (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 159; Todd Shepard, The invention of decolonization: the Algerian War and 
the remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 7; Raphaëlle Branche, La Torture et 
l’Armée pendant la Guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 15.  
 
6Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, 215. 	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of the Empire.”7 Indeed, building the myth of the Resistance, and, by metonymy, the 
mystique of Charles de Gaulle, offered “the best way to hide the origins of the Fifth 
Republic.”8 Not only was the memory of Algeria “a humiliating defeat,” but the war had 
“challenged the democratic legitimacy of the Fifth Republic,” as well as the Republican 
principle of the indivisibility of French territory.9 Recognizing the Algerian conflict as a 
war against another nation would have disrupted de Gaulle’s narrative of history, 
according to which France generously and wisely granted Algerian independence.10 
 Because of these political and memorial silences, and because of the growing 
unpopularity of the war, veterans demobilized from North Africa returned “home from 
the djebel” to France in a climate of “indifference at the best, contempt at the worst.”11 
This generation of veterans was expected to disappear in France during the “trente 
glorieuses,” or “glorious thirty years” of modernization after the end of World War II.12 
Examining the memory and activism of these veterans, who presented an inconvenient 
reminder of a war that the state and society alike sought to forget, offers insights into the 
dynamics of early Fifth Republic politics, as well as helping to illuminate the long 
aftermath of the Algerian War.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Frank Renken, “De Gaulle et l’effacement de la question coloniale,” trans. Ingebord Rabenstein-Michel, 
173-177 in dir. Philippe Artières and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, 68: une histoire collective [1962-1981] 
(Paris: Découverte, 2008), 177.  
 
8Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, 221.  
 
9Martin Evans, “Rehabilitating the traumatized war veteran: the case of conscripts from the Algerian War, 
1954-1062,” 73-85 in eds. Martin Evans and Ken Lunn, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Berg, 1997), 75.  
 
10Frédéric Rouyard, “La bataille du 19 mars,” 545-552 in dir. Rioux, op. cit., 548.  
 
11Benjamin Stora, Appelés en guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 13. “Djebel” is the Arabic word 
for “mountain,” and French soldiers used this term to refer to Algeria in general.  
 
12Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979).  
	   4 
 This dissertation takes as its focus the return experiences, memory, and activism 
of the generation of French citizens that served in the Algerian War of Independence. 
Between the indifference of society on one hand, and the silence on the part of the 
government on the other hand, the only narrative available for veterans of Algeria to 
express in public was one of betrayal and victimhood. But the two poles of the Algerian 
War veterans’ movement differed sharply on the nature of this victimhood. As early as 
1958, competing veterans’ associations emerged, attempting to speak for the “third 
combat generation” and convey its demands to French society and the state. In presenting 
claims about the virtue of citizen-soldiers and what they had experienced in the war, 
these associations were also by extension debating the responsibilities of the French 
nation, and what decolonization meant for France. The Algerian War is the source of 
major political references and tendencies that continue to this day, and examining the 
cultivation of memory within the veterans’ movement allows a fuller understanding of 
the long-term impact of the war on French politics and national identity. 
 By the late 1980s, over two decades after the war’s end, there remained five 
national veterans’ associations in France that welcomed veterans of Algeria. The left-
leaning FNACA or Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc et 
Tunisie (National Federation of Veterans of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) had the 
highest membership, with around 300,000 adherents. Next came the nationalist UNC or 
Union nationale des combattants (National Union of Soldiers), possessing around 
257,000 members, which by 1985 had merged with its Algerian War branch, the 
UNCAFN or Union nationale des combattants d’Afrique du nord (National Union of 
	   5 
Soldiers of North Africa).13 These two associations, the antiwar FNACA and the pro-
French Algeria UNCAFN, had both formed by 1958, representing opposite poles in the 
Algerian War veterans’ movement. Eventually the FNACA, tiny and impoverished at its 
birth, came to overtake the UNCAFN, initially well-funded and powerful. The gradual 
reversal in size between these two associations suggests the growing strength of an 
anticolonial interpretation of the Algerian War, and the declining popularity of traditional 
nationalism and military pride in France.14 In view of their wartime foundation, their 
mutually exclusive narratives of the war, their highly visible activism during and after the 
war, and their national importance to this day, the FNACA and the UNCAFN were 
chosen for comparison in this dissertation.15  
 The scant literature existing on veterans of Algeria has tended to focus chiefly on 
the FNACA, in part because of this association’s vigorous educational efforts begun in 
the 1980s.16 But it is likely that this overemphasis also occurs because the FNACA’s left-
leaning political orientation and antiwar stance seem reassuring to scholars—the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13The third largest association, the CN-CATM or Confédération nationale des combattants en Algérie, 
Tunisie et Maroc, claimed about 150,000 members. The UNACITA (Union nationale d’anciens 
combattants en Indochine, des TOE et d’Afrique du Nord), a group combining veterans of Algeria, 
Indochina, and of “external operations” such as Lebanon, possessed around 70,000 members. After that, the 
ARAC or Association républicaine des anciens combattants—the oldest extant veterans’ association in 
France, a Communist-oriented association founded in 1915—counted around 45,000 members. Finally, the 
UCC-TAM or Union confédérée des combattants de la Tunisie, l’Algérie et le Maroc possessed around 
14,000 members. All figures provided by Rouyard, “La bataille du 19 mars,” dir. Rioux, 544.   
   
14The left-wing association took decades to overcome its rival’s numerical superiority; in 1961 the FNACA 
could only claim around 2,200 members, while the UNCAFN boasted 80,000. Annick Sicart, Tous à jour 
de leur cotisation!, 69; “Caracteristiques des 200,000 lecteurs de Djebel,” Djebel 19 (May 1961), 5. But by 
its thirtieth year of existence in 1988, the FNACA held a plurality in the “veterans’ world”—40% of all 
veterans of Algeria who belonged to an association were FNACA members. Rouyard, 546. 
   	  	  
15However, Chapter 2, in examining the foundation of both associations, also discusses the trajectory of a 
small short-lived centrist association (the UDAA or Union démocratique des anciens d’Algérie) that 
positioned itself in opposition to both the UNCAFN and the FNACA, in order to understand why the 
veterans’ movement became so polarized before the war even ended.	  	  	  
16Evans, “Rehabilitating the traumatized war veteran,” 78. 	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association appears to have been on “the right side of history” from its birth. And with its 
tireless emphasis on “rights and reparation,” the FNACA appears almost like a trade 
union for veterans, with a great coherence of purpose. Furthermore, the FNACA is 
logistically simpler to study, since it has always only assembled veterans from a single 
combat generation. The genealogy of the UNCAFN is more complex—it invited veterans 
of Algeria to join an association founded by veterans of World War I (the UNC), which, 
by the time of the Algerian War, was dominated by veterans of World War II.  
 But this emphasis on the FNACA has created a lacuna in scholarly understanding 
of the Algerian War veterans’ movement. The left-leaning Federation was politically 
isolated, and did not grow to become the largest association for veterans of Algeria until 
over a decade after the war’s end. From its wartime foundation, the UNCAFN received 
political access and support from the state, and its members were actively involved in the 
movement to return Charles de Gaulle to power. Following the logic of its commitment 
to French Algeria, the Union’s national leadership supported the generals’ putsch, and 
never publicly condemned the illegal violence of the OAS (Organisation armée secrète, a 
clandestine pro-French Algeria militia organized in 1961 in Algeria and metropolitan 
France).  
 Indeed, many UNCAFN members, allies, and at least one co-founder would go 
over to the OAS in this period. This extremist tendency as well as the logistical 
difficulties outlined above may explain why the Union has not attracted much scholarly 
interest. But to ignore the political engagements of nationalist veterans of Algeria is to 
miss the lion’s share of veterans’ activism during the war itself. To disdain the pro-
French Algeria narrative these veterans cultivated is to obscure the channels of memory 
	   7 
that helped develop a highly receptive audience for the National Front in the 1970s and 
1980s. A comparison of both poles of the Algerian War veterans’ movement is necessary 
for a fuller understanding of veterans’ political engagements during and after the war.  
 
Chronology 
 This investigation of the early Algerian War veterans’ movement covers a 
coherent yet dense chronology. Analysis begins in 1956, when the earliest reservists and 
conscripts to serve in Algeria were returning to France, and ends in 1974, the year that 
the National Assembly and Senate voted to open the official status of ‘veteran’ to soldiers 
who fought in North Africa. More broadly, this timeline coincides with the era of French 
economic modernization after World War II. Finally, it delineates the Gaullist period—
from the escalation of the Algerian War under the Fourth Republic as de Gaulle sought a 
way to return to public life, through the first decade of the Fifth Republic under 
Presidents de Gaulle and Pompidou, to the opening of the post-Gaullist era, when 
Independent Republican Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected President in 1974. The 
chapters of this dissertation are defined thematically—the rhetoric and memory of 
associations, or the fight for veterans’ recognition, for instance—but each individual 
chapter unfolds chronologically to the extent possible.  
 
Historiography 
 A vast body of literature exists on the Algerian War of Independence—especially, 
from the French perspective, its operational history and its impact on the Army, the 
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experiences and memory of the war in French society, and its political consequences.17 
Yet over sixty years after the end of the war, studies on the postwar experiences of 
French soldiers in general remain “practically nonexistent,” and this is a major gap in our 
understanding of the aftermath of the Algerian War.18 While several scholars have used 
interviews and questionnaires to investigate veterans’ memory of the war itself, no 
academic oral history analyzing veterans’ return experiences and political engagements 
has been conducted.19 This dissertation thus makes historiographic contributions in terms 
of content as well as framing and interpretation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17For general histories of the war, Alistair Horne, A savage war of peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: 
Viking, 1978), remains a reference; Benjamin Stora, Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (1954-1962) (Paris: 
Découverte, 1993) offers a brief but thorough overview; and Sylvie Thénault’s Histoire de la guerre 
d’indépendence algérienne (Paris: Flammarion, 2005) provides a synthesis of decades of research on the 
war. For more specialized military and political studies, see George Armstrong Kelly’s work on changing 
civil-military relations, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962 (The MIT Press, 
1965); Jean-Pierre Rioux, dir., La Guerre d’Algérie et les Français (Paris: Fayard, 1990), a compilation of 
essays on the experience and memory of the war among different sectors of French society; Martin Evans, 
Algeria: France’s undeclared war (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), which analyzes the French state’s handling 
of the war; and Todd Shepard, The Invention of decolonization: the Algerian War and the remaking of 
France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), which examines how France sought to reconcile the 
paradoxes of an imperial Republic through the course of the war.  	  	  
18Raphaëlle Branche, “La dernière génération du feu? Jalons pour une étude des anciens combattants 
français de la guerre d’Algérie,” Histoire@Politique, Politique culture, société 3 (November-December 
2007): 3, doi: 10.3917/hp/003.0006. 	  	  
19Claire Mauss-Copeaux, Appelés en Algérie: la parole confisquée (Paris: Hachette, 1998) represents the 
first academic oral history on the memory of conscripts of Algeria conducted outside of military auspices, 
and argues that “the history and collective memory specific to a region, more than the colonialist culture of 
the era, structured individual memories and figured in representations of the Algerian War.” (281).  
Jauffret’s work, op. cit., offers the results of a large-scale questionnaire investigation into conscripts’ 
memory of the war, and also analyzes some oral histories conducted by the Army. While he includes a 
chapter on conscripts’ return experience, he focuses on the immediate process of demobilization, and then 
veterans’ memories in the 1980s and 1990s, leaving the majority of their adult lives largely unexamined.	  	  	  
 
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, two journalists published nonacademic 
studies of veterans’ memory. Florence Dossé, Les héritiers du silence: Enfants d’appelés en Algérie (Paris: 
Stock, 2012), analyzes interviews performed with 50 people in the Limousin region, including former 
conscripts and their wives and children, arguing that since conscription affected around one in four families 
in the Metropole, the traumas of the war were “collective” (132, 12). And while Isabelle Maury, 
L'empreinte de la guerre: Paroles d’appelés en Algérie (Paris: J. C. Lattès, 2012) analyzes interviews with 
only five veterans, this does seem to be the first work to have investigated veterans’ lives after the war in 
any detail.	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 On the level of content, this dissertation offers close examination of a topic that 
historians on both sides of the Atlantic have proven reluctant to study. Raphaëlle 
Branche—whose career began with a dissertation analyzing France’s systematic use of 
torture in Algeria—notes that French historians have sometimes doubted their ability to 
bring “scientific objectivity” to a war whose memory remains so divisive through the 
generations, while Anglo-American historians have tended to focus on operational 
history, international relations, and French public opinion and intellectual engagements.20 
Thus, French and foreign historians have not examined the experiences of veterans of 
Algeria as a generation, and the impact of their movement in French society.  
 While associational life was a central feature of French society in the twentieth 
century, the history of the Algerian War veterans’ movement, and its long but ultimately 
successful fight for state recognition, have never been chronicled.21 The campaign for 
veterans’ recognition represents a rare example of a social interest group in twentieth 
century France successfully organizing for novel legislation, rather than reacting against 
policy proposed by the state.22 Indeed, this dissertation directly answers Raphaëlle 
Branche’s 2007 call urging historians to study the process by which the interest group of 
veterans of Algeria “was constituted in regard to public authorities.”23   
 Finally, this project devotes equal attention to the history and engagements of 
both the left-wing FNACA as well as the right-wing UNCAFN, which has barely been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 297, 330.  
 
21Serge Barcellini, “Réflexions sur les associations Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre,” 25-33 in 
dir. Bruno Benoît and Marc Frangi, Guerres et associations: actes du colloque de Lyon, 29 septembre 2001 
(Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2003), 28. 	  	  	  
22Frank L. Wilson, Interest-group politics in France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 222. 	  	  
23Branche, “La dernière génération du feu?”, 6.  	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mentioned in the literature.24 It also examines the political trajectories of the two most 
prominent founders of the Algerian War veterans’ movement, Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber and François Porteu de la Morandière. While Porteu de la Morandière 
published several books offering his political interpretations of the Algerian War and 
critiques of contemporary French politics, no scholar has examined his central role in 
organizing the nationalist wing of the Algerian War veterans’ movement.25 And although 
a sea of ink has been spilled over Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, an iconic public 
intellectual of mid-twentieth century France who himself published many works, scholars 
have not investigated his legacy as the founder of what would become the largest 
association for veterans of Algeria, and remains so to this day.26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24Here follows a nonexhaustive but suggestive sample of the over-emphasis on the FNACA in the scant 
literature on veterans of Algeria. Several conference papers discuss the FNACA as if it were the only 
association for veterans of Algeria in dir. Benoît and Frangi. Ludivine Bantigny inaccurately reports that 
the FNACA was founded in 1960, and does not mention the UNCAFN at all in Le plus bel âge? Jeunes et 
jeunesses en France dès l’aube des Trente glorieuses à la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 376. 
Frédéric Rouyard’s Master’s thesis, “Les commémorations de la guerre d’Algérie,” Université de Paris-X-
Nanterre, dir. Philippe Levillain, 1989, as well as his 1990 chapter in dir. Rioux, focus almost exclusively 
on the FNACA. Raphaëlle Branche’s La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? briefly discusses the 
activism of the FNACA toward veterans’ recognition, yet ignores the role of the UNCAFN, only 
mentioning its rejection of the FNACA’s date to commemorate the end of the war. Claire Mauss-Copeaux 
does discuss the UNCAFN and the FNACA together in her book analyzing veterans’ memory, and 
helpfully highlights the discomfort many individual veterans felt toward the divisive polemics of the 
national veterans’ movement. Appelés en Algérie, 48-50. Martin Evans, in a chapter on veterans’ activism, 
“Rehabilitating the Traumatized War Veteran,” takes the FNACA as his exclusive subject as if it were the 
only association that represented conscripts, providing no explanation for this choice. 
 
25François Porteu de la Morandière’s publications on the Algerian War and its political consequences 
include La Révolution en sursis: vers une République à trois ordres (Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 
1961); Soldats du djebel: histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Société de production littéraire, 1979); and 
Sacrée Marianne! Fausse crise politique et vraie crise morale (Issy-les-Moulineaux: Muller, 2000). 
 
26A selected bibliography of Servan-Schreiber’s own publications includes Lieutenant en Algérie (Paris: 
Julliard, 1957); Le défi américain (Paris: Denoël, 1967); Le réveil de la France, mai-juin 1968 (Paris: 
Denoël, 1968); coauthored with Michel Albert, Ciel et terre: manifeste Radical (Paris: Denoël, 1970); Le 
pouvoir régional (Paris: Grasset, 1971); Le défi mondial (Paris: Fayard, 1980); and his two-volume 
autobiography, Passions (Paris: Fixot, 1991) and Les Fossoyeurs (Paris: Fixot, 1993). 
 
Books authored by others about Servan-Schreiber include Jean-Claude Vaujou, JJSS par JJSS (Paris: La 
Table ronde, 1971); Raymond Barrilon, Servan-Schreiber, pour quoi faire? Réflexion sur quelques données 
de la vie politique en France (Paris: Grasset, 1971); and an authorized biography published a year before 
his death, Jean Bothorel, Celui qui voulait tout changer: les années JJSS (Paris: Laffont, 2005). 
	   11 
 On the level of interpretation, this dissertation also makes considerable 
contributions to the historical literature. While Italian historian Andrea Brazzoduro 
published a work of cultural history interpreting the memory of both major veterans’ 
associations through a postcolonial lens, no scholar has examined how these associations 
mobilized memory toward the fight for veterans’ recognition, or their political 
interventions in the Fifth Republic.27 Aside from being the first academic study of the 
postwar engagements of this forgotten generation of veterans, this dissertation makes 
three major interpretive contributions to the historiography of modern France. First, by 
describing the Algerian War veterans’ movement in comparison with those of previous 
combat generations, this dissertation frames veterans of Algeria as a central yet 
underestimated force in French politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.28 
Second, analyzing veterans’ activism toward state recognition highlights the constraints 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27Andrea Brazzoduro’s work, Soldati senza causa: memorie della guerra d’Algeria (Gius: Editori Laterza, 
2012), cautions against exaggerating the degree of French “amnesia” of the Algerian War, and seeks 
instead to analyze the cacophony of competing memories (29). This book traces veterans’ memory through 
debates between the UNCAFN and the FNACA over portrayals of the war in commemoration, literature, 
and film. Aside from the fact that he relies on public external sources alone, such as press coverage and the 
associations’ newspapers, our contributions differ in that Brazzoduro’s work frames veterans’ memory and 
discourse within postcolonial French society, whereas I study veterans’ memory and their associations to 
understand the impact of veterans’ politics in France during and after the war.	  	  	  	  
28Antoine Prost, himself a veteran of Algeria, began the conversation on the role of veterans in 
contemporary French politics, arguing that the World War I veterans’ movement formed the moral bulwark 
of democracy in the Third Republic. Les anciens combattants et la société française: 1914-1939 (Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977), 3 vols. Chris Millington challenges Prost’s 
long-dominant thesis with From victory to Vichy: veterans in inter-war France (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012), which depicts the World War I veterans’ movement as a crucible for political ideas 
that permeated broader society because of the moral authority conferred to veterans. Millington argues that 
the movement’s political actions and gradual discursive shift to the right helped erode “the perceived 
legitimacy” of the Third Republic, facilitating public acceptance of the Vichy regime (18). My dissertation 
draws on the analytical model Prost established. But it accords more with Millington’s thesis, as it argues a 
gradual but important political impact for the veterans’ movement, with the caveat that since there was no 
consensus on the moral authority of veterans of Algeria, establishing the virtue and political acumen of this 
generation was the first challenge the movement faced.   	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that Gaullism built in French civil society, helping to explain the ruptures of May 1968.29 
Third, this research frames the nationalist wing of the Algerian War veterans’ movement 
as central to the project of regrouping the far right in its “desert crossing” in the early 
Fifth Republic.30 It thus uncovers a long trajectory of support for the extreme National 
Front party, which by the late 1980s had upset the bipolarity of the French political 
landscape. 
 
Sources 
 Unlike the aforementioned instances of scholarly discussion of veterans of 
Algeria, this dissertation cross-references internal and external documentation to trace the 
memory, institutional growth, and political engagements of the associations they formed. 
Since the Algerian War remains a sensitive and divisive topic to this day, and because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29The movement for veterans’ recognition coincided with Charles De Gaulle’s transformation of the 
Republic of parliamentary tradition into a centralized “monarchical” Republic. By 1965, “the major act of 
democracy was no longer the election of deputies, but that of the head of state through universal suffrage.” 
Serge Berstein, L’histoire du gaullisme (Paris: Perrin, 2001). Both wings of the Algerian War veterans’ 
movement, because their legislative aims so fundamentally contradicted the will of the head of state, 
experienced significant obstacles to their political action in the Gaullist period. The story of the campaign 
for veterans’ recognition is thus an important but unexamined case study on the relationship between the 
Gaullist regime and civil society, an indifference verging on hostility that made the protests of 1968 seem 
inevitable in retrospect to many observers. 	  	  
30While numerous scholars have commented on either the participation of nationalist veterans in general in 
the movement to return Charles De Gaulle to power, or their later receptivity to the platform of the National 
Front, no single work has traced this right-wing trajectory through a single organization focused 
exclusively on veterans of Algeria. On veterans’ involvement in the death of the Fourth Republic, see for 
example the scholarly work, Christophe Nick, Résurrection: naissance de la Ve République: un coup 
d’État démocratique (Paris: Fayard, 1998), and a well-researched edited volume by investigative 
journalists, Roger Faliot and Jean Guisnel, dir., Histoire secrète de la Ve République (Paris: Découverte, 
2006). For discussion of veterans of Algeria as an important early demographic for the National Front, see 
an authoritative history of the party, Valérie Igounet, Le Front National de 1972 à nos jours: le parti, les 
hommes, les idées (Paris: Seuil, 2013); a history of pro-French Algeria nostalgia in general as a political 
tendency, Benjamin Stora, Le transfert d’une mémoire: de «l’Algérie française» au racisme anti-arabe 
(Paris: Découverte, 1999); a sociological study, Nonna Mayer, Ces Français qui votent Le Pen (Paris: 
Flammarion, 2002); and a work in political science, Alain Bihr, Le spectre de l’extrême droite: les 
Français dans le miroir du Front National (Paris: L’Atelier, 1998). 
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state did not “see” those who had served in Algeria as “veterans” until 1974, access to 
state documents corresponding to the category of  “veterans of Algeria” in the period 
before 1974 is haphazard at best.31 The archives of the Paris Police Prefecture contain 
ample documentation on the UNCAFN during the death throes of the Fourth Republic, 
yet the police did not begin to take notice of the FNACA until its nationwide recruitment 
and activism became more visible in the 1960s.32 Association newspapers served the 
double purpose of communicating between national and local committees, and explaining 
the associations’ concerns to voters and politicians outside the veterans’ world.33 
Memoranda and newsletters for cadres published by both associations allow an inside 
view of institutional priorities and political positions that sometimes could not be stated 
publicly.34 A paper archive of Le Monde at the Bibliothèque de documentation 
internationale contemporaine (BDIC) proved invaluable for tracing national press 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31My diplomatic requests (well-written and proofread by a professional translator) for access to confidential 
records at state veterans’ offices in the departments of Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis, the Morbihan, and 
Finistère—in the hopes of being able to compile statistics on measures like employment, requests for 
professional reeducation assistance and loans—were all refused. Arnaud Bayeux, the Director of the 
departmental veterans’ office in the Morbihan and one of the recipients of my requests, told me that my 
research was on “too fresh” a topic: because of French privacy laws, researchers are only now receiving 
access to the files of soldiers who fought in World War I. Conversation with Arnaud Bayeux, ONACVG 
Director in the Morbihan, Vannes, France, 3 March 2014. Raphaëlle Branche notes that the 1979 law 
codifying the system of archival access in France specifies “no official criteria” for refusing a request for a 
dérogation, leaving individual archivists much discretion to judge the intentions of the researcher, as well 
as the sensitivity of the subject. Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée?, 159. 
 
32Archives of the Paris Police Prefecture (APP). Series Ba2453 contains daily reports on the numerous 
protests surrounding the coup of May 13, 1958, documenting the UNCAFN’s active engagement in this 
period. Series Gd18 contains yearly lists of organizations on the political right and left that the state found 
concerning, only mentioning the FNACA for the first time in 1967.  	  	  
33I received access to the FNACA’s newspaper, L’Ancien d’Algérie, in the office of the archivist at the 
Paris headquarters in 2012, and it was subsequently digitized in full online. I consulted the UNC’s 
newspaper, La Voix du combattant, in which the UNCAFN regularly published an insert called “La Voix 
du djebel,” at the UNC headquarters in Paris. This archive also contained some editions of the UNCAFN’s 
short lived independent newspaper, Djebel, which I supplemented with the full run held at the Bibliothèque 
nationale française (BNF).  
  
34The UNCAFN archives contained an incomplete but valuable collection of “memoranda to cadres,” and 
the BNF holds a complete collection of L’Écho FNACA, an internal organizing bulletin. 
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coverage of both associations’ actions, as well as analyzing the narratives in their press 
releases that did make it into print.35  
 Access to sources on the internal workings of both associations remains 
unbalanced due to differing institutional cultures and priorities. The FNACA, proud of its 
opposition to the Algerian War, has published numerous pamphlets and books over the 
decades, attempting to control its own public narrative and the legacy it passes to its 
members.36 Yet as an institution, it remains hesitant to open its internal archives to 
researchers.37 To uncover the early history of the FNACA outside of how it narrated its 
own origins, I found recourse in documentation from other veterans’ associations, 
especially the UDAA, a splinter group that left the FNACA in 1961.38 The gatekeepers at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35On the topic of the Algerian War, Le Monde was notably less biased in favor of the state’s narrative than 
other mainstream dailies. Its journalists “made a concerted effort to understand events on the ground,” and 
from 1957, the paper unequivocally condemned France’s use of torture. Evans, The Memory of Resistance, 
78. 	  	  
36For instance, Tous à jour de leur côtisation! Témoignages sur Maurice Sicart (Paris: FNACA de Paris, 
2011), a collection of remembrances of former Secretary General Maurice Sicart, is a crucial source to 
understand the internal dynamics of this association in its early years. But it is also an example of 
institutional memory cultivation, as they are eyewitness testimonies composed decades after the events.  
 
37Despite building the trust of internal contacts over several years of researching at the FNACA 
headquarters in Paris, I was unable to receive access to any internal documents, and seemed to generate 
some alarm when I made my request. The association is likely jealous to protect its legacy, fully aware of 
its central importance in the veterans’ world today, and it certainly bears the scars of decades of accusations 
of being a Communist front organization. Moreover, since the FNACA now appears on the “right” side of 
history, having opposed the Algerian War from the beginning, its officials do not feel the need to 
“rehabilitate” its reputation in public opinion.   
 
38UDAA documents aided in my understanding of the FNACA’s origins, as well as suggesting the 
symbolic importance of this short-lived centrist association: “Union Démocratique des Anciens d’Algérie: 
Programme,” UDAA pamphlet, 1961, BDIC, 4 delta 0880; Jean-Pierre Prouteau, “Les Anciens d’Algérie 
dans la Nation. 23,405 morts, 50,376 pensionnés, 3,000,000 hommes. Un nouveau style d'Ancien 
Combattant,” UDAA pamphlet, 1963, BDIC, O pièce 32495; La Tribune des Anciens d’Algérie, UDAA 
newspaper (February and May 1962), BNF, FOL-JO-12655. 
 
I also supplemented my knowledge of the FNACA with such external sources as a hybrid memoir and 
institutional history of the FNACA published individually by a FNACA member, Roger Lajoie-Mazenc, La 
guerre de là-bas: Anciens d’Algérie: un demi-siècle de parcours du combattant (La Primaube: Graphi 
Imprimer, 2009), at the BDIC; as well as the archives of UDR Deputy David Rousset, a survivor of the 
	   15 
the UNC, on the other hand, allowed me unconditional access to the association’s 
archives.39 In the archives of the UNC and the UNCAFN, I discovered papers discussing 
the foundation of the UNCAFN, the association’s engagements in the “days of May” in 
1958 and 1968, and its ties with other far-right and pro-French Algeria groups.40  
 Researching the founding Presidents of both associations was an uneven affair as 
well. Concerning UNCAFN co-founder and twenty-seven year National President 
François Porteu de la Morandière, I discovered, as the French expression terms it, an 
embarrassment of documents. I received access to the entirety of his UNCAFN papers as 
well as some of his personal archives, and conducted three long interviews with him.41 
Researching Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber presented a challenge from the other 
extreme, however. “Servan-Schreiber, founder of the FNACA” is an analytical category 
that neither archivists nor scholars have used before, which underscores one of the 
original contributions of this dissertation.42 I supplemented my knowledge of Servan-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
deportation and an anticolonial militant, whose correspondance with the General Secretary of the FNACA 
is included in his papers held at the BDIC.     
 
39I strongly suspect this happened because the UNC is today led by conservative nationalists who generally 
regret the outcome of the Algerian War, and now feel eager for outside validation of their point of view. 
Opposing decolonization has ultimately placed this association on the side of the “vanquished” of history 
after 1962. Yet those who had supported French Algeria possessed a “coherent and tenacious” memory of 
the war, and they craved acceptance of this memory in broader society. Paul Thibaud, “Génération 
algérienne?” 608-616 in dir. Rioux, 611.  	  	  
40UNC and UNCAFN archives, UNC headquarters, Paris.  
 
41He showed me some “uninteresting” documents from his personal archives, including correspondence 
with Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas, and loaned me a full run of the UNCAFN’s cadres’ 
magazine from the 1970s, Les Cahiers du djebel, which I could not locate anywhere else. 	  	  
42The BDIC contains archives of Servan-Schreiber’s work at l’Express from 1955 to 1974, but nothing at 
all on his work for the FNACA, for which he was National President between 1958-1965. Collection 
“L’Express et le groupe JJSS, 1955-1974,” F delta res 0372, BDIC. Furthermore, Servan-Schreiber’s 
biographer, Jean Bothorel, received the authorization of the Servan-Schreiber family, as well as access to 
private archives, yet Bothorel does not once mention the FNACA as part of Servan-Schreiber’s 
engagements against the war or his legacy. No results came of my attempts to contact Bothorel, despite 
being invited to send him a personal letter through his publisher. 
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Schreiber’s work in the FNACA with two excellent primary sources: a book of 
interviews conducted after he became head of the Radical party in 1970, and an edited 
collection of private correspondance between Servan-Schreiber, Pierre Mendès-France, 
and Françoise Giroud through their lifetimes.43 In the end, I achieved a balance between 
the words of these two rival association founders, an especially sensitive concern since 
Servan-Schreiber died in 2006 while Porteu de la Morandière is alive to this day.    
 Finally, this dissertation relies on other voices—interviews with twenty-five 
veterans, and questionnaires filled out by nineteen. All of the questionnaire respondants 
were identified through the FNACA and the UNC: 16 in Finistère and the Morbihan in 
Brittany, 1 in the Orne in Normandy, and 2 in Paris. Consult Appendices A-D for 
verbatim transcripts of the questionnaires in French and English, and Appendix E for 
categories of responses.  
 Between December 2013 and May 2014, with the organizational help of local 
FNACA and UNC officials, I interviewed 3 veterans in Annecy, capital of the department 
of the Haute-Savoie, 10 in the small village of St-Anne-d’Auray in the department of the 
Morbihan in Brittany, and 12 in the department of the Île-de-France, which includes Paris 
and some close suburbs. Former conscripts predominated among these interviewees, but 
there were also former reservists, one Legionnaire, and several volunteers. See Appendix 
F for statistical analysis of these interviews.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43Jean-Claude Vajoux, ed. JJSS par JJSS. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1971; Éric Roussel, ed., Pierre Mendès-
France, Françoise Giroud, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber: la politique soumise à l’intelligence: 
correspondances croisées (1953-1981) (Paris: Laffont, 2011). 
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Methods 
 My project combines oral history with archival research. The major questions I 
brought to print archives were institutional, political, and cultural. They concerned the 
origin and self-definition of both associations; their internal organization and recruitment 
methods; their attitudes and tactics toward the state, and how the state viewed them; their 
narratives of what the Algerian War and military service had meant; what they demanded 
of society and through what sorts of appeals; and with whom they allied toward these 
goals. As much as possible, I sought confirmation of accounts between archival sources, 
especially concerning the associations’ activism, since each had the motivation to 
exaggerate the weight of its own actions, and downplay the contributions of its rival.  
 To obtain veterans’ testimonies, I established contact with national UNC and 
FNACA officials during my pre-dissertation research trip, and then asked them to help 
me organize interviews and send out questionnaires during my year of research.44 As a 
function of the interests and abilities of each organization, as well as some chance, I 
ended up with a higher proportion of UNC interviewees, and more UNC questionnaire 
respondents as well, so the interviews and questionnaires are not representative for an 
analysis of association membership.45 But my samples are representative on other axes. 
Service in the Algerian War, whether as a conscript or a remobilized reservist, affected 
the majority of a generation regardless of economic class, and the sample of interviewees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44I received Institutional Review Board approval for oral histories and questionnaires in May 2012.  
 
45Sometimes the categories were confused, however, as several veterans had belonged to both associations 
at some point. One of the veterans interviewed did not join any association, and he was even more an 
outlier because he was an educated reservist from a wealthy pied noir family. I met him through a Parisian 
friend. All other veterans interviewed were encountered through associations. 	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does reflect this broad experience.46 With veterans interviewed in three distinct 
geographic regions in France—the Île-de-France, Brittany, and the Haute-Savoie, as well 
as with most having been employed in agriculture, industry, or trades, and only a small 
minority having access to higher education and employment in white-collar professions, 
this sample is representative of the demographics of France during the Algerian War.47 
The most obvious bias in my sampling method is that almost all veterans encountered 
were members of associations. However, one questionnaire reached me filled out by a 
veteran who had never joined any association, and I was able to interview one such 
veteran as well. Another built-in bias was that I only interviewed veterans who felt 
capable of discussing their experiences with an historian—they numbered among the 
least traumatized members of their cohort, although some bore a great deal of anger or 
sadness.48 But the veterans who agreed to meet with me also felt able to talk with a 
foreigner and a student, and these class and cultural differences might have proven too 
intimidating for some.   
 Oral history is a challenging endeavor, and remains somewhat less legitimate in 
France than in the United States today.49 The collection of oral testimonies from rank and 
file soldiers on their experiences returning from the Algerian War is one of the central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46Bantigny, 15. 	  	  
47Jauffret, 13.  	  
48Mauss-Copeaux, 282.  	  
49In particular, for the topic of the Algerian War, Raphaëlle Branche argues that most of the established 
French scholars of the Algerian War—still a sensitive subject today, for which it is difficult to avoid an 
obvious bias—have shied away from the use of oral history because of its “militant origins.” La guerre 
d’Algérie, 237. 	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contributions of this dissertation.50 But the pitfalls of selective memory, and the 
disynchronicity between the ‘self’ who remembers in the present and the ‘self’ in the past 
being narrated, were nowhere more apparent than during my interviews with UNCAFN 
co-founder François Porteu de la Morandière.51 He was older than the majority of my 
interviewees, and his chronology of events was not always quite accurate. Furthermore, 
as a longtime leader in the veterans’ movement, he had greater possible motivation to 
exaggerate his importance and effectiveness, so his testimony demanded heightened 
scrutiny. Before citing any claims he made, I therefore sought external confirmation in 
primary sources and secondary literature. When I could not find direct documentary 
evidence supporting his claims but felt they were important to discuss nonetheless, I 
clearly indicated so in footnotes, as well as how plausible I judged the claim based on my 
knowledge of the period. These difficulties of memory were not the main concern in the 
majority of my interviews, however.  
 Most of my interviewees were rank-and-file association members—former 
conscripts and reservists who often felt they had not done anything special during the 
war, who thus did not have the same potential motivation to heighten their importance in 
the eyes of an historian. The major challenge I faced interviewing these veterans was to 
frame the discussion in a way that made them feel they even had a story to tell. Many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50Claire Mauss-Copeaux notes that “[in French culture], where the written word is of supreme value, the 
use of oral sources is often looked down upon [...].” Yet she argues that “to deprive history of oral sources 
would be to impoverish it; it would also mean privileging the point of view of those who have command of 
the written word.” Appelés en Algérie, 10. This is particularly true in the case of conscripts of Algeria, the 
overwhelming majority of whom only received education to the level of junior high school. When veterans 
of Algeria began publishing memoirs to express their perspectives on the war to the public, most of them 
were professional soldiers or middle and upper-class conscripts, their task facilitated by adequate education 
and wealth. Ibid., 9.  
   
51Philippe Carrard, The French Who Fought for Hitler: Memories from the Outcasts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 110.	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were prepared to say something about their military service or at least their time in 
training, but they were not accustomed to thinking of the periods before and after their 
mobilization as “historical” as well. This element of surprise—the fact that I was asking 
them to compose a narrative that they had almost certainly never been asked to tell 
before—heightened the authenticity of the reactions I elicited.  
 I began interviews with a set of specific questions on veterans’ memories of 
mobilization and demobilization, their family situation before and after the war, their 
careers, and their sense of veteran identity and reasons for joining associations. However, 
to gain the trust of my interlocutors, once I posed these preliminary questions, I allowed 
them to take the conversation in directions that made them feel comfortable, redirecting 
or doubling back at certain points if I needed more clarification. Many times they ended 
up revealing more useful information than if I had tried to get the same responses with a 
direct approach.   
 Many interviewees showed some sense of “a determination to ‘set the record 
straight,’” whether that was to convey an anticolonial, pro-French Algeria, or 
reconciliatory narrative, and it often seemed like they were hoping to ultimately address a 
French audience rather than an American historian.52 Here, the cultural distance between 
us, and the infantilizing view French people tend to hold toward students, served to my 
benefit—because it led many interviewees to explain “what it was like” in great detail, 
often revealing their own biases or perspectives they would not state directly.53 With the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Evans, The Memory of Resistance, 10, 8. 	  	  
53Martin Evans comments on the “immensely reassuring” factor of his cultural outsider status, and the 
impact of his “relative youthfulness” as he interviewed French activists who had opposed the Algerian 
War. These variables proved an important advantage for me as well. The Memory of Resistance, 8. 	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distance of time and the benefit of higher education, I had a better global understanding 
of the Algerian War itself and the politics of the period than most of these veterans, and I 
drew on this knowledge when necessary to elicit their trust. But learning veterans’ 
perceptions and memories of their return to French society after the war was the real aim 
of my oral history investigation, and I succeeded in this goal.54     
 Aside from institutional, political, and oral history, this dissertation is also a work 
of military history, falling into the “war and society” subfield. On the level of 
associations, it demonstrates veterans’ engagements with “events in civilian society [...] 
during and after the period of the war itself,” highlighting the importance of veterans’ 
activism in the Gaullist period of the Fifth Republic.55 And this work also analyzes the 
“‘effect of service and war on the individual soldier and the veteran’” as well, for social 
questions such as the return to work, and for cultural questions such as veterans’ identity, 
memory, and masculinity.56 Throughout this dissertation, the narrative navigates between 
large scale military, political, and social considerations; the experiences and perceptions 
of individual soldiers; and the responses of associations. 
  
Theory 
 This project relies above all on theoretical invocations of memory. It begins with 
Maurice Halbwachs’ definition of all “memory” as a “collective” body of representations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54Martin Evans notes that while “[of] course all oral testimonies must be viewed as retrospective accounts,” 
these “retrospective reconstructions also involve a recovery of the past which even if it cannot be presented 
as infallible can nonetheless be richly suggestive.” The Memory of Resistance, 14.  
 
55Michael S. Neiberg, “War and Society,” 42-60 in Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpot, eds., Palgrave 
Advances in Modern Military History (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2006), 43. 	  	  	  
56Peter Kartsen, “The ‘New’ American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and 
Unexplored,” American Quarterly 36 no. 3 (1984): 389-418, 389.  
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through which societies define themselves, that links the individual to a larger “affective 
community.”57 But the framework must go beyond Halbwachs’ conception. From its 
origins in the 1958 moment, the Algerian War veterans’ movement sought to build a 
narrative of the war and of veterans’ experiences that conveyed universals about the 
French nation, and the duties and rights of citizenship. However, no such universal 
narrative could be developed, polemicized as the war was by this time—debated on the 
home front and in the United Nations.  
 Thus, even before the ambiguous “partial defeat” of 1962, the veterans’ 
movement fragmented into competing “memory communities,” by which I mean rival 
sub-groups in society that demarcate themselves through conflicting interpretations of a 
shared experience.58 These memory communities represented themselves and their 
narratives of the war through artifacts of “cultural memory” including street names and 
plaques, mourning rituals, and even the opposing legislative texts they proposed for 
veterans’ recognition.59 The stakes of these “competing memories in the public realm” 
could be quite high: the UNCAFN offered a narrative of veterans who had done their 
duty and deserved political respect to argue for symbolic recognition and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Maurice Halbwachs, La mémoire collective (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950), 12.   
 
58John Horne establishes a typology of different memories of military defeat, describing “partial defeat” as 
occurring when “a state suffers a military and diplomatic setback without being threatened in its territorial 
or political integrity.” He notes that, as was the case for France’s defeat in Algeria, partial defeat “acts as a 
catalyst for the modification of domestic or foreign policy and of broader cultural horizons.” However, 
nationalist veterans who had supported French Algeria to the end bore a memory akin to that of “internal 
defeat” in a civil war, leaving them “[frozen...] in an eternal re-enactment designed to reverse the fatal 
moment.” John Horne, “Defeat and Memory in Modern History,” 11-29 in ed. Jenny MacLeod, Defeat and 
Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 16, 14, 15.  	  
59Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, “Collective memory and cultural identity,” New German Critique 65 
(Spring/Summer 1995): 125-133, 128.	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authority, while the FNACA deployed a narrative of veterans who served in the war 
against their wills to demand material compensation.60  
  One of the central design decisions behind this project was to investigate the 
memory of the veterans’ movement as it developed, rather than solely describing its 
appearance through the distance of decades.61 This methodological emphasis is especially 
warrented given that political stances on Algeria changed dramatically through the course 
of the war, while both competing associations from their very origins cultivated distinct 
and mutually exclusive narratives explaining the Algerian War and its impact on soldiers. 
 The low level of education and political culture which the overwhelming majority 
of conscripts brought to their military service gave an outsized impact to the narratives 
transmitted by veterans’ associations. And these rival memory communities became more 
stable and self-referential over time, which is why, for instance, the antiwar FNACA 
began small-scale commemorations of the cease-fire in 1963, but by the early 1970s, the 
association defined itself in large part through its observance of “March 19,” a victory for 
peace. Through the same period, the UNCAFN increasingly came to define itself through 
fierce resistance to commemorating “March 19,” a ritual that implied that the end of the 
war had been a victory for France. This dissertation thus investigates not France’s 
collective memory of the Algerian War, but the refraction of memory between competing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60Konrad H. Jarausch, “Living With Broken Memories: Some Narratological Comments,” 150-199 in ed. 
Christoph Klessmann, The Divided Past: Reuniting Post-War Germany (Oxford: Berg, 2011), 172. 
 
61As Pieter Lagrou notes in his comparative history of the collective memory of World War II in France 
and Holland, “Awareness of and explicit research into representations of a historical event immediately 
afterwards generally help the historian to avoid the bias implicit in many of his or her sources, and to avoid 
the pitfalls of partisan accounts or carefully constructed self-serving narratives that might otherwise impose 
themselves as ready-made interpretations.” Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National 
Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 2.    
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“memory communities” that could barely communicate with each other, so violently 
opposed were their frames of reference.  
 The troubled memory of the Algerian War in France has long nourished 
discussions of “memory wars,” a politicized “competition of memories.”62 In retrospect, 
this process may appear yet another example of recurrent “franco-French” conflicts 
dating to the Revolution.63 Yet it is important to remember that the debate over the 
Algerian War could not be neatly reduced to an “assault” between “two Frances,” such as 
the political “antagonism” between the right and the left.64 This is because the political 
sands shifted greatly through the course of the war; in 1956, even the Socialist and 
Communist parties supported the defense of national territory in Algeria, while by 1961, 
only far right groups sought to preserve a colony that had once been a matter of national 
consensus. The irrelevance of traditional labels to define political stances on the war 
suggests “that it was an entire system of values that had broken” during France’s war 
effort, and this crisis of French values heightened the stakes of memorial debates after the 
war ended.65   
 
Chapter Summaries and Argument 
 This dissertation thus combines cultural, social, political, military, and 
institutional perspectives to offer a history of the Algerian War veterans’ movement in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62Benjamin Stora, “Préface,” 7-13 in dir. Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson, Les guerres de 
mémoires: La France et son histoire: Enjeux politiques, controverses historiques, stratégies médiatiques 
(Paris: Découverte, 2010), 10.	  	  	  
63Robert Frank, “Les troubles de la mémoire française,” 601-607 in dir. Rioux, 607.   
 
64Jean-Pierre Rioux, “La flamme et les bûchers,” 497-508 in dir. Rioux, 500.  	  
65Paul Thibaud, “Génération algérienne?”, 608-616 in dir. Rioux, 614.	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France. The first half of the manuscript examines the components that went into the 
movement. Chapter 1 offers a generational history of French veterans of Algeria, from 
their childhood and education, to their deployment, to their postwar integration into 
France, drawing heavily on oral histories and questionnaires. Chapter 2 examines the 
wartime competition of the UNCAFN and the FNACA to elevate the Algerian generation 
as worthy of political power, as well as these associations’ memorial politics after the 
war’s end. Chapter 3 compares the political trajectories of two founding members of the 
Algerian War veterans’ movement, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and François Porteu 
de la Morandière, to highlight the formative impact they brought to their associations.  
 The second half of this dissertation examines how the veterans’ movement 
functioned, and with what effects. Chapter 4 provides an institutional history of the 
FNACA and the UNCAFN, comparing their mobilizing ideologies and the mutually 
exclusive legacies they drew from the World War I veterans’ movement. Chapter 5 
examines the political engagements of both associations during the war itself, and 
Chapter 6 offers a thorough analysis of the movement’s fight for official state recognition 
during and after the war. Through this study of the Algerian generation and the 
associations that spoke on its behalf, my dissertation demonstrates that years before the 
state that had asked them to serve deigned to recognize them, veterans of Algeria actively  
engaged in political action as veterans, both to promote their group interests, and to 
reshape French society based on lessons they brought from the war.
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CHAPTER 1: “THE GENERATION OF THE DJEBEL”: AN EXPERIENTIAL 
HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTS IN ALGERIA AND THEIR RETURN.66 
  
 
 The Algerian War took place at the crossroads of great political, social, and 
economic changes in France, and this crucible would form a generation. In 1954, as the 
French government scrambled to respond to the opening salvos of what seemed like a 
local rebellion in a distant territory, the notion of ‘youth’ as a separate demographic was 
just beginning to emerge.67 National military service was widely accepted in France as a 
rite of passage into adulthood for young men, and a duty of Republican citizenship.68  
 The Algerian War was the last time that France would send citizen-soldiers into a 
conflict—they were the last native inheritors of the levée en masse, and the last unified 
combat generation. Between 1955 and 1962, 80% of French twenty-year olds served in 
Algeria; this was a generationally-defining event for French men.69 But the young 
citizens sent to fulfill their national military service in Algeria participated in a war 
whose necessity was not universally self-evident—unlike the World Wars, in which their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66Xavier Grall, La génération du djebel (Paris: Cerf, 1962), an essay based on surveys conducted by La Vie 
Catholique illustrée, was one of the earliest publications by a French veteran that attempted to explain what 
the Algerian War had done to veterans. Grall, also a poet and Breton nationalist, argued that the 
“generation of the djebel [...] has suffered at a time in life made for laughing,” but that it would eventually 
accede to political power in France, moving beyond bitter political divisions engendered by the war to 
create a more just and inclusive country. 125.   
  
67Ludivine Bantigny, Le plus bel âge: jeunes et jeunesses en France de l’aube des Trente Glorieuses à la 
guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 383.  
 
68Ibid., 279; Martin Evans, The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954-
1962) (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 225-6. 
 
69Bantigny, 17.  
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fathers and grandfathers had served. Service in the Algerian War was the foundational 
coming of age initiation for over one million young Frenchmen, but, upon returning 
home, they discovered that their rite of passage was not valued in society as French 
patriotic tradition had led them to expect. 
 The Algerian War and its aftermath coincided with a period of post-World War II 
economic transformation in France commonly referred to as les trente glorieuses, or the 
“glorious thirty years.”70 Historical narratives of this period tend to follow either internal 
developments, such as the modernization of agriculture, industry, and culture, or 
international affairs—in particular President Charles de Gaulle’s attempts to reassert 
France’s great power status. Yet the active male population that experienced these rapid 
transformations also served in the war that facilitated them. In a way, this generation 
would be a “sacrificed” in pursuit of Charles de Gaulle’s plans for France.71 
Rediscovering the “greatness” that Charles de Gaulle saw in the country—elevating her 
role on the world stage—eventually required that France relinquish Algeria. In the very 
period when France was preparing to enter capitalist modernity—an entrance delayed by 
two World Wars—its young men were discovering colonial contradictions in a foreign 
corner of the world they had been taught was French.72 
 French memory and history have obscured this generation of Frenchmen by 
focusing on more storied generations—those who experienced World War II as adults, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Jean Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 1979). 
 
71Martin S. Alexander, “The War Without a Name,’ the French Army and the Algerians: Recovering 
Experiences, Images, and Testimonies,” 1-39 in eds. Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger, 
The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-1964: Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave, 2002), 16. 
 
72Henri Mendras with Alisair Cole, Social Change in Modern France: Toward an Anthropology of the Fifth 
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.  
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and those who lived the days of May 1968 as young people. Examining the trajectory of 
the generation of French men who served in Algeria in their youth helps us understand 
why the memory of the Algerian War has been so difficult for French society to 
assimilate. This chapter addresses two key questions: What was the specificity of the 
“Algerian experience,” and how did the “impossible collective memory” of Algeria affect 
the generation of French citizens who served there?73 After discussing the social world 
that produced this generation, we will examine the nature of conscription and combat in 
the Algerian War, before analyzing veterans’ return experiences to the circles of family, 
the city, and work. Then we will evoke how veterans “brought the war home” to diverse 
kinds of political struggles, before examining the impact of the war on veterans’ 
masculinity, relationships with family, their identity as veterans, and their participation in 
veterans’ associations.  
 Because of the nature of national military service in France, the draftees who 
served in Algeria formed a generationally distinct contingent.74 The great majority was 
born between 1932 and 1942. They belonged to the “shallow cohort” [classes creuses] 
resulting from low birthrates after World War I, after much of a generation of young men 
perished.75 They had lived through World War II as children or teenagers. In its infancy, 
thus, this generation was exposed to diverse traumas: the exodus of refugees from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Découverte, 1989), 
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74Ludivine Bantigny distinguishes a “generation” from a “demographic cohort” thus: “history is required, 
principally an event, and more so a receptivity to this event," and continues, "If several generations live the 
same historical events concurrently, the ‘young’ generation is confronted with an essential stage in its 
formation, often as a first experience. The perception, the appreciation of the importance of the event and 
its interpretation are not therefore the same as those of other witnesses.” 15.  
 
75Ibid., 24.  
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combat zone, the German occupation, the genocide of French Jews, the specter of 
bombardments, the deportation of forced laborers, clandestine action of Resistance 
groups and summary retribution from the Nazis, and finally the combats for the 
Liberation and the purges in the Resistance.  
 Later observers in the 1950s postulated a crisis of authority, resulting from 
children who had watched their parents resist the state in various ways during the war, 
deal in the black market, or collaborate with the Nazis.76 At an early age, these children 
had been exposed to the perfidy of military and political authorities, and the arbitrariness 
of suffering and death.77 Most of the nine hundred thousand or so French POWs in 
German captivity were fathers and heads of the family, and their absence had disrupted 
family dynamics as well as paternal authority.78 Food rationing continued until 1949, and 
children had been the most affected by malnourishment during the war, many suffering 
from restricted growth.79   
 The privations of a childhood in World War II—and the premature education in 
anxiety and uncertainty it offered—meant that this generation was very different from the 
post-war ‘baby boom’ generation that followed, born into a world of peace and relative 
plenty.80 Numerous surveys of “the youth” performed in France after World War II 
indicate that this generation had much the same values as its elders, cherishing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76Bantigny, 37.  
 
77One veteran of Algeria, who experienced the war as a young teenager in occupied Paris, watched his 
twenty-year old cousin die in his front yard from an errant American bomb. She and her mother had been 
appreciating the beauty of the tracers of anti-aircraft munitions, which “‘looked like fireworks.’” Interview 
RO17, Sèvres, 15 February 2014.  
 
78Bantigny, 36.  
 
79Ibid., 35.  
 
80Ibid., 20.  
 
	   30 
security of family and work, and not seeking to disrupt the status quo, which 
distinguishes it from the generation of “sixty-eighters.”81 But the Algerian generation was 
destined to live through great disruption. Even after the end of World War II in Europe, 
these youths faced the new reality of living in the atomic age, and the constant specter of 
conflict in a demarcated world. 
 In 1954, the year the Algerian revolution broke out, France still faced material 
difficulties in the long recovery from World War II. About half of all young married 
couples still lived with their parents, following tradition and also obliged by the severe 
housing shortage caused by bombing raids and artillery.82 Childhood or adolescence 
during the Second World War generally entailed a truncated or disrupted education, but 
there were also problems in national education after 1945. At the start of every school 
year, schools turned down large numbers of students, lacking the material resources and 
teachers to welcome all applicants.83 At the beginning of the Algerian War, education 
was only required until the age of fourteen, hopefully leading to a “diploma of primary 
studies” [certificat d’études primaires or CEP], but a Ministry of Education reform in 
1959 extended obligatory schooling to sixteen years, which would be too late for the 
young men conscripted from 1956 onward.  
 Regardless of the specific requirements, access to schooling was very uneven for 
this generation, and foremost determined by economic class and whether the family could 
afford for its children to continue school rather than beginning work as soon as 
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possible.84 For instance, as of 1962, farmers and farm workers composed about twenty 
percent of the French population, while only about eleven percent of their children had 
the level of a junior high school education. Yet the classes of middle managers and those 
in the liberal professions, making up only 11.5% of the population, represented 33% of 
children attaining the same level of education. Workers, who made up fifty percent of 
France’s population, represented only 29% of those to make it this far in school.85 
Similarly, high school was “reserved for the social elite.”86 Even in 1960, only eleven 
percent of the age cohort received the vaunted baccalaréat, signaling completion of high 
school.87  
 Following from the restricted access to high school, university was generally only 
conceivable for those from a certain class background. University students numbered 
only 180,000 in 1957 and 215,000 in 1960.88 Deferments were available to university 
students until the age of twenty-five, with a requirement of good grades, and a possible 
addition of an extra two years for certain fields of study.89 Thus, most of the military-
aged men who were able to avoid or delay service in the Algerian War came from 
positions of relative ease. Public debate centered on the social privilege inherent to 
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student deferments in 1959, when the government briefly considered reforming the 
system.90  
 Primary education presented an unduly positive image of the situation in the 
colonies, and of a “prosperous Algeria born of French generosity.”91 Schoolbooks 
mentioned nothing of French violence inflicted during the conquest of Algeria—the 
villages burnt, the razzias, the livestock and harvests destroyed. In describing the current 
state of Algeria, some schoolbooks did evoke the poverty of the native population, which 
French administration would eventually alleviate, given enough time. But the narrative 
always centered on “exalting the French mission” offering Algerians “‘peace, order, 
security, justice, education, health and medical care.’”92 France’s overseas “crown jewel” 
was thus portrayed with little nuance—without mentioning settlers’ success in 
expropriating the best land for themselves, creating segregated and inferior schools for 
Algerian children after destroying indigenous schools, and denying Algerians basic 
political rights.93 Finally, young conscripts’ education about the Army itself was very 
minimal—textbooks often only mentioned the role of the Army in protecting national 
territory, or explained the differences between ranks.94 But the Army tasked itself with 
continuing the education of these youths, as will be discussed below.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90Bantigny, 304-305.  
 
91Ibid., 231.  
 
92Ibid., 233. 
  
93David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 64.  
 
94Bantigny, 234.  
 
	   33 
  Most young men who would be drafted to serve in Algeria were already part of 
the world of work at the time of their call. The conscripts fully reflected the 
demographics of France, which, in this period, was primarily composed of agricultural 
and industrial workers.95 In 1959, the average age of beginning work was fifteen years 
and six months for single-child families, but fell to thirteen years and seven months for 
families of five children or more.96 Regions that were either predominantly rural or 
industrial—especially Brittany, Normandy, and the Nord—saw youths beginning work 
the soonest.97  
 Growing up in World War II and its aftermath incontestably forms part of the 
specificity of this generation.98 Events had obliged these young men to take on adult 
responsibilities early, and living under the Occupation had imprinted many of them with 
a lasting sense of humiliation.99 This led to a particular eagerness among some young 
men to serve when their country called them; they left with the patriotic combats of 
“1914-1918 in mind,” feeling that Algeria would be their war, perhaps their way to 
avenge the Fall of France in 1940 and the defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.100 Yet later 
classes of conscripts, who had been able to observe the progression of the war, were often 
“anguished,” fearing what they were being sent into, especially if young men from their 
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village had already died “down there.”101 Overall, the cultural formation, myths, and 
expectations that conscripts brought with them ensured that the great majority was 
woefully unprepared for the conflict ravaging Algeria.  
 Since Algeria was never declared a war, the first and second reserves were never 
called up, which made this a young man’s war in a way that the Second World War had 
not been for France. Conscription into national military service was a broadly accepted 
rite of passage into manhood.102 The gradually expanding nature of French troop 
deployment in North Africa, as well as the government’s attempts to suppress what it 
minimized as a ‘rebellion,’ meant that the conscripts in Algeria were consistently 
underprepared and underequipped, and that more was constantly asked of them. The law 
of November 30, 1950 had set active service to a period of eighteen months, followed by 
three years of readiness, then seventeen years in the first reserve and seven and a half 
years in the second reserve.103 However, as the war escalated and the military manpower 
shortage occasioned by the “shallow cohort” became more severe, tours of duty were 
progressively increased from 18 months to 27 months, and finally to 30 months.104 Until 
the dates began to be published in 1960, conscripts often did not know the precise day of 
their “liberation.”105  
 National military service represented the last stage of adolescence for French 
males. Many soldiers were minors at the time of conscription and could not vote, since 	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the age of majority was twenty-one. Indeed, the oldest conscripts were young newlyweds, 
and most still lived at home with their parents.106 The Army “presented itself as a second 
family” because “the young conscripts were viewed as adolescents.”107 For many young 
men, military training offered their first opportunity to escape from “countryside 
isolation,” and discover their fellow countrymen.108 Especially in rural parts of France, 
the rituals of conscription integrated into village tradition, presenting a true rite of 
passage in the anthropological sense.109 
 Until 1954, young men had to pass through a review council [conseil de révision], 
the goal of which was to be deemed “good for service,” which candidates and their 
families also took to mean “good for the girls.”110 The review council consisted of the 
prefect or his delegate, as well as an officer representing the recruiting office, and 
sometimes also the sub-prefect, mayor or town council members; its deliberations were 
public.111 Candidates for conscription had to present themselves before this grave 
assembly stripped down to their underwear or naked.112 In 1954, the review councils, 
judged as too archaic and humiliating, were abandoned in favor of more moden 
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“selection centers,” although the process of passing through the “conseils de révision” 
was so culturally ingrained that the use of that phrase continued.  
 In the selection centers, candidates received a more detailed medical examination, 
as well as tests on the ability to manipulate symbols, such as Morse code and figures.113 
Candidates were judged “fit to serve,” “fit for auxiliary service,” “adjourned,” or 
“exempted.”114 But the maw of the Algerian War would prove hungry for men from this 
“shallow cohort.” In 1953, a year before the rebellion broke out, fifty-three percent of 
candidates had been accepted by the selection centers, whereas between 1954 and 1965, 
the acceptance rate was at eighty-five percent; exemptions became much more difficult to 
obtain during the war that was not a war. Doctors eventually even turned a blind eye to 
obvious cases of tuberculosis.115    
 Although the massive mobilization of French troops began in October 1956 
following the vote of “special powers” for the government, ten infantry battalions of 
conscripts had already been deployed in Algeria as early as December 1954, a month 
after the initial attacks on All Saints’ Day.116 With the “special powers” vote in 1956, all 
conscripts were required to be stationed in French North Africa as soon as possible, and 
before they had reached fourteen months of service.117 They joined recalled reservists 
[rappelés], who had been mobilized beginning in August 1955.118 The necessity to 
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mobilize large numbers of troops for pacification and counter-guerilla actions sometimes 
led to a “certain improvisation.”119 Thus, some conscripts were “directly incorporated,” 
meaning that they were sent to Algeria and received their military training there, and 
some recalled reservists were deployed in branches for which they had not been trained—
for instance, proud Air Force or cavalry officers, or technicians trained in 
radiotransmission, hastily redeployed as foot soldiers: “We were all grunts.”120 
 The improvisation required by the undeclared war in Algeria and changing war 
aims caused a certain ambivalence in soldiers’ motivation. It may be most accurate to 
class conscripts’ and reservists’ participation in the war under “contingent consent,” 
which describes citizens’ compliance with state demands “only if [they perceive the] 
government as trustworthy and [they are] satisfied other citizens are also” subject to the 
same demands.121 Globally, young Frenchmen did not show enthusiasm to serve in the 
war, but “accepted” their fate, acculturated as they were by a “long tradition” portraying 
military service as a duty of citizenship, and knowing it was a trial specific to their age 
group.122 Sometimes they enlisted themselves—to be able to start their adult lives with 
their sweethearts as soon as possible, for instance—or to indulge a sense of adventure and 
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see the French Empire after getting “bitten by the travel bug.”123 Some students even 
broke their military deferments out of feelings of patriotism.124  
 The great majority of soldiers did not resist the call, but this was not primarily due 
to an ideological commitment to preserving French Algeria.125 Most soldiers fought out 
of a “tacit patriotism” acquired through Republican schooling—although they were not 
politicized, they more or less adhered to a “latent ideology” that the state that sent them 
to fight was just, and therefore so must be its war aims.126 Against broad cultural 
consensus on national military service as a duty of citizenship, even conscientious 
objection seemed heretical to many, and indeed, there were no legal provisions to request 
this status until after the war’s end.127 Because this was a citizen army, discipline relied 
“above all on an intellectual adhesion following from civic spirit,” and thus morale could 
be damaged by soldiers’ sense of being abandoned or ignored by the homefront, which 
explains why civic associations supporting the Algerian War considered propaganda a 
priority.128 
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 What resistance soldiers did level at the war unfolded in four phases, not all of it 
marked by ideological or political critique. In 1955-56, recalled reservists protested their 
imminent departure from numerous cities including Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Perpignan, 
Nantes, and Brest.129 Some politicized reservists made their ideological dissent known, 
but most had no critique of a war of decolonization, and only resented being hastily 
remobilized after they had completed their military service and begun their adult lives.130 
Between 1957 and 1958, soldiers and some officers publicly revealed and opposed the 
systematic use of torture. And in 1960, a movement backed by prominent intellectuals in 
favor of desertion garnered national attention.  
 Finally, during the short-lived “generals’ putsch” of April 1961, the great majority 
of conscripts refused to obey the orders of the generals revolting in Algiers. This 
resistance revealed their distaste for blind obedience to the military hierarchy, and, likely, 
their hope that under the reins of Charles de Gaulle rather than fierce partisans of French 
Algeria, France would end the war sooner rather than later.131 At this point, independence 
seemed a foregone conclusion; the end of the war was in sight. The putsch was “planned 
and executed almost entirely in disdain for the civilian milieu,” and thus attracted 
professional soldiers and Legionnaires who identified with the Army, rather than citizen-
soldiers serving time in it.132 Even though General Challe addressed conscripts directly 
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months, conscripts rallied behind de Gaulle, whom they considered “the head of the 
Republic to save,” rather than a military figure.133 One former conscript interviewed 
expressed hostility toward “the generals, who almost led us to catastrophe.”134   
 The putsch revealed the important distinction between career soldiers, who were 
more invested in the Army and its mission, as opposed to conscripts and reservists, who 
were only temporarily passing through its tutelage. This divide proved a “chronic defect” 
of the French forces in Algeria throughout the war: the professionals and the citizen 
soldiers did not have a shared military culture and were not used to fighting together.135 
Many of the professionals had fought in World War II and Indochina, and some were 
former Resistance members and concentration camp inmates.136 Some of the earliest 
professional soldiers and Legionnaires to be deployed in Algeria at the outbreak of the 
revolution had only made a very brief stopover in France on their way back from 
Indochina, since the war there had just ended in May 1954.137  
 Many of these career soldiers perceived the Algerian rebellion as another front in 
the combat against global Communism. They subscribed to the French theory of 
“revolutionary warfare,” which was a perspective that conflated the tactics of a 
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nationalist revolution with Communist ideology, and called for a politicization of the war 
effort in response, using psychological operations on civilians based on Maoist tactics.138 
But the conscripts did not share this politicized, anti-Communist worldview, having had 
neither the political background nor the combat experience to develop it. They forged a 
separate culture from previous wartime generations based on their “distinctive language, 
attitudes and feelings,” and their shared dilemma of being asked by the nation to serve in 
a war of which most had only a rudimentary understanding.139 Moreover, because new 
cohorts of conscripts were called up every two months, conscript culture evolved and was 
transmitted very quickly.140 
 The cultural and experiential divide between the professional soldiers and 
conscripts meant that the French Army was not united in a common ideal, unlike their 
adversaries in the Algerian National Liberation Army [Armée de libération nationale, 
ALN]. The great majority of French officers did not take the nationalist ideology of the 
Algerian independence movement seriously; their anti-Communism and “revolutionary 
war” perspective led them to believe that Algerian nationalists “were either agents of 
Communism or dupes.”141 Among reservists and conscripts, only a minority of true 
believers fought to keep Algeria French. Most served out of a sense of duty, resignation, 
or perhaps adventure at most. Many were just serving time, illustrated by the persistent 
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conscript fetish of the “quille,” a bowling pin that symbolized the glorious day of 
demobilization. 
 The Army, ever cognizant of the need to study and improve morale, performed 
numerous psychological surveys that revealed conscripts’ general attitudes toward the 
Army and officers. Even after six months of military training, conscripts still tended to 
regard the Army with “incomprehension” of what seemed like a foreign world.142 
Surveys also found that conscripts were inclined to respect uniforms more than the 
character of those wearing the uniforms—although they reserved their most “pejorative” 
criticisms for the battle-hardened veterans of Indochina.143 When conscripts did seek 
promotion to become officers, a sense of duty and honor generally came after material 
considerations, the search for social mobility, and the quest to distinguish oneself from 
the mass of rank and file troops.144 Sometimes superiors encouraged soldiers whom they 
identified as particularly intelligent to attend reserve officer training school.145 An oral 
history and survey investigation undertaken by Jean-Charles Jauffret reveals that relations 
between soldiers and officers were largely satisfying, although this varied greatly 
between different sectors: there were some notorious absentee officers, while others 
“gave themselves utterly to their tasks.”146  
 Relations with junior officers, such as corporals and sergeants, were more 
ambiguous, as they could conflict with the social divisions of the civilian world. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142Bantigny, Le plus bel âge?, 312. 
 
143Ibid., 314. 
  
144Idem. 
 
145Interview EO09, St-Anne-d’Auray, 6 March 2014. 
  
146Jauffret, Soldats en Algérie, 257, 255. 
  
	   43 
instance, sometimes these junior officers were younger and less well educated than the 
troops they commanded, who might have a high school diploma or even a university 
degree. On the ground in Algeria, some conscripts resented being led by native North 
African commanders.147 In the hopes of instilling “feelings of equality and trust between 
conscripts of different origins,” the Army promoted an official discourse of “mixture” in 
Algeria, which conflicted in practice with the maintenance of segregated dormitories and 
mess halls for Muslims of North African origin.148 But European conscripts could find 
themselves commanding units that were predominantly North African, and sometimes 
this increased their attachment to the cause of French Algeria.149 Along with the 20,000 
or so Algerian Muslims in the professional Army, and around 58,000 auxiliary forces 
(generally grouped under the term harkis), about 100,000 conscripts of North African 
origin served through the course of the war. The conscription law of 1912 concerned all 
male French citizens, although only a tiny minority of native Algerians could access 
French citizenship.150   
 Beside ethnic origins, geography played a key role in soldiers’ outlook and 
experience. Conflicts could arise between units of Metropolitan conscripts and their pied 
noir commanders.151 Metropolitan conscripts generally hoped to end the war as soon as 
possible, while conscripts from North Africa were fighting to preserve French 	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sovereignty in their settler colony.152 This is the major reason that so many recently 
demobilized pied noir veterans would join the terrorist OAS militia upon their return 
home to Algeria.153  
 Besides the conscript versus career military distinction and the question of 
origins, the most important lines dividing the French Army in Algeria were social and 
intellectual. Among conscripts and reservists, those who had benefitted from education—
“students, school teachers, seminarians, members of youth movements, politically active 
or unionized youth”—formed their own world.154 They brought political opinions and 
organizing experience, knowledge of history and international events, and moral 
conviction to a largely ignorant cohort of young conscripts, some of whom were illiterate, 
and most of whom had “no political culture,” as one former conscript confessed.155 
Indeed, military commanders observed that conscripts “for the most part were scarcely 
interested in current political questions, except for the repercussions that they could have 
on the duration of service.”156 In an era when most military-aged men were workers or 
farmers with, at best, a junior high school education, those few reservists and conscripts 
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who were educated or politicized could sometimes command “a higher authority than that 
of noncommissioned officers.”157  
 Continuing a long Republican tradition, the Army considered the civic education 
of its young charges a primordial mission. This task involved about 30 hours of 
instruction: seven hours of civic lessons, four and a half of moral education, eight hours 
of education on Algeria, and nine on the action of the Army in Algeria.158 The education 
was systematized, yet presented in the simplest and most unambiguous ways possible, 
given the uneven schooling of this cohort.159 Beyond exotic images of the Casbah from 
films, most conscripts knew only that Algeria consisted of three French departments, as 
they had learned in school.160 Indeed, some of the pamphlets destined for conscripts 
almost resembled schoolbooks in register and content, addressing soldiers in the informal 
“tu” and attempting to connect on a personal level: “Yesterday...it was July 5, 1830: the 
soldier DuPont [the French everyman’s name, like Smith], maybe one of your great-
grandparents, entered the Casbah. [...] Turning this page, you will travel through more 
than a century of French history and all of a sudden you will understand: [...] that Algiers 
and Algeria are a French creation and you have the right to be proud.”161    
 The earliest educational materials were created for recalled reservists: as one 
pamphlet put it, since they were “torn away from their work and families and [...] often in 	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a difficult material situation,” it was urgent to explain to reservists “why they are fighting 
[...] and tell them all the threats facing Algeria, and, consequently, France and the 
Western powers.”162 Army propaganda developed by the Cold Warriors in the military 
hierarchy sought to deflect responsibility from France for the Algerian rebellion and 
blame instead pan-Arabism and Marxism, citing “above all external factors that tend to 
separate Algeria from France: the call of Islam and the Orient on one hand, anti-
colonialist propaganda on the other hand.”163 Government propaganda presented reasons 
to be cautiously optimistic about the challenges facing French sovereignty in Algeria, 
noting the state’s “economic efforts, social reforms, and administrative reorganization” 
which “should assure the evolution of the French Muslims of Algeria,” thus denying the 
FLN its pretext for revolution.164 This systematized but cursory education was intended 
to “sensitize the recruits in their role as defenders of the Nation,” but it often frustrated 
instructors, who would have liked more time to spend on military training.165  
 The conscripts also received targeted psychological action, viewed as essential by 
anti-Communist Army officers who had fought in Indochina.166 Army brochures 
designed for instructors explained that in this new kind of combat being waged, “action 
on the morale of the troops, as well as that on the civilian populations, is 
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preponderant.”167 This psychological action centered on presenting the Army as a family 
with a division of roles, to replace the family that conscripts had just left, as well as 
developing military camaraderie.168 These attitudes could lead commanders to act in a 
“rather paternalistic” way toward their young charges.169 Conscripts were invited into a 
“patriotic genealogy,” which tied them to their ancestors who had also defended the 
fatherland.170 Army instructors attempted to instill a culture of heroism through stories 
and historic visits, addressing “these youths in particular, whose fathers and brothers had 
been or could have been Resistance heroes.”171 Axiomatic in this psychological action 
was the notion that “‘France has always had the best soldiers in the world,’” and that 
these conscripts were but one link in the chain extending all the way back, in the words of 
some instructors, to the First Empire.172  
 Psychological action also emphasized the responsibility soldiers bore for winning 
over the homefront: “when you return home, people will ask you questions. [...] You can 
tell them that FRANCO-MUSLIM Community is not a vain word. You can tell them that 
if Algeria needs the Metropole, the Metropole also needs Algeria.”173 From 1958 onward, 
civic education as well as psychological action emphasized the contributions and loyalty 
of veterans of North African origin who had served France in the World Wars, which was 	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intended to generate sympathy for the cause of French Algeria, as well as develop hatred 
for the FLN and its brutal treatment of fellow Muslim Algerians.174 Until 1961, when the 
French government openly pursued negotiation, “military instruction attempted to 
persuade the conscripts that France was going to save Algeria and that all advantages 
were on its side to win.”175 
 Not the least because of such changes in political currents, conscripts’ experience 
in Algeria was extremely diverse, based on the time, location, and branch of service.176 
Nothing could fully prepare them for the kind of war they were destined to serve in, 
“neither the history of other wars, nor lessons on the colonial empire, nor even the 
military instruction received in the bases of Germany or the Metropole.”177 Combat 
primarily occurred in the Atles and Aurès mountains and in the plains, as a geometric 
operation known as “quartering” [quadrillage] sought to isolate highly mobile ALN 
detachments from their supply lines. But in these regions as well, soldiers were tasked 
with winning the “hearts and minds” of the Algerians, and proving that France was there 
to stay—running medical clinics and schools, for instance, or protecting farmers’ fields 
from terrorism.178 Duties of “pacification” also included “regrouping” entire villages into 
camps surrounded by barbed wire so that they could not supply or host the ALN; over 	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two million Algerian farmers would be displaced in this manner.179 Operations in the 
cities were generally along the lines of policing, counterterrorism, and guard work.  
 As for the timeline of operations, the Algerian War is generally divided into four 
temporal phases; “even [France’s] consciousness of being in a war only installed itself 
progressively.”180 In 1955-6, reservists and conscripts, alongside police forces, primarily 
participated in “hunting rebels.”181 In 1957-8, the FLN brought the war to the city of 
Algiers with terrorism, and French troops responded with police operations; this was the 
era of revelations of widespread systematic torture. In 1959-60, as the new Fifth Republic 
sought a position of military dominance from which to pursue eventual negotiations, the 
Challe Plan proceeded to “steamroll” ALN companies and cut off materiel lines with 
electrified fences on the borders with Morocco and Tunisia.182 And lastly, in 1961-62, 
French troops were paving the way for the government’s chosen policy of Algerian “self-
determination,” and they were equally vulnerable to attacks from the anti-independence 
OAS as from the FLN.183  
 The geographic and temporal diversity of different phases in the war meant that 
no two soldiers, except those deployed in the same sector at the same time, fought the 	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“same” Algerian War, and this was a strong factor behind the personalization of the war’s 
memory. Because of the great diversity among war experiences as the conflict 
progressed, perhaps it is appropriate to speak of “generational sub-groups.”184 Conscripts 
mobilized in 1961 or 1962 had had years to observe the evolution of the war and the 
declining support of the homefront, while those mobilized in 1956 or 1958 often had few 
political opinions to frame their service.  
 The idea of combat was well engrained in French mentalities at this point in the 
twentieth century, but conscripts had to be introduced to an entirely new kind of combat. 
Republican schooling had not prepared them for the “singular” nature of the counter-
guerilla war in Algeria; this combat “had nothing to do with a classic military campaign, 
with its well-identified belligerents, its circumscribed battlefields, its established 
tactics.”185 The majority of combat consisted of ambushes and skirmishes, with bored or 
anxious soldiers sometimes initiating “monkey business” themselves to “show that we 
were there.”186  
 Conscripts often experienced their “baptism of fire” with an ambush and the 
desire for revenge that came afterward; as one former conscript explained, “you become a 
true soldier after the death of a buddy. After that, you harden.”187 Along with learning to 
handle firearms and artillery in their military instruction, conscripts also studied counter-
guerilla combat: how to kill with knives, with their bare hands, and by strangling with a 	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cord.188 Indeed, much of the combat was close-range, as opposed to the trench warfare of 
World War I and the massive frontal assaults of World War II.189 However, involvement 
in regular combat proved to be extremely uneven; under “10 percent of French forces did 
much fighting,” with most troops either involved in police actions in cities, escorting 
convoys, or performing “static duties” such as guarding isolated villages or 
infrastructure.190 At any time, however, they could fall prey to terrorism and ambushes, 
and the sense of constant insecurity wore on many soldiers.191  
 Despite the uneven exposure of conscripts to combat itself, the Algerian 
generation as a whole experienced the power imbalances and contradictions inherent in 
settler colonialism. The Army encouraged soldiers to establish as much contact as 
possible with the civilians inhabiting the villages and towns where they were stationed, 
all while instilling suspicion of all “Muslims” in general, since terrorized or attentiste 
civilians often supported France by day and the FLN by night.192 The extreme poverty of 
the mass of Algerians, juxtaposed with their often deep generosity toward French 
soldiers, “moved and scandalized most conscripts,” and put France’s “civilizing mission” 
into question.193 And French conscripts, many coming from a peasant background 
themselves, might feel they had more in common with Algerian farmworkers than with 	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the colonists who owned the land, or might refuse an officer’s orders to slaughter a 
village’s livestock, knowing how devastating that would be.194 Such power disparities led 
some conscripts to question the axiom that “Algeria was France,” after spending time in 
country—and sometimes, the doubt came as soon as they arrived in the port of Algiers or 
Oran.195 Through the course of their deployment, numerous conscripts would develop the 
nauseating suspicion that their role more closely resembled that of Nazi occupiers than of 
the heroic partisans of the Resistance.196 
 Despite the Army’s efforts to instill the idea of a patriotic lineage of combat, 
conscripts soon realized that “their task was more difficult than that of their elders.”197 
The tactics the FLN used in its revolutionary war, and the policies the French Army 
pursued in response, posed deep moral challenges to French soldiers. The FLN used 
bombings, arson, and assassination and mutilation—against Algerian civilians and 
notables who served the French state, against European colonists, and also against French 
soldiers—to provoke an extreme response from the French authorities, which would 
increase anger and hatred on both sides. The FLN’s tactics worked extremely well. In this 
sense, the downward spiral of the war itself and France’s repression, affecting ever-wider 
swathes of the Algerian population, further developed sentiments of Algerian 
nationalism.198 Without any explicit orders from the state, the Army used torture in 
Algeria at the “heart” of “a repressive system [...] conceived of as necessary to win [the] 	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war.”199 Preferred methods of making suspects speak included electric shocks, simulated 
drowning, and beatings.200 Because there was no official war, only efforts to “pacify” a 
territory that was administratively French, these acts were “implictly authorized,” even 
while being illegal with regard to French law.201 In fact, the Army adopted torture 
following the precedent set by the police forces.202  
 In a climate where both sides felt entitled to use any means necessary to win the 
war, conscripts “whether as officers or soldiers,” commonly employed torture, although 
the media has focused much of the blame on professional soldiers and especially 
outspoken and unrepentant generals like Massu and Aussaresses.203 Conscripts in 
particular “neither wanted to see nor hear [about torture], in an era where the majority of 
French tolerated [it...] as a lesser evil in response to terrorism,” but many conscripts were 
directly involved or complicit with torture, and most were at least vaguely aware that it 
was happening—if not in their sector, then elsewhere.204 Out of the minority of veterans 
interviewed who brought the topic up voluntarily, only one, a reservist and junior officer, 
implicited justified the use of torture in the battle of Algiers as an effective response to 
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terrorism: “these interrogations were very brutal, in this kind of war. [...] Obviously it 
was hard, because it was necessary to neutralize the networks of bombers.”205 A former 
conscript insisted that he “was never a witness, neither from close up nor far away, of 
acts of torture”; one former officer denied that anyone in his intelligence unit 
“interrogated in a brutal manner.”206 Another former conscript, without directly 
implicating himself, blamed the French state for “sending us to do things she was 
ashamed of,” adding that after conscripts “saw torture, everything,” they were expected 
to disappear in silence.207   
 The state turned a blind eye to torture committed by men acting in its name, and 
protected itself from repercussions through censorship and imprisonment for those who 
spoke out, as well as with amnesties after the war that erased all crimes committed on 
Algerian soil.208 Officers had the option to publicly criticize torture—although very few 
did, including General Jacques Parîs de Bollardière, who would be imprisoned and then 
relieved of his duties. But ordinary conscripts had to choose between their internal moral 
code, and the rules “imposed by their hierarchy.”209 For some veterans, it is less painful 
to deflect the blame onto officers in the professional Army than to recognize the 
complicity of citizen-soldiers: “Of course we did not torture. But it was used in Algiers, 
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and the officers never denied that.”210 The tendency of every soldier in Algeria to think 
that his war was the only war, means that veterans still disagree vehemently on how 
widespread torture was. 
 Summary executions were another of the war crimes committed by the French 
Army in Algeria, described euphemistically as “corvée de bois” [woods duty], in which a 
prisoner would be released and then shot while fleeing.211 The French Army also 
committed massacres of civilians. Sometimes, professional soldiers or more experienced 
conscripts initiated the ‘green’ (or, in the French parlance, ‘blue’) conscripts into such 
behavior. For example, the Indochina veterans and Legionnaires in the unit that replaced 
the reservists who had been killed and mutilated at Palestro in May 1956 led the new 
conscripts on a rampage against Algerian civilians.212  
 French soldiers encountered a strikingly different gendered order when they 
arrived in what they had been taught was French territory. The “natives” had long been 
gendered feminine in the French imagination, and Algerian women were portrayed as 
sexually available to Europeans. Some young conscripts would have their first sexual 
experience in one of the military’s official brothels.213 This offered a sad coming of age 
initiation for some young Frenchmen.214  Moreover, sexual violence was an intrinsic 	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aspect of this war; rape of women, children, and sometimes men occurred on patrols and 
during “interrogations.”215 Arguably, the presence of official Army brothels in Algeria, 
when prostitution was illegal in France, facilitated the “degradation of the image” of 
North African women for many soldiers, and accelerated the turn to rape.216 While 
French society’s knowledge of torture was widespread by the middle of the war, sexual 
violence would long remain concealed by the perpetrators, their superiors, and the 
victims.217 
 Because of the nature of combat, the impact of the Algerian War on the French 
troops was different from that of European wars. The death toll was lower; the Army lost 
23,716 men and the Air Force 898. A surprisingly high proportion of deaths (32%, 7,917 
total) was due to accidents—sometimes caused by mechanical errors or “foolishness” and 
poor training, but also due to confusion occasioned by the fact that the ALN and French 
uniforms closely resembled each other except for the color of their scarves.218 Families 
were never notified that their sons had died from accidents, which would have hurt 
support for the war effort on the home front. There is no literature on widespread 
incidents of “fragging” such as occurred during the Vietnam War, but it is likely that 
some friendly-fire incidents or ‘accidents’ were the result of personal disputes.219  	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 More than 27,000 men had been wounded in combat; the mortality rate from 
wounds tended to be much higher than in conventional wars, since injuries from 
explosions often led to shock, which favors infection.220 Conscripts also suffered 
numerous tropical illnesses, including malaria, dysentery, typhoid, and viral hepatitis—to 
which they were less resistant than the hardy veterans of Indochina.221 Finally, the 
uncertainties and shocks of guerilla combat and terrorism left at least nine thousand 
soldiers with psychological trauma, usually characterized by “mental confusion, troubled 
sleep and nightmares, and even psychomotor impairments” or lasting anxiety.222 War 
traumas could also be somatic, including intestinal ailments or extreme fatigue.223 None 
of these symptoms was abnormal given the war conditions French soldiers had 
experienced. But during the war and for many decades thereafter, the French state “did 
not want to hear” about these consequences of the Algerian conflict; no state institution 
“attempted to take care of the young veterans and give them psychological support.”224 
As one former conscript explained, “We were sent without our opinion being asked, to do 
things we were not prepared for. Afterwards, we had to sort it out on our own.”225 
 Following from the great diversity of combat experiences, veterans’ return 
experiences were quite varied. To begin with, there was no massive demobilization, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220Bantigny, Le plus bel âge?, 364. 
  
221Idem.  
 
222Bantigny, Le plus bel âge?, 365; Bantigny, “Jeunes et soldats,” 104.  
 
223Sigg, 44. 
  
224Sigg, 43, 45; Bantigny, “Jeunes et soldats,” 106. Two veterans interviewed, as well as the wife of one 
veteran, emphasized that “there were no psychologists to take care of us,” and one mentioned, “I am still 
depressed. But one does what one must.” Interview UO19, Annecy, 11 February 2014; Interview RO02, 
Paris, 6 May 2014.  
  
225Interview RO02, Paris, 6 May 2014. 
  
	   58 
there had been at the conclusion of the World Wars, and thus, no demobilization 
celebrations.226 Soldiers simply returned when their tour of duty was over.227 For some, 
the day of return was not even a noteworthy transition; perhaps they had already “lost the 
taste” for the military after previously coming home on leave.228 Compared with the 
patriotic mood concluding previous wars, the moment of demobilization felt a bit 
peremptory: “you gave your gear to the Army; they gave you a little money; that was 
it.”229  
 The disjointed nature of soldiers’ return, and the invisibility it created around 
them, was an impetus behind the creation of veterans’ associations, which emerged as 
early as 1957. These were a “response to isolation”: newly returned veterans knew that 
they were passing the torch to future cohorts, and felt responsible for helping them when 
society seemed unconcerned.230 Solidarity and mutual aid were required of this combat 
generation; Prime Minister Guy Mollet himself had half admitted early into the war that 
given budgetary constraints, charity was required to support the soldiers.231 While each 
association bore a particular political standpoint on French Algeria and the war, they  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, 73; Branche,“Clémentines et bifteck,” 67. 
  
227Numerous soldiers remained deployed well beyond the official cease-fire of 19 March 1962, including 
among my interviewees one former conscript who was assigned to “maintain order” in Constantine until 
August 1962, and remembers the settlers throwing rocks at French soldiers, and the OAS “making 
everything explode.” Questionnaire CI11. And those soldiers imprisoned for joining the putsch or going 
over to the OAS generally remained in prison until De Gaulle’s amnesties in 1968; one of my interviewees 
alluded to being in this situation. Interview ER22, Paris, 30 January 2014. 
  
228Interview RO02, Paris, 6 May 2014.  
 
229Interview UO23, Paris, 17 January 2014.  
  
230Interview EA20, Annecy, 10 February 2014. 
  
231Bantigny, Le plus bel âge?, 319.  
 
	   59 
shared a common concern for mutual aid and uplift for mobilized and returning soldiers, 
against a backdrop of lagging support on the homefront.  
 The primary return experience for most veterans was coming home to their 
families—which, for conscripts, generally meant their parents and siblings, or for 
reservists, their wives and children. Although most veterans hoped to continue the lives 
they had left behind, this was only possible for a select few; overall, there was no “return 
to normalcy,” since “the post-war reinvents its [own] norms.”232 Returning to France was 
generally an enormous “relief,” but even for those without physical or mental wounds, 
“the shock was great.”233 This was no more true than for pied noir conscripts, for whom 
Algeria was the only home they had ever known; for them, being “repatriated” to France 
at the war’s end felt like an “ending” rather than a return.234 For many Metropolitan 
soldiers, deployment had been the first time they had traveled outside of their native 
region at all, and coming home from a war that was not officially recognized as such led 
to many ambiguities. Soldiers had usually avoided writing about the “moral and material” 
details of their deployment, fearing to worry their families, who thus understood even 
less what it had been like “over there” in Algeria.235  
 After years of worry and scant communication, being reunited with family was an 
occasion for “joy and relief.”236 Yet some demobilized conscripts did not receive the 
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family welcome they had expected—such as a farmer who found no one waiting for him 
at the train station and had to walk home two kilometers, because his family did not know 
the date of his demobilization.237 For others, the return to family was the only time they 
felt a “welcome” at all on returning to France; otherwise, it was not an “event.”238 But 
coming back to the “intimate” site of the family could heighten “the feeling of 
fragmentation that many veterans experienced upon their return home to the Hexagon.”239 
For instance, it was not uncommon for returning conscripts to encounter condescension 
and infantilization from elders in their families who had served in the World Wars.240  
 Often, families “felt distressed by the veteran’s inability to express his 
sentiments.”241 And “almost uniformly,” veterans’ wives or parents observed that “‘he is 
not the same since he went there.’”242 Sometimes veterans’ families observed changes in 
their son more than the veteran did himself, for instance, that it took one conscript a year 
to “pull himself together” after the war.243 Young conscripts were eager to begin their 
own families; demobilization felt like a “fresh start,” and they sought to build a future, 
and chase “new horizons.”244 Some veterans married “she who would be my wife” 	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immediately on their return, while others discovered to their sorrow that “all the girls in 
my town were already married.”245 Returning from a war that France had largely ignored 
and sought to forget quickly, many veterans felt like “intruders in their own families, 
strangers in their own village.”246  
 The next sphere of return was to the neighborhood and the village or city. This 
entailed the return to French society after being “cut off from civilian life,” and here the 
ambiguities of the Algerian War, as well as the impacts of returning during different 
phases of the war, became most apparent.247 One former conscript demobilized in August 
1962 recalls that the people of his town “cared more about their vacation than the fact 
[that] Algeria [had just become] independent.”248 Conscripts and reservists returned to a 
country that traditionally bore great esteem for the military, yet the state did not 
recognize their status as veterans, and society sought to move on from the war.249 One 
former conscript summarized this atmosphere as “total lack of consideration from 
citizens and politicians.”250   
 Sometimes returning conscripts did find their neighbors open to hearing about 
their experiences in North Africa and the current “situation down there,” especially if 
they had served themselves, or had relatives deployed.251 But even veterans who ended 	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up reintegrating fairly easily could experience “several months disconnected from 
civilian life.”252 Some veterans perceived “no reaction” whatsoever from their neighbors, 
perhaps only the casual observation: “‘Oh, you’re back.”253 Others felt a “manifest 
disinterest, even hostility” from their neighbors, leading them to “turn in” on 
themselves.254 
 It was difficult to “relearn how to live as a civilian.”255 The return to one’s village, 
town, or big city, for those deployed for two years or more in the mountains or plains of 
Algeria, represented a return to Western civilization. One veteran had completely 
forgotten how to order an appetizer-main plate-dessert, and had to copy a neighboring 
customer’s formula his first time dining in a restaurant after his return.256 The backfiring 
of cars—common in the era—could cause a veteran to drop to the ground; “one keeps the 
instincts” learned in war.257 Sometimes passing an Algerian or North African in the street 
raised feelings of fear and mistrust.258 Finding oneself unarmed and in a crowd could 
bring anxiety, a heightened alertness that could have meant the difference between 
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surviving and dying in Algeria.259 Some veterans never succeeded in the transition back 
to civilian life, committing suicide quickly, with firearms, or slowly, with alcohol.260 
 French culture had trained young men to see conscription as the rite of passage 
toward adulthood, and many veterans considered their time in the war as a threshold “that 
marked the rupture between youth and the seriousness” of adult life, but there was a 
general consensus that the youth of the Algerian generation had been amputated.261 
Numerous veterans felt they had “aged by ten years, not two.”262 Conscripts had spent the 
final years of the “intensity and fragility” of adolescence confronting dangers and moral 
dilemmas that their peers could not understand.263 When they came back, they often 
found that their “friends were not the same”—the younger ones were still serving time in 
Algeria, and the older ones were busy with family obligations, or had already left to 
pursue careers elsewhere.264  
 One veteran mentioned that he felt completely rejected by the youths in his 
neighborhood who had not served in the military: they refused to speak to him when he 
returned from Algeria.265 Another veteran discussed his disorientation with the rapid 
evolution of youth culture: “I felt like I no longer belonged to the same generation when I 
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came back.”266 Some veterans returned with a strong aversion to adolescents in 
general.267 Yet others felt great affection for children, both because of the Algerian 
children they had worked or played with, and because of the near-children they 
themselves had been on their mobilization.268 But spending two or more years in Algeria 
as young men during the very period when the public began to take notice of “the youth” 
in France had led numerous veterans to conclude that their youth (or that of their entire 
generation) had been “ruined.”269 
 Unemployment during the late 1950s and early 1960s was “practically 
nonexistant,” and there was a “boom” in housing that made construction-related trades 
especially viable, but this does not mean that all veterans had an easy return to work.270 
“Professional reinsertion” was probably easier for those deployed earlier in the war; for a 
reservist recalled in 1954, for instance, his company simply took him back when he 
returned, which might not have been the case in later years of more significant 
demobilizations.271 And sometimes, through careful planning or family connections, 
conscripts had been able to secure a promise of future employment before they were even 
mobilized.272  
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 But in a modernizing economy, qualifications became a major concern. At the 
beginning of the 1960s, 60% of rural youths and 30% of working-class youths had no 
professional qualification beyond a diploma indicating they had completed primary 
school.273 Veterans could feel there was no longer a place for them—for instance, a 
Breton peasant who returned home to discover that “the farm did not work anymore,” or 
another who spent “several years of misery” with his wife, trying to enter another field 
before deciding to return to what he knew, farming.274 One veteran returned to discover 
to his surprise that he had been passed over for inheritance of the family land in his 
absence.275 Growing up in a traditional society where sons generally entered their father’s 
profession, veterans could feel great anguish on realizing they had to “create a new job” 
or “build a trade” in a modernizing economy.276  
 Some veterans did gain in their career prospects after the war. Those who were 
trained as officers, for instance, could be entrusted with “responsibilities that surpassed 
[their] competence,” which they never would have received in the civilian world at 
twenty-three years old.277 They learned to command and organize men, which might help 
in career advancement after the war, or even just give enough confidence to change 
careers.278 In addition, officer training afforded many conscripts more education than 
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their socioeconomic status would have granted them in civilian society.279 Men who had 
voluntarily enlisted could use their eight years in the professional military as a reference 
for employers.280 Veterans who had worked closely with Algerian civilians—as the 
leader of an intelligence unit, for instance—often picked up some Arabic, which might 
help them later in business or a trade.281 For some conscripts, service in the war gave 
them skills and qualifications that they might not have acquired in the civilian world—
things as seemingly simple as a driver’s license, which remains prohibitively expensive 
for many in France to this day.282 For others, demobilization was an opportunity to 
change professions, as for the former carpenter who decided to apply to be a policeman 
when he went to drop off his military gear in town.283   
 Yet some veterans were disappointed to find that their newly acquired skills 
meant little. A Breton who had earned two certificates in radar detection in the Army 
learned they did not transfer into the field of civil aviation; he eventually emigrated to the 
U.S. to work in construction for decades before returning to France to retire.284 For those 
soldiers who had entered the war with higher education or some degree of family wealth, 
demobilization seems to have been less disruptive.285 They had more flexibility to change 
careers, such as a conscript who had studied psychological nursing, served as a doctor 	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during the war, and returned home to begin a career in commerce, or an aspiring law 
student who lost the taste for studies “after this interruption,” but became a school 
teacher.286 While service in the Algerian War did provide some avenues of social 
mobility, in general, the socioeconomic status and educational qualifications soldiers 
carried with them to the war determined the ease of their return to the world of work.  
 An individual veteran’s reintegration also depended significantly on the economy 
of his home region. In rural regions like Brittany, demobilized veterans faced the 
disruptions caused by de Gaulle’s efforts to rationalize agriculture. Decolonization both 
encouraged and enabled the French state to devote more resources toward the 
modernization of agriculture, the expansion of industry, and the proletarianization of 
former peasants.287 Veterans returning to industrial or white collar work in regions like 
the Île-de-France might need to seek professional training to keep up with necessary 
qualifications. In regions with a mixed economy like the Haute-Savoie—where men 
usually worked for a business during the day and tended a family farm or pursued cottage 
industries in the evening—veterans might have had an easier time reinserting themselves 
into the economy.288 Indeed, veterans in the Haute-Savoie were often able to return to 
work two or three days after demobilization.289   
 During and after the Algerian War, a generation of military-aged farmers and 
workers brought the war home in dramatic ways. The period of the Algerian War 
coincides with the “beginning of the modernization of [French] agriculture” under an 	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interventionist state, and the acceleration of the postwar rural exodus, and the economic 
dislocation of veterans plays a major role in this story.290 In 1962, 20.5% of the total 
French population was involved in agriculture, but only 9% would remain so in 1975.291 
In 1961, “a general revolt of peasants against the state” of unprecedented size and 
violence began in Bretagne and spread through all of France.292 Bretagne was a model of 
economic development under the early French Fifth Republic, which meant that its 
farmers were highly susceptible to grievances stemming from a sense of “relative 
privation,” as France was modernizing and general standards of living elsewhere were 
visibly increasing.293 Peasants nationwide saw the Breton movements as successful, and 
used similar methods in their protests until around 1974, when sociological and tactical 
considerations changed and encouraged farmers to use less violent means.294   
 The Algerian War strongly informed the farmers’ movement in Brittany.295 Not 
only did peasant activists consciously mimic the FLN’s methods, including attacking 
government buildings and cutting telephone poles, “creating an atmosphere of diffuse and 
permanent rebellion,” but some organizers explicitly identified with the Algerian 
nationalists, as both Algerians and Breton peasants were represented as “backward” in 
French modernizing discourse.296 Some scholars even argue that discourse involving the 	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Algerian War was central to the regionalist character of social conflicts in Bretagne.297 
The peasants’ movement that began in Brittany in 1961 and spread to a national scale 
was collective, very aggressive, and confrontational, and it is likely that a coming of age 
initiation in a brutal colonial war combined with longstanding Breton nationalism 
coalesced to fuel “the most important farmers’ protest movement under the Fifth 
Republic,” one of remarkable violence.298   
 Through the 1960s and 1970s, industrial workers constituted the largest socio-
professional group in France, around 37% of the active male population.299 The collective 
power of labor had been on the decline immediately after World War II, but rose again in 
the early 1960s, and important workers’ protests began in 1963.300 The year 1968 saw a 
“generalized [workers’] insubordination” spreading from the local to the national level, 
which employed an “expanded repertoire of action.”301 These workers’ actions appeared 
both in old industrial bastions, such as the Île-de-France, as well as recently industrialized 
areas, including Bretagne.302 Workers’ movements in this period demonstrated “a 
resurgence of the strongest forms of opposition between workers and management,” 
combining “illegality and violence” in actions such as sabotage, the sacking of offices, 
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and confinements.303 Many of the actors in this labor agitation had been conscripts in 
Algeria, and some historians note workers’ references to Algeria at the time.304 The 
Algerian War “constituted a negative reference point for a generation of young workers,” 
and it is likely that this generational experience “helps to explain the particular virulence 
of the antagonism in the factories” around 1968.305  
 Historian Benjamin Stora finds that the Algerian War “destroyed the idea of a 
harmonious society” for many in the generation who served in it; and indeed, veterans 
brought the war home to diverse kinds of political struggles.306 Psychologist and Algeria 
veteran Bernard Sigg describes the “determining characteristic” of the war for French 
soldiers as “a conflictual and even paradoxical relationship to the Law. Crimes were 
committed against the laws of the Republic, and in her name.”307 In light of the 
unprecedented and violent farmers’ and workers’ revolts in the decade after the end of the 
Algerian War, perhaps it is accurate to speak of the “brutalization” [ensauvagement] of 
much of a generation of conscripts.308 
 The experience of serving in a war that was either derided or ignored by the 
French public, and one that was ultimately lost, could have important effects on veterans’ 
sense of masculinity as they returned to France. For generations, military service had 
represented “the way in which men demonstrated their adherence to the national 	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community” in France.309 Some veterans felt their virtue constantly in question because 
of civilian society’s tendency to associate all veterans with war crimes; one former 
conscript recalls a pied noir friend jokingly asking him, “Maybe you were a rapist?”310 
For the officers who had worked in close concert with Algerian civilians or soldiers—
giving their word that France would stay and protect them—the end of the war resulted in 
feelings of shame and dishonor, wounds left by a “fictional bullet.”311 Perhaps out of a 
sense of masculine honor, hoping to spare their loved ones distress, many veterans tended 
to cover their memories with silence, not discussing their combat experiences with their 
families.312 Indeed, well into the twenty-first century, some veterans have never discussed 
their wartime experiences with their children or grandchildren.313 
 Because of the pressures of society and collective memory, many veterans of 
Algeria took years if not decades to come to think of themselves as veterans, like their 
fathers or grandfathers. Because of the diversity of combat exposure, numerous veterans 
felt that they had only experienced a “so-called war,” or that they served in a “conflict, 
not a war.”314 Those who did not see regular combat—convoy escorts or prison guards, 
for instance—might have returned feeling like they had not done anything particularly 
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heroic during the war.315 Many of these veterans minimized their combat experience 
compared to the World Wars: “we did not feel like veterans of 14-18 or 39-45.”316 
Metropolitan veterans without ideological commitment to French Algeria might think of 
what they did not as “defending the fatherland, but [only] a corner of it.”317 Many simply 
felt that “it was my military service and I did it,” or that it was merely a “‘hole’” carved 
out of their lives rather than a defining experience.318  
 Despite the recruitment efforts of veterans’ associations, and their success in 
winning veterans’ recognition in 1974, by the late 1980s only about 33% of surviving 
veterans had received their veterans’ card from the state veterans’ office. 319 This seems 
to suggest a coherent lack of veteran identity in this generation, but it may also indicate 
lack of interest in the material benefits that state recognition offered, as well as the 
deterrent factor of combat requirements for veteran status, or even disinterest in obtaining 
state recognition for an unwanted status.320 Many veterans “felt they had been betrayed 
by a State which constrained them to make war uselessly for a cause that was lost to 
begin with, and which was not their own.”321 To this day, many veterans remain “bitter,” 	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jealous of younger generations who did not serve, and feeling that they “sacrificed” their 
youth for a state that would not recognize them.322 But it is inaccurate to characterize the 
entire generation as embittered: many have moved on, feeling it is “not in [their] nature” 
to hold resentment.323 One veteran emphasized that he “is full of life, except when we 
talk of this period.”324 It is safe to conclude that the veterans who tended to be attracted to 
veterans’ associations early on—which recruited in part through depicting veterans as 
citizens who had been wronged by the state—either possessed feelings of bitterness at 
their experience already, or cultivated them following the associations’ lead. 
 Social and cultural pressures also made it difficult for veterans to feel capable of 
expressing any feelings of pride in their service to the nation. Previous generations of 
combat veterans in France could feel that they had accomplished a “sacred duty to the 
nation,” but veterans of Algeria were left without a coherent narrative to frame their 
service.325 As journalist Philippe Labro, himself a veteran of Algeria, reflects, “‘Paris and 
France gobbled them up like a bull eats flies: in packets of ten. They were swallowed, 
absorbed, because they had no identity.’”326 The soldiers conscripted from the Nation to 
safeguard French territory overseas seemed an archaic relic after French society came to 
see decolonization as an inevitable historical wind.327 Tainted by association with the 
cause of “French Algeria,” veterans were also identified with the extreme violence of the 	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OAS. Despite all these associations, some conscripts managed to feel military pride: “Our 
manner of waging war, it was a model for the whole world. That’s something to be proud 
of.”328 Others took pride in their efforts to protect and organize Algerian civilians against 
the FLN, recalling that most of the FLN’s victims were their fellow Muslim Algerians.329 
Some common conscripts resented the notion “that any colonization was a moral error,” 
and felt that it had been their duty to protect the work of France in Algeria.330 Almost 
taking ahistorical moralization for granted now, some veterans insist that there was no 
reason for them to feel “any guilt”—they were not to blame for the political outcomes of 
the war, and all of its attendant damage.331  
 Those coming from distinct memory communities with a strong tradition of group 
identity, such as the professional Army or the Foreign Legion, have perhaps had the 
fewest qualms about expressing their pride of “belonging” to the French endeavor in 
Algeria, a pride that is both “individual and collective.”332 But without colonial ideology 
or professional esprit de corps, it remains difficult for conscripts to express collective 
pride in their service. “Even if society does not have much of a place for us,” one former 
conscript explains, “we feel that we represent something.”333 This sentiment of 
melancholy, almost apologetic pride is understandable, given the patriotic expectations 	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with which this generation of men viewed military service, and the indifferent welcome 
they received in France.  
 Regardless whether former conscripts and reservists considered themselves 
veterans, many were struck by the rejection they faced in society. A junior officer 
demobilized in 1957 recalls that he was “revolted” by the indifference he encountered on 
the homefront.334 “Paradoxically,” many veterans felt the largest rejection came from 
veterans’ associations, and in particular veterans of the Second World War.335 A common 
sermon from older veterans was that “‘You were not capable of holding onto 
Algeria.’”336 Faced with such reactions from public opinion and even their own families, 
it is little wonder that most veterans responded with “self-censorship,” and a minority 
with activism.337 Fighting societal indifference and convincing this combat generation of 
its specificity were among the primary tasks of veterans’ associations.  
 But it took a long time for most veterans to join veterans’ associations.338 For a 
large part, this was because veterans had “other priorities” on demobilization—getting 
married and finding work.339 It did not even occur to many veterans to seek out 
associations for a decade or longer—they considered veterans’ associations a hobby for 
old men, or simply did not care to mingle with former conscripts in a war they preferred 	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to forget.340 But sometimes the hesitation to join associations was out of a sense that they 
were not veterans like their fathers and grandfathers—a common explanation was that 
Algeria “was not Verdun.”341 But in this era, civic engagement and associational life 
were commonplace: it was rare for veterans to “stay in their own corner.”342      
 Before the state’s official recognition of veterans in 1974, there were two 
principal reasons to join veterans’ associations: ideological or concrete concerns, and the 
concrete reasons predominated. Veterans joined associations to seek out comrades, or to 
rediscover the inside-group solidarity and fraternity they felt in their military units, “a 
togetherness that I consider exceptional,” as one association leader explained.343 Indeed, 
most veterans’ associations began as “amicales” for soldiers from particular regiments, or 
from a certain specialty, like intelligence units.344 It felt safer to gather with fellow 
veterans and “communicate between ourselves,” before trying to navigate veteran 
identity “outside” the fold of the association.345 And associations tended to present 
themselves foremost as mutual aid societies—supporting wounded soldiers, children 
orphaned by the war, and widows.346 
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 Veterans joined associations for other reasons before 1974, sometimes out of 
military pride or because they wanted to “play soldier.”347 There is a high correlation 
between former officers and junior officers becoming veterans’ association officials; 
these veterans were used to organizing and leading men, and had the confidence to speak 
and convince others. Aside from that, officers were better educated, which often implied 
the socioeconomic security to be able to devote long volunteer hours to running the 
associations.348 Recruitment to veterans’ associations proceeded through friends, 
coworkers, family, and sometimes even business ties, like one’s car mechanic.349 
Veterans’ associations were central to the struggle to obtain state recognition of this 
combat generation, but not all of their activity was political. Associations also 
participated in charity, as well as team sports and games—these “affirm our presence in 
society.”350  
 Some veterans did not seek out associations until their retirement, when they had 
more spare time to fill with social pursuits.351 There still remain, however, veterans of 
North Africa who never joined any association, well into the twenty-first century.352 
Some were doubtless repelled by the polemics dividing the Algerian veterans’ 
movement: feeling it did nothing to honor the dead, they “ABSOLUTELY did not want 
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to join any association.”353 But others state that the sense of belonging in the movement 
was an inspiration to those outside of it: “Some of the men of my generation have spoken 
almost with regret at not having been veterans of Algeria—because they see how strong 
our solidarity and friendship are.”354   
 Although most veterans did not join a veterans’ association for years or decades, 
many participated in other civic associations soon on their return to France, usually out of 
a sense of giving back: “Our generation was made to give,” one conscript explained.355 
Groups like Souvenir Français, Soldats de France, and Secours de France aided young 
people and inspired patriotic values.356 Naturally, some of these men joined associations 
to pursue personal hobbies, such as literature or scuba diving.357 Others even created 
associations attempting to promote Franco-Algerian reconciliation, to help Algerian 
immigrant youth, and to foster conversation on immigration and diversity in France.358 
For some veterans, “the war never ended,” and these civic engagements represented an 
attempt to find a positive conclusion to their war experiences, and perhaps exorcise some 
ghosts.359  
 For many veterans alive today, the “duty of memory” toward lost comrades and 
war victims is primordial, especially in light of the “non-recognition” that their 	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generation suffered for so long.360 Many veterans joined civic or patriotic associations 
like the Comité de la Flamme—which organizes the re-lighting of the Eternal Flame at 
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier under the Arc de Triomphe—to honor the memories of 
friends.361 Believing that “there is no society without memory,” veterans involved in civic 
and veterans’ associations feel that they must bear witness with their presence at 
“patriotic manifestations.”362 Some veterans devoted years of their lives to researching all 
of the dead from their region and publishing beautiful books in their honor.363 Sometimes 
the duty of memory impelled veterans to try to broker peace between warring veterans’ 
associations in their towns, or to attend the commemoration ceremonies of both rival 
associations.364 “We must not forget anyone,” a veteran insisted, with tears in his eyes, 
explaining why he worked to organize the creation of a monument to his region’s soldiers 
lost in Algeria.365 
 Historians have observed that veterans of this generation were distrustful of 
politics, “invest[ing] themselves little in the state, […] and greatly in civil society.”366 Yet 
the high barrier for entry to politics—wealth and education—might have deterred some 
veterans more than disinterest itself. A former conscript and reserve officer with access to 
higher education, who attended the École nationale d’administration, became an adjunct 	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to the mayor in an arrondissement of Paris.367 Numerous veterans sought positions at the 
state veterans’ office, the Office national des anciens combattants et victimes de guerre 
(ONACVG), or its departmental branches; one explained his thinking: “I came back 
whole; I should help.”368 Former conscripts also commonly served on town councils and 
as mayors.369 But some veterans returned “embittered by politics in general,” or 
“disgusted by politics and its practitioners,” and with or without a specific political 
critique, they resolutely avoided party politics.370 Many veterans returned feeling that 
“politicians [had] condemned a whole generation to waste the best years of their lives in a 
hopeless conflict. Then, in refusing to face up to the legacy of the war, they left the same 
generation to carry an intolerable burden of shame and guilt.”371    
 As individuals, and through associations, some veterans attempted to explain the 
meaning of their war and the nature of their generation. At the time of their return, many 
veterans were conscious of belonging to a specific generation; the extended duration of 
their military service as well as the silence around the war itself created an initial group 
identity.372 Numerous veterans took up the pen to express “the memories denied at a 
public level by an indifferent mother country,” but only a “tiny minority” of all veterans 
had access to this route, via an education and the financial means to write and publish a 
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book.373 Almost none of these memoirs were written by conscripts.374 Before the 1980s, 
the great majority of veterans’ memoirs had been written by officers and professional 
soldiers with an axe to grind, often to justify torture during the war, or to blame President 
de Gaulle for the “abandonment” of French Algeria. Progressive amnesties of crimes 
during the war, beginning with those proclaimed in the Accords of Évian of March 18, 
1962, and continuing through a rehabilitation of the putschist generals in 1981, obscured 
contentious memories of the war “in a climate of indifference.”375 The conjuncture of 
these amnesties with the political divisions of the veterans’ movement itself left veterans 
with only a collective memory of victimhood to share in common. The absence of a 
national collective memory of the Algerian War, as well as conscripts’ often limited 
understanding of the global history of the war, left a generation to struggle to sort out a 
narrative on its own. One veteran explained his understanding of these paradoxes: “I 
often say, I fought the war against Algerians, and with Algerians!!”376 
 These men were born during the Great Depression, and lived through the Second 
World War as children—very early in their lives, therefore, they learned deprivation and 
sacrifice. It stands to reason that the majority did not complain of having had to perform 
national military service. Having grown up in an era where surviving veterans of the 	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World Wars were very visible in life, it also makes sense that most veterans of Algeria 
should minimize their military service in comparison: they are just grateful to have 
returned alive and mostly intact. Now, very conscious that their generation is in the 
process of disappearing, many are concerned about their legacy, and what their 
grandchildren learn about their service in school.377 Many seem to still suffer from 
feelings that the media has painted them with a broad brush as a generation of sadistic 
criminals and colonialist oppressors. Perhaps conscripts’ memory of the Algerian War 
only has a place in the timeline of “‘traditional’ French society”; their experience marked 
the end of a colonial era that today seems utterly foreign.378 
 The specificity of the Algerian war generation lies in a crossroads of 
expectations—the confrontation of a traditionally patriotic, but undereducated and 
unpoliticized cohort of conscripts with the ambiguities of a brutal war, at once a conflict 
of decolonization and a civil war.379 If a country prepares for each new war as it fought 
the previous war, then these young Frenchmen had scant preparation for the guerilla 
combat, terrorism, and state-sponsored torture apparatus they would encounter.380 Since 
the period when young men called to serve in Algeria could think of the conflict as “their 
war,” as the Great War had been for their grandfathers, European society has been 	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thoroughly demilitarized.381 This combat generation thus presented an “untidy [reminder] 
of outdated colonial values.”382  
 In a decolonized and resolutely forward-looking France, “[c]olonial violence [...] 
seemed wasteful, anachronistic, and illegitimate, part of a vanished world in which the 
ability to wage war had been centrally important to what it meant to be a state,” and 
indeed, a vanished world in which military service had been central to the definition of 
male citizenship.383 Although the French state would only abolish compulsory national 
military service in 1996—under President Jacques Chirac, who had served as a conscript 
in Algeria himself—the bitter memory of the Algerian War helped to provoke a “crisis in 
the social legitimacy of compulsory military service” in France in the 1960s and 1970s.384 
And this loss of acceptance toward national military service means that the “contingent 
consent” that most conscripts manifested during the Algerian War renders them alien to 
younger generations today in France, who cannot understand why they simply did not 
refuse to serve in a “dirty war.”  
 An international comparison to the life trajectory of this combat generation 
confirms a pattern resulting from the confrontation of traditional patriotic values with the 
ambiguities of post-1945 unconventional wars. Similar to French veterans of Algeria, 
American veterans of the Korean War had been formed by a childhood on the homefront 
of World War II, then were sent to fight “their war” in a maelstrom that had nothing to do 	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with the patriotic combats for national preservation they had admired as 
schoolchildren.385 And just as American veterans of Korea were often considered 
“passive” in comparison with the highly vocal veterans of Vietnam, veterans of Algeria 
may appear passive if compared with the generation of the Resistance, or of the students 
of 1968 in France.386 But veterans of Algeria did not have as strong a group veteran 
identity as did veterans of Vietnam, and they did not assemble into one united 
movement—their engagement in society was diffuse, in both poles of the veterans’ 
movement as well as in farmers’ and workers’ protests, diverse civic associations, and 
sometimes party politics. Also like American veterans of Korea, many French veterans of 
Algeria resented the idea that their conflict had ended in a defeat, were often looked on 
with disdain by the veterans of World War I and World War II dominating the veterans’ 
associations, and were expected to quietly and uncomplainingly assimilate back into 
society. In general, veterans of Algeria and of Korea largely withdrew into themselves in 
a society that did not honor their sacrifices as it had for previous generations of 
combatants.387  
 To understand why the memory of the Algerian War has been so difficult for 
France to assimilate, we must not overlook the citizen-soldiers who served in this war. 
Armies are the “critical instrument whereby the individual, collective, and national levels 
of the experience of defeat are mediated,” arguably even more so for citizen armies in the 
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nation that originated the levée en masse.388 Furthermore, the extreme variation in combat 
exposure between conscripts meant that there was no central experience around which to 
generate a memory of the war. After the war, veterans could not even agree whether the 
cease-fire was a victory—because the oppressed Algerian nation received its 
independence and French soldiers could return home—or whether it was a defeat—since 
French soldiers had died protecting a territory they knew to be French, and then their 
government negotiated with the enemy to grant independence.389 Indeed, “for some 
veterans the loss of Algeria did not even represent a military defeat,” and historians agree 
that at least militarily, France had all but defeated the ALN by 1961.390 However, these 
veterans failed to understand—or resented—that the FLN won this war by diplomatic and 
political means rather than military ones. The escalation of the French war effort, and the 
Army’s use of torture to fight terrorism, had alienated the Algerian people, intellectuals 
on the homefront, and France’s allies on the international stage.  
 To this day, veterans who regret the political outcome of the war reject the date of 
the cease-fire, March 19, as the end of the war, and tend to “refuse” the idea of “colonial 
repentance.”391 Other veterans decline to take sides in the polemicized “war of 
memories,” yet still believe that “the war could have ended differently,” without the 
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state’s abandonment of tens of thousands of Algerian auxiliaries, for instance.392 
Regardless of politics and ideology, however, most veterans feel the “vague need for 
recognition of what [really happened], with its shadows and its dark stains, in all its 
complex realities.”393 
 On a broader scale, the memory of the Algerian War has been so difficult to 
process because it involved an entire generation of Frenchmen. The French government 
would not even recognize veterans of Algeria as “real” veterans until 1974; the absence 
of recognition of an entire generation of veterans signaled the state’s desire to quash 
France’s collective memory of the war. After a “partial defeat” in Algeria—international 
and domestic politics, instead of a full military defeat, leading to diplomatic 
negotiations—veterans were “an awkward reminder of an earlier state of mind in a world 
that now [thought] differently” about the fight to preserve French Algeria.394 Defeat after 
a national mobilization had “cancelled the collective enterprise in which much of society 
had been engaged,” and required reconceptualizing the nation, indeed, the very one that 
had innovated universal male conscription.395  
 Intellectuals, political activists, and the media have tended to focus the 
responsibility for atrocities, torture, and war crimes on prominent officers and the state, 
but 80% of the young men born between 1932 and 1942 served in this “dirty war.” 
Juxtaposed with the “civilizing mission” narrative that France had told about itself for a 
century, the idea that citizen-soldiers had also engaged in torture and atrocities seemed to 	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indict all of France, and, in a country desperate for positive national myths after World 
War II, this was too much to contemplate. The Algerian War, especially because it was 
waged with a citizen army, continued longstanding debates about the virtue of the French 
nation, and fractured any unitary self-image that France might have had in the years 
following World War II—especially when the war brought to mind unsavory 
comparisons with the Resistance and the German occupiers. For decades, memories of 
that earlier state of mind that got France into war—when French society had viewed 
colonial Algeria as indisputable—remained “crystalized, as if at the interior of an 
invisible fortress.”396  
 The rudimentary education and relative political naïveté of most conscripts, 
coupled with the reticence of most of veterans on returning to a society that preferred to 
forget Algeria, highlights the importance of the veterans’ associations that claimed to 
speak for the Algerian generation.397 Because of the silence surrounding the war and the 
rejection by older generations of veterans, both poles of the Algerian War veterans’ 
movement recruited with aggressive appeals to veterans’ identity, as wronged citizens 
who deserved rights and recognition for their military service—although they differed 
sharply on what recognition entailed. These associations—the founders of which were 
educated and politically aware—cultivated specific narratives of the war and structured 
veterans’ understanding of what the war had meant, why defeat had occurred, and what 
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society owed veterans in return for their service. They were mediators of veterans’ 
memory as well as instigators of their political engagement in France. Therefore, 
understanding the Algerian War veterans’ movement allows us to evaluate the memorial 
and political afterlives of the war in France. Toward this end, Chapter 2 examines the 
rhetoric of veterans’ associations toward positioning veterans as political actors, and their 
debates on how to commemorate the war.
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CHAPTER 2: “READY TO FIGHT”: VETERANS OF THE ALGERIAN WAR 
WAGE A WAR OF WORDS AND MEMORY IN FRANCE.398 
 
 In 1958, four years into what would become known as the Algerian War of 
Independence, the faltering French Fourth Republic called on General Charles de Gaulle 
to return to power, sharing the widespread conviction that he would “fix” the Algerian 
situation. But de Gaulle’s Algerian politics evolved toward withdrawal, and by 1962, 
French society and the state were eager to move on. After the war, the state continued to 
cultivate the memory of the Resistance in World War II, and proceeded as if Algeria had 
never happened. Gaullist memorial politics tended to favor “abstract and elitist” 
commemorations rather than promoting “the cult of veteranism as a social movement.”399 
Yet even as the Fifth Republic sought to forget Algerian War, young veterans back from 
North Africa cultivated their own narratives, forging rhetorical space for their political 
engagement. And the indifference of much of French society to the memory of the war 
allowed veterans’ group memories to gain in intensity and power over time.400
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 During the war itself, French veterans formed associations to harness the vitality 
of the generation serving in North Africa and give meaning to its sacrifices. The months 
surrounding de Gaulle’s return to power saw the creation of the pro-war UNCAFN 
(Union nationale des combattants d’Afrique du Nord) and the antiwar FNACA 
(Fédération nationale des anciens combattants en Algérie, Maroc, et Tunisie).401 Three 
years later in 1961, the UDAA (Union démocratique des anciens d’Algérie) emerged, 
presenting itself as a third way between the “Communist dominated” FNACA and the 
“fascist” UNCAFN.402 The FNACA and the UNCAFN have continued in varying forms 
to the present day, but the UDAA vanished by 1964.403 
 By analyzing the rhetoric and the memorial politics of veterans’ associations, this 
chapter contributes to two major discussions in contemporary French history: the political 
role of veterans in society, and the fractured memory of the Algerian War. First, 
compared with the generations of veterans of the World Wars, it took longer for veterans 	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of Algeria to attain political influence, because there was no initial consensus on their 
moral authority, as combatants of a deeply divisive war that ultimately ended in defeat.404 
Thus, one of the major goals of veterans’ association rhetoric was to endow veterans of 
Algeria with moral authority serving to justify their political engagement.  
 Second, as historian Benjamin Stora argues, no state-sponsored collective 
memory of the war emerged in France because President Charles de Gaulle diverted the 
Fifth Republic’s gaze, refusing to acknowledge that the Algerian conflict was even a war, 
through words, laws, or commemoration.405 Between official silence and public 
indifference, the memory of the Algerian War became refracted into opposing memory 
communities, insider groups defining themselves through a particular frame of reference 
on the war, which became more stable and self-referential over time. Veterans’ 
associations were a crucial component of this process: during the Gaullist period, they 
cultivated mutually exclusive narratives of the war that would resurface in later decades, 
when the taboos surrounding the war remained, but Gaullist memorial politics no longer 
existed.  
 Associations representing veterans of Algeria often insisted they were ‘apolitical,’ 
yet the major associations founded during the war made significant political claims, the 
first of which was to elevate veterans as witnesses with crucial perspectives to offer the 
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nation.406 Veterans of Algeria, who did not automatically receive the same moral 
authority granted to veterans of earlier wars, faced an uphill battle to position themselves 
as worthy political actors. This chapter examines why only the associations with the most 
polarized politics could thrive after the war. Evaluating the lasting political impact of this 
veterans’ movement in French society, this chapter argues that despite Gaullist efforts to 
repress the memory of the war and constrain political participation, veterans’ associations 
cultivated narratives of the war already formed by 1958, forging space for political 
engagement by young French citizens deeply marked by their Algerian experience. The 
first half of this chapter examines the wartime rhetoric of veterans’ associations that 
aimed to establish veterans as political actors, and the second half of the chapter analyzes 
the memorial politics and debates of veterans’ associations after the war. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, service in the Algerian War affected almost an entire 
generation of young Frenchmen.407 From 1956 onward, the French state began sending 
classes of conscripts to fulfill their national military service in Algeria. Until 1962, men 
born between 1932 and 1945 faced being drafted, producing a coherent generational 
experience, despite differences in location, time, and branch of service.408 A quarter of all 
families in mainland France had a son “over there” at some point during the war.409 Yet 	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these soldiers formed an invisible generation for several reasons. First, the war itself 
existed in an uncertain space: over one million French citizens lived in Algeria, which 
was administratively divided into French departments, and the French state thus 
considered the conflict a “rebellion” rather than a “war.” Second, many veterans of the 
World Wars—who held great moral and often, political authority—did not regard the 
“kids” of Algeria as “real veterans.”410 In their view, conscripts merely served in police 
operations and “pacification” of “rebels,” rather than defending the homeland against an 
invading existential threat, as Frenchmen had fought the Germans at Verdun or in the 
Ardennes. Third, metropolitan French society, seeking tranquility after World War II and 
wary of colonial conflicts after the loss of Indochina in 1954, was ambivalent toward the 
war and its veterans, moving from indifference to outright disdain.411  
 Most significantly, however, the state’s self-conception was at stake—not least 
because it had violated its own laws in “implicitly” authorizing torture.412 Both the 
“conception and the conduct of the war were incompatible with the laws of the 
Republic.”413 It was politically expedient for President de Gaulle to portray French 
Algeria as having been “an unfortunate colonial detour,” and independence a foregone 
conclusion brought by inevitable historical winds, although he had returned to power 
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backed by officers and activists who believed he would “save” French Algeria.414 For all 
these reasons, Gaullist ministers forcefully rejected the notion that Algeria was in a state 
of war, and thus that the young Frenchmen sent there for military service were veterans. 
 Against this backdrop of ambivalence and silence, veterans’ associations framed 
their missions in competing moral imperatives, the first step toward establishing the 
political authority of this new generation of veterans. The UNCAFN emerged in 1957 to 
defend the dignity of the Army and its cause. Co-founder and longtime National 
President François Porteu de la Morandière recalls the combativeness of his movement: 
he and his colleagues were “ready to fight, to defend French Algeria, to defend the 
memory of our dead comrades.”415 The UNCAFN’s founding goal of “continuing combat 
for the Franco-Muslim community” meant that its solidarity with the Army and French 
Algeria would last “to the end.”416 But the FNACA, consciously “confronting the 
UNCAFN,” opposed the war on moral grounds.417 At its first Congress, led by founding 
President Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the FNACA declared that the war “strongly 
prejudices the prestige of France,” and it urged “peace in Algeria” in order to “save the 
traditions of France and its army.”418 The lines in the sand were already drawn by 1958; 
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these associations would never significantly deviate from their mutually exclusive moral 
visions of the war.   
 The UDAA, formed in 1961 by former FNACA members displeased with the 
Federation’s cooperation with Communists, likewise considered it a moral duty to end 
the war.419 However, this group also warned against the manipulation of veterans by 
either the UNCAFN, which it claimed had tacitly sided with the generals’ putsch in April, 
or the FNACA, which ostensibly collaborated with the French Communist Party.420 The 
leaders of the UDAA hoped to group all “unengaged” veterans into a “union of 
democrats,” to face the double peril of fascism and communism.421 Numerically, the 
UNCAFN posed the greatest threat; by 1961 it had about 80,000 members, and claimed a 
readership of 200,000.422 The FNACA struggled to recruit until the early 1970s; even in 
1967, it had only around 20,000 members.423 Fighting perceived ideological threats on 
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the right and the left, the UDAA expanded rapidly, opening committees in forty-one 
departments in France by spring 1962.424  
 Confronting societal indifference and governmental neglect, these associations 
appropriated the “veteran mystique” established by World War I veterans, to position 
veterans of Algeria as political witnesses with moral authority.425 The UNCAFN was 
born mere months before the coup of May 13, 1958, which marked the apex of French 
support for the Algerian War, so the association began on a confident footing.426 For 
instance, in the days immediately after May 13, a National Committee member wrote that 
winning over the Algerian population would “be remembered as one of the most 
beautiful victories of our Army.”427 But the UNCAFN’s rhetoric grew increasingly 
strident as it became apparent that Metropolitan society did not care to keep Algeria 
French. In a 1961 editorial, the President implored nationalist veterans to testify in 
defense of French Algeria: “the future of the Country depends on your bearing 
witness.”428  
 The group’s rhetoric turned bitter and confrontational when it became clear that 
de Gaulle would “abandon” French Algeria. A few months later, the President’s pleas 
turned to generalized threats: “Wait another couple of years and you will see the 	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Generation of the Djebels rise up. But, make no mistake, we will be merciless.”429 The 
UNCAFN portrayed the generation of veterans as true believers in French Algeria who 
had been betrayed by the government and de Gaulle in particular, and argued that these 
veterans deserved a corrective role in politics. 
 The rhetoric of the FNACA also depicted veterans as a generation of wronged 
citizens, but the wrong was having been drafted to fight in an unjust conflict in the first 
place. The association urged veterans to turn the tide of public opinion, arguing that since 
the Algerian War “too often marks the soldier because it implies contempt for human life 
and racism,” veterans should “join with all those who act for Peace, and bring them the 
contribution of those who lived the war.”430 Accordingly, as French society grew to 
oppose the war, the FNACA’s rhetoric became more confident. In 1961, the association 
insisted that the generation “marked” by the war had “the right and the duty to make its 
voice heard, to play a role in the future of the country.”431 As we will see, the FNACA’s 
portrayal of veterans’ suffering, and the UNCAFN’s depiction of French Algeria’s true 
believers abandoned by the state and society, would remain their guiding narratives after 
the war’s end.   
 The UDAA admittedly sought “identical goals [to those of the FNACA] such as a 
negotiated peace in Algeria” and “the defense of rights.”432 The UDAA also emphasized 
the value of veterans’ testimony, insisting that “all those who served [...] have the duty to 
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bear witness.”433 However, it offered a significantly more ambitious platform, proposing 
that “an action of education and civic formation must be undertaken for the veterans of 
Algeria [and] those who are leaving for military service, along with youth movements, 
students, and conscripts.”434 On top of this, the association sought a comprehensive 
restructuring of the armed forces, the transformation of national military service into a 
civic corps and perhaps its eventual abrogation, and Franco-Algerian technical 
cooperation.435 The UDAA was born in a moment when France seemed on the edge of 
civil war—generals had launched a coup in Algiers and the OAS aimed to forestall 
decolonization with the power of plastique in Algeria and the mainland.436 The 
association therefore felt empowered to propose a radically different France, and believed 
that this vision could attract a wide political coalition in the midst of chaos.  
 In qualifying veterans as political witnesses, these associations all followed a 
precedent established by veterans of the Great War, many of whom had used their moral 
stature to castigate the parliamentary politics of the Third Republic.437 The French Army 
was highly politicized through the Algerian period, and remained so until de Gaulle 
purged it in the mid-1960s.438 Conservative officers and career military dominated the 
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UNCAFN, which had been founded by nationalists.439 But the leadership and members of 
the FNACA were quite politicized as well in this period, as former conscripts chose to 
join an antiwar and anticolonial association.440 Thus, it was not unusual in itself that 
associations for veterans of Algeria should engage in political matters; more noteworthy 
is how they overcame a highly forbidding context to do so.   
 For several decades, veterans’ politics in France had required delicate navigation. 
With the February 6, 1934 antiparliamentary riots led by veterans’ associations still in 
living memory, many nationalist veterans were wary of seeming too closely involved in 
politics.441 Making matters worse, in August 1940, Marshall Philippe Pétain had 
dissolved all state-recognized veterans’ associations and ordered their incorporation into 
the Légion française des combattants (French Legion of Soldiers).442 In retribution for 
the collaboration of the veterans’ movement with Vichy, Charles de Gaulle had 
“personally opposed” the creation of a Veterans’ Ministry in 1946, and generally 
distrusted veterans’ associations and their demanding attitudes.443 The most immediate 
obstacle to the Algerian War veterans’ movement, however, was the constitution of the 
Fifth Republic itself, which placed executive power with the President rather than the 
legislature.444  	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 This constellation of power deprived Algerian War veterans of sympathetic 
intermediaries in the government. During the war, President de Gaulle sought approval of 
his policies by referendum, and afterward instituted universal suffrage for the 
presidency.445 In creating this “dialogue” between himself and the French people, de 
Gaulle diminished the power of traditional intermediaries, especially elected deputies.446 
The government could veto deputies’ proposals for the order of the day in the National 
Assembly.447 This new dynamic located the source of political change in de Gaulle and 
his ministers, who were not keen to listen to the appeals of young soldiers who fought a 
war they would rather forget. 
 These considerations compelled the right-wing and left-wing associations to deny 
the political nature of their missions. “Apolitical by statute,” but “national in its form, 
spirit and action,” the UNCAFN reserved the right “to take an interest in state affairs 
[...],” as it frequently would.448 Similarly, the FNACA emphasized that its statutes 
“affirmed its independence from civil and military authorities and all political parties,” 
but asserted it could not be neutral, since that precluded defending veterans’ rights.449 
Both associations sought to frame their activism as civic engagement or mutual aid. But 
the UDAA, emerging as the generals’ putsch and the rise of the OAS “transform[ed]” the 
war “into a subject of interior French politics,” did not face the same pressures.450 The 
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association was unabashedly political. As one of its members noted, in such divisive 
times, “being apolitical does not mean anything. What must be avoided is being 
‘partisan.’ ”451  
 After the end of the war and the defeat of the OAS, the UDAA minimized its 
program of civic formation, feeling that “the problems posed by the reintegration of 
conscripts dominate all others.”452 In spring 1962, the association created a special bureau 
to help mediate between the Ministry of Labor and unemployed veterans, who were often 
“shuttled between one office and another” when they sought help with professional 
reinsertion.453 The UDAA also addressed society, publishing a book in 1964 portraying 
conscripts as victims of an indifferent Metropole, and evaluating their place in the 
Republic.454 This book argued that veterans were robbed of their youth for the 
preservation of a colonial order in which they had no stake, and now faced reintegration 
into a society where “their fellow citizens ignore them” and a modernizing economy 
where “every undereducated man will be out of work.”455 
 In 1964, Le Monde listed the UNCAFN, the FNACA, and the UDAA as “the 
three associations of veterans of Algeria,” but this seems to have been the last year of the 
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UDAA’s existence.456 The UDAA had neither a discrete mobilizing ideology, like the 
UNCAFN’s pro-French Algeria nationalism, nor a concise, easily explained campaign for 
concrete results, like the FNACA’s fight for veterans’ status. Presenting itself as a 
bulwark of democracy during chaos, the UDAA was intended to be “transitory”—it 
sought to “give youth the taste for social and political engagement,” and announced plans 
to disband “once the war is over, once democracy is reconstructed.”457 Yet it continued 
for several years beyond 1962. And its goals, including restructuring both the armed 
forces and national military service, certainly aimed far beyond the end of the war or 
defense of veterans’ rights, to a fundamental transformation of civil and military relations 
in France. It presented the most sophisticated and avowedly political program of all 
veterans’ associations founded during the Algerian War.   
 But the UDAA’s existential challenge was that it proposed a political vision of 
veterans to a disappearing audience. This association joined a wave of political and civic 
movements emerging around 1958 amid much optimism in renewing national life. But its 
idealistic politics courted a democratic center that no longer existed after eight years of an 
extremely polarizing war, when politicized veterans had already chosen their sides. All 
three associations proposed a veterans’ politics, and the UDAA’s was by far the most 	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ambitious, but only the FNACA’s and the UNCAFN’s combative political stances could 
find an audience and ensure the survival of these associations. This polarization of the 
Algerian War veterans’ movement—the disappearance of a conciliatory center—allowed 
the rhetorical space for veterans to transmit only two, mutually exclusive narratives of the 
war in society: the antiwar, anticolonial view of the FNACA, or the nationalist pro-
French Algeria view of the UNCAFN.  
 From the moment of the cease-fire itself, there was no consensus on how to 
commemorate the more than 24,000 soldiers lost in the war. In 1962, most of France 
“was not conscious of having experienced a defeat”; indeed, for President de Gaulle, as 
well as for the Republic he had created, the end of the Algerian War represented “a 
resounding political victory.”458 As discussed in Chapter 1, the scope and aims of the war 
had shifted over time—from ‘pacification’ of a local rebellion, to fighting terrorism and 
winning over ‘hearts and minds,’ to seeking diplomatic negotiations from a position of 
military strength. In retrospect, the Algerian War was “a war without a message,” which 
made commemoration a particularly complex question.459 The “mission creep” of the 
Algerian War, from fighting “rebels,” to “pacifying” a national independence revolution, 
to peacekeeping leading up to a negotiated withdrawal, meant that determining why 
soldiers had died was a painful question for veterans on both sides of the political 
spectrum.  
 To veterans who had believed in the fight to preserve French Algeria, France’s 
embrace of decolonization was scandalous, disgracing the memory of soldiers who died 	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serving the nation. After the loss of French Algeria, its raison d’être, the UNCAFN 
entered a period of mourning, inviting other nationalist associations and patriotic figures, 
such as the wife of Marshall Alphonse Juin, to frequent remembrance masses at the 
church of Saint Louis at the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris.460 Its Vice President even 
penned meditations on a requiem mass for all of France after the Algerian War, writing 
for the moment of confession, “oh! how true it is vis-à-vis the Algerian War that we 
sinned by thought, word, deed, and omission!”461  
 The UNCAFN was well aware that society “now judged” the combat to preserve 
French Algeria as “stupid and useless,” and the way it cultivated a memory of the war 
sought to fight this sense of futility.462 The nationalist veterans who spoke for this 
association believed that soldiers in Algeria had been defending “principles of justice, of 
liberty, the French tradition,” ideas which they felt were “weak” in France itself.463 
Following from this assumption, the association represented the combat as continuing on 
the homefront: veterans must work “[t]o renew among the masses a taste for civism,” and 
“[r]ediscover the meaning of the words ‘responsibilities’ and ‘duties’ before that of 
‘rights.’”464 UNCAFN discourse had sought for years to elevate nationalist veterans as “a 
civic elite” with a “voice that must be heard on the national level.”465 Reconstructing the 
nation in accordance with veterans’ collective insight offered the hope that “‘our war’ [...] 	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will not have been in vain.”466 As one militant explained, France’s future “obviously” 
depended on those “who passed through the crucible of Algeria [...],” who now must 
“impose [...their] way of seeing things [...].”467     
 But for those who had longed for the war to end, its duration had only “rendered 
their sacrifices more useless.”468 After the cease-fire, the FNACA emphasized soldiers’ 
suffering in a futile war, to justify its campaigns for veterans’ rights. The association 
launched vigorous mass campaigns for rights and recognition, arguing that the state owed 
veterans’ status and material benefits to young citizens sent to fight a war against their 
will. The FNACA often used pathos to convey this injustice. For instance, a special series 
in its newspaper, entitled “The Great Misery of Demobilized Veterans,” presented 
unsigned first-person testimonials with heart-wrenching titles such as “On the street with 
my two children,” “I am completely disgusted,” and “How to survive?”469 These 
testimonials were intended to illustrate how “the state, after having used us for many 
months, refuses to recognize the extent of harm caused by the Algerian War.”470   
 The choice of a commemoration date followed logically from both associations’ 
narratives of the war. The FNACA, believing the war had been harmful to French 
soldiers and the very soul of the French nation, chose to commemorate the anniversary of 
the cease-fire, March 19, 1962. Its National Committee decided on this commemoration 
date at its third Congress, at Noisy-le-Sec in 1963. Selecting a specific commemoration 	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date for this combat generation, in the tradition of November 11 and May 8, asserted the 
FNACA’s position that Algeria was a war, and that its veterans deserved rights like their 
elders.471 The association took care to explain that in commemorating March 19, it was 
not celebrating the “Accords of Évian,” the diplomatic agreement with the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic signed on March 18; rather, the FNACA 
commemorated the end of a war that had killed 25,000 young Frenchmen. It publicly 
framed veterans’ remembrance of this day as “work in favor of peace,” noting that the 
end of the Algerian War “brought our country its first day of peace in nearly a quarter of 
a century.”472 At first, the state did not oppose this commemoration date, since it did not 
seem to contradict the official narrative portraying the end of the Algerian “conflict” as a 
victory for France. From 1964 onward, the FNACA’s yearly ceremony at the Arc de 
Triomphe in Paris was authorized to use military music.473  
 The commemoration of March 19 was not initially the FNACA’s first priority, but 
over the years it became intertwined with the association’s primary goal; the national 
leadership provided a written statement demanding veterans’ recognition, to be read at 
March 19 ceremonies.474 And by 1970, with the tenth anniversary of the war’s end in 
sight, the battle over its meaning intensified. President de Gaulle’s amnesties of the last 
OAS members in prison in 1968, as well as his death in November 1970, seemed to give 	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free rein to opponents of decolonization to air their grievances. Concomitant with an 
increased focus on commemorating March 19, the FNACA sought to inscribe its 
narrative of the war on the French memorial landscape.  
 The first “March 19-Cease-fire-in-Algeria Square” was inaugurated in 1971, on a 
square formerly named for André Maginot in Vitry-sur-Seine, a working-class suburb 
southeast of Paris.475 The local FNACA committee persuaded the town council to vote in 
this measure unanimously, in remembrance of the twenty young inhabitants of Vitry-sur-
Seine who had died in Algeria.476 In the same town in 1964, the committee had 
succeeded in building a monument to the war’s dead, which was seems to have occurred 
without controversy, as two associations representing pieds noirs had attended the 
inauguration, and they certainly would not have sanctioned the monument if it seemed to 
celebrate the end of the war.477 But to nationalists who regretted the outcome of the 
Algerian War, the conversion of a square named in memory of a wounded World War I 
hero, to a square celebrating March 19, 1962, was a grave affront.  
 Commemorating March 19 clearly celebrated the victory of all those who had 
worked to end the war.478 For those who had supported French Algeria to the very end, 
the commemoration of the cease-fire felt like a slap in the face, as it seemed to celebrate 
the loss of a French territory, as well as the victory of the Left in yet another “Franco-
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French war.”479 The antiwar left had run the gamut from the legal opposition, including 
the FNACA, to the so-called “porteurs de valises” (suitcase carriers), diverse 
underground activists who collected money for the FLN. But in the eyes of nationalists 
who never accepted the loss of French Algeria, these antiwar groups were all treasonous. 
As the UNCAFN Vice President wrote, “the date of March 19 could only have been 
suggested by those who ardently wished for our defeat in Algeria.”480  
 The FNACA’s nationwide campaign to convince towns and villages to name 
streets and squares in honor of March 19 tempted nationalist veterans and pro-French 
Algeria politicians to polemicize the commemoration date.481 The year of the first 
square’s inauguration in Vitry-sur-Seine, 1971, the two rounds of municipal elections 
bookended the date of March 19, and the FNACA’s commemoration could thus be 
construed as a gimmick to help the left gain power. In January and February 1971, two 
deputies wrote to Minister Duvillard to alert him to the FNACA’s alleged political 
manipulation. Alain Griotteray, an Independent Republican, pointed to Vitry-sur-Seine, 
asking the Minister what his plans were “faced with this political agitation unfolding 
around the anniversary of the Accords of Évian.”482 And Charles Pasqua, a Gaullist, 
emphasized the “shocking” nature of FNACA’s commemoration date, and explained the 	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association’s strategy to inaugurate a street or place for March 19 in each town of France, 
“thus exploiting the memory of this painful and tragic event which divided France at the 
time.”483   
 The FNACA’s chief rival eagerly jumped into the fray of the “battle of March 
19.”484 In March 1971, UNCAFN President François Porteu de la Morandière wrote a 
letter to Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas in protest of the FNACA’s 
upcoming commemoration.485 Chaban-Delmas responded that he “shared the sentiment 
of your companions regarding this project,” and that he had received “vehement protests 
from all of France,” including from repatriated pied noirs and other veterans’ 
associations.486 Indeed, only one national veterans’ association, the Communist-oriented 
Association républicaine des anciens combattants (ARAC), founded during World War I, 
supported the FNACA in this matter, and leaders of pied noir associations were hostile to 
what they perceived as a celebration of their exodus from Algeria.487  
 The Prime Minister’s letter informed Porteu de la Morandière that, with his 
approval, the Minister of Veterans had mailed out a circular “giving the point of view of 
the Government” that the state would “neither participate nor be represented at any so-
called ceremonies of March 19.” This circular instructed prefects throughout the country 	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to direct their subordinates, such as mayors, “not to participate in any manner” in the 
FNACA’s commemoration, nor to “receive any delegations.”488 Apparently, Porteu de la 
Morandière had sent another warning to Minister Duvillard himself, because an excerpt 
of the letter—“I would like to draw your attention to the absurd and indecent character of 
this anniversary, which tries to assimilate the Accords of Evian to a victory comparable 
to those of 1918 and 1945”—featured in a Veterans’ Ministry periodical entitled 
“Dialogues.”489 The UNCAFN’s letters to either the Prime Minister or the Minister of 
Veterans may well have triggered Duvillard’s instructions to the prefects; in any case, 
they provided ammunition for his anti-March 19 campaign.  
 The UNCAFN, for its part, preferred a commemoration of the Algerian War that 
embraced its veterans in a patriotic lineage of French military sacrifices. In his letter to 
Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, the UNCAFN President had suggested that November 
11 become a national day of remembrance in honor of all soldiers lost in war, and the 
Prime Minister promised to pass this idea on to the Minister of Veterans.490 The 
UNCAFN likened its proposed commemoration date to a generalized French “Jour du 
Souvenir (Memorial Day),” as in the United States.491 The armistice of 1918 represented 
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the last time in the twentieth century that France had a cohesive collective memory of 
victory. Choosing to commemorate the Algerian War on November 11 minimized the 
war’s exceptional nature, in effect tying it to a defense of “the land and the fundamental 
values of our civilization.”492 This was how the UNCAFN preferred to remember soldiers 
lost in a war whose original aims now seemed utterly foreign in the postwar period. 
 But the UNCAFN’s attempts to quash the FNACA’s March 19 commemoration 
did not have the desired effect, suggesting a split between higher and lower levels of state 
power. As in previous years, in 1971 the Federation received the proper authorization 
from the Paris Police Prefecture to hold its ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe. The 
Committee of the Flame, the association that organized the relighting of the “Sacred 
Flame” at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—a Republican rite that has taken place 
every day at 6:30 pm since 1923—reportedly invited the association to “‘attend in great 
numbers.’”493 But a nationwide campaign attacked the FNACA’s upcoming 
commemoration: in the weeks preceding the event, anonymous opponents had 
“profaned” war monuments by posting tracts reading, “Évian is not a victory, NO to 
March 19!”494  
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 However, the growing polemic around March 19 only energized the FNACA to 
organize its largest commemoration to date. National President Jacques de Jæger 
estimated over 1,200 attendees at the ceremony in Paris, and recalled that officials of the 
“Committee of the Flame” remarked that “never [...] had a ceremony of relighting the 
flame seen such numbers.”495 The Federation was confident enough at this point to use its 
detractors’ campaign against them—pointing out, for instance, that the Sub-Prefect of 
Pithiviers, Minister Duvillard’s hometown, attended the ceremony there, despite the 
orders that Duvillard had sent out.496 And the national battles between the FNACA and 
the UNCAFN did not always translate to the local level; in Saint-Médard-de-Guizières 
and in Saône-et-Loire, for instance, the local UNC sections participated in the FNACA’s 
ceremony.497 In 1972, public officials continued to take sides; Senate President and 
former presidential candidate Alain Poher was the guest of honor at the FNACA’s March 
19 ceremony in Chartres, while the mayor of Laval stated that he regretted the 
“abstention of prefectoral and military authorities” at the FNACA’s commemoration in 
his town.498   
 In 1973, however, in a period of détente with the Ministry of Veterans, the state 
installed a plaque under the Arc de Triomphe in memory of the soldiers lost in Algeria. 
Created on the suggestion of the Cabinet, it was inaugurated in January 1973, in the 
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presence of recently elected Veterans’ Minister André Bord, the first in his position to 
publicly acknowledge that Algeria had been a war. Leaders of both veterans’ associations 
attended the ceremony.499 After this promising sign, though, there were some setbacks to 
the FNACA’s memorial politics in the short term. From 1974 onward, after the election 
of President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the FNACA would not be permitted to use 
military music at its ceremonies, and this is likely because the pro-French Algeria 
Giscard d’Estaing agreed with the argument that to commemorate March 19 was to 
celebrate defeat.500 But in the long term, the struggle to defend March 19 gave the 
FNACA a stronger sense of identity around which to rally.  
 In honor of the tenth anniversary of the ceasefire in 1972, the FNACA furthered 
its efforts to frame March 19 as a victory for peace. Its newspaper held a contest asking 
members to submit their stories of the day of the cease-fire itself, thus encouraging them 
to incorporate the association’s narrative of the war into their personal memories. The 
first-place winner had been stationed in Algiers on March 19, 1962, and his description of 
the moment of the ceasefire—“at noon, under the reddening sky of Algiers, joy and relief 
replaced worry”—spoke to the memory community of antiwar or apolitical conscripts, 
for whom demobilization was the ultimate prize. However, this memory of March 19 had 
nothing in common with that of many professional soldiers, pieds noirs, or Algerian 
auxiliaries.501 Nor did it speak for conscripts deployed in Algeria well after the cease-fire. 
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 Indeed, the schism over the choice of a commemoration date suggests that, at its 
base, the Algerian War was “uncommemorable” for France—there could be no consensus 
over why soldiers had died.502 These skirmishes over commemoration reflected the 
veterans’ movement attempting to define the Algerian War generation and explain what 
had been done to it. The FNACA’s memorial politics conveyed that the Algerian War 
had injured a generation of conscripts, physically and morally, and that they deserved 
state support and recognition. The UNCAFN’s memorial politics indicated that veterans 
of Algeria had believed in their mission, were grievously betrayed by the state, and 
deserved political authority in return. Debating what had been done to soldiers was, by 
metonymy, a way of evaluating how the Algerian War had affected France. This 
commemoration polemic represented the first phase of processing the memory of defeat 
in Algeria, an “active experience” that took decades.503  
 As with the first phase of collective memory of World War II in France, which 
emphasized the martyrdom of the Occupation and the heroism of the Resistance, the first 
phase of processing the memory of Algeria centered on what had been done to France. 
Veterans’ associations agreed that the Algerian War had been harmful to France and her 
soldiers, although through diametrically opposed political lenses. Only in the later 
“anamnesis” phase of memory, in both contexts, would French society be able to 
contemplate what France had done—in terms of the Shoah and collaboration under 
Vichy, and crimes and torture in Algeria.504  	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 The debate over what had been done to France and to veterans, although rendered 
public through commemorations, largely took place in the private “world of veterans.” As 
the state and society both turned to other priorities—modernization, European 
integration, the growth of consumer society—the Algerian generation was left to sort out 
its “identity crisis” alone.505 The two associations competing to speak for veterans of 
Algeria drew on mutually exclusive narratives of the war, formulated as early as 1958. As 
they cultivated their remembrances against a background of social indifference, they 
ended up channeling the veterans’ movement into two separate memory communities that 
had little to say to each other, so incompatible were their frames of reference on the war. 
And each frame of reference contained an inherent contradiction. Choosing to remember 
the war through a nationalist lens ran up against the facts of defeat and division, and 
remembering the war through an antiwar lens precluded the patriotism that was central to 
the discourse of previous veterans’ movements.506 Two more contentious questions of 
memory divided the associations into hostile camps after the war, both concerning the 
final traumatic year of the Algerian War: the fate of Muslim auxiliaries who had fought 
for France, and the legal consequences facing OAS members and the putschist generals. 
 Regarding Muslim Algerian auxiliaries or harkis, both associations showed a 
remarkable cognitive dissonance, influenced by their political interpretations of the war. 
The FNACA’s national newspaper made its first substantive mention of harkis in 1974, 
when the subject became a national question following hunger strikes launched to draw 	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attention to the harkis’ social and economic exclusion in France.507 The 1974 article 
simply stated that “local committees have joined the outpouring of solidarity” triggered 
by the hunger strikes. The rest of the article summarized government plans to improve 
the housing, employment, and education of resettled harkis, without commentary or 
editorializing.508 An article in Le Monde confirms that the FNACA committee in Évreux 
“expressed solidarity” with the local hunger-striker, Mohamed Laradji, but it is curious 
that the national FNACA newspaper did not consecrate any more coverage to this 
protest.509  
 The second article on harkis the FNACA published in 1974 was an administrative 
notice confirming that former Algerian auxiliaries could have their military service 
validated and counted toward social insurance.510 These were useful notices to those few 
harkis who might have been members of the FNACA, or for veterans who were friends 
with harkis, but these scant discussions suggest they were not a major priority of the 
association. According to the FNACA’s anticolonial narrative that the Algerian War 
pitted French soldiers against the Algerian nation rather than the FLN, harkis were 
collaborators at best. Furthermore, the mere existence of Muslim Algerians who would 
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take up arms for France out of patriotism contradicted the FNACA’s “malgré nous” 
narrative of French veterans’ military service against their will. Finally, the torture and 
massacre of harkis and their families by the tens of thousands after the cease-fire in 1962, 
as traitors in a newly independent Algeria, belied the FNACA’s affirmation that the end 
of the war was a victory for peace.511 So it was easier for the association to ignore these 
veterans, who did not fit into any useful schema, and focus its attention on other matters.  
 The UNCAFN’s pro-French Algeria stance led to the cognitive dissonance of 
fetishizing harkis as “French Muslims who loyally defended our flag,” while failing to 
acknowledge the diversity of reasons other than patriotism—from economic necessity to 
the desire for self-defense or vengeance—that might compel Algerians to take up arms in 
the French military.512 But it is indisputable that the disarming, abandonment, and 
massacre of tens of thousands of harkis formed part of the brutal aftermath of the 
Algerian War. After the French state shielded itself from the consequences by forbidding 
“‘any individual initiative toward installing French Muslims in the Metropole,’” via an 
order from Minister of Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe, the UNCAFN protested loudly.513  
 In response to the persecution and slaughter of harkis in the summer of 1962, the 
UNCAFN welcomed them to France as “refugees.” It asked the government to “demand 
the respect of the Accords of Évian by forbidding FLN reprisals against Muslims faithful 
to France,” and excoriated “the Leaders of the New Algeria, who speak of coexistence 
and fraternity” while “our Muslim Brothers in arms continue to be arrested, imprisoned, 	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tortured, killed.”514 Later, during the hunger strikes in the mid-1970s, the UNCAFN 
asserted that harkis were “at home” in the association, and told its members that they 
needed “our help obtaining justice from an ignorant population and bureaucrats who still 
treat them as immigrant workers and not as true citizens.”515 The association asserted that 
“only veterans of Algeria will know how to find the gestures, the attitude and the words 
that will touch the harkis,” and urged its members to “act without delay.”516 This vocal 
support of the harkis is nearly impossible to disentangle, however, from the UNCAFN’s 
nostalgia for French Algeria and its desire for “good Muslims” who proved that not all 
Algerians had supported the FLN.517   
 The second point of contention after the war concerned amnesty for French 
soldiers imprisoned for crimes in Algeria, a major rallying point of the far right through 
the 1960s. The FNACA firmly established its position soon after the trial of General 
Edmond Jouhaud, one of the four putschist generals, who became the right-hand man of 
General Raoul Salan in the OAS. Jouhaud was sentenced to death on April 13, 1962, but 
stayed on death row for months. The FNACA urged his execution, as well as protesting 
the “scandalous indulgence that marked the verdict of Salan,” who had been condemned 	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to life in prison instead of the death penalty. The association felt that “before so many 
crimes, firmness is a humane attitude; forgiveness is complicity.”518  
 The FNACA headquarters in Paris had been bombed by the OAS in March 1962, 
a week after the cease-fire, and so the association’s outrage at the state’s lenient treatment 
of OAS leaders was emotional as well as ideological.519 The Federation decried the 
successive amnesties throughout the 1960s as political opportunism. It also seized on a 
further OAS amnesty proposed by the Cabinet in 1968 to demand amnesty for all 
conscripts who had been involved in driving accidents in Algeria, and still owed the state 
thousands of Francs each. However, the association’s attempts to lobby the Minister of 
the Army and the judicial agent of the Treasury on this matter bore no fruit.520  
 The UNCAFN’s position on amnesty resulted from two factors: ideological and 
institutional sympathies with the OAS, which numerous leaders and rank-and-file 
members of the association had joined upon demobilization in Algeria or France, as well 
as bitter memories of de Gaulle’s condemnation of Pétain as a traitor in 1945.521 Along 
with insisting on veterans’ recognition and drawing attention to the plight of the harkis, 
the UNCAFN repeatedly passed motions asking the government to institute “a broad 
amnesty covering all the consequences of the Algerian War” at its yearly congresses.522 
In 1963, its Vice President explained that “camaraderie forces us to fight for” amnesty, 	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since it “directly concerns” so many “comrades,” presumably in the association itself. He 
concluded that since France “had not yet recovered from the consequences of the 
Liberation [in 1944],” the country “could not afford the luxury and the shame of 
accumulating new resentments.”523 For many nationalist veterans of Algeria and 
especially pied noir veterans, the OAS had represented the last hope to save French 
Algeria when the state seemed determined to abandon it. The final amnesties of OAS 
members in 1968, and thus the erasure of an official record of their crimes, emboldened 
the far right to organize in ways that continue to affect France to this day. de Gaulle’s 
final amnesty indirectly paved the way for the creation of the National Front. 
 Jean-Marie Le Pen’s political party represents the blowback of the aggrieved 
memory of French Algeria shared among nationalist veterans. He was a survivor of the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu, and wrote afterward, perhaps apocryphally, that there he had 
learned how “wars are won and lost away from the battlefield,” swearing to himself “that 
if I made it back, I would devote myself to politics.”524 At age 27, Le Pen became the 
youngest elected deputy in France, representing the right wing Union de défense des 
commerçants et artisans (UDCA) party of Pierre Poujade, which thrust itself into the 
defense of French Algeria. He then volunteered as a paratrooper in Algeria for six months 
between 1956-1957 before returning to far-right activist circles.525 On May 13, 1958, as 
the leader of the short-lived political party Front national des combattants (FNC), he 
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joined pro-French Algeria associations, the UNCAFN among them, marching in Paris to 
demand the return of General de Gaulle.526  
 Although an elected deputy, Le Pen briefly dallied with the idea of insurrection as 
decolonization appeared on the horizon. For instance, in January 1960, the FNC printed 
tracts attempting to organize Parisian students to support the civilian revolt in Algiers that 
became known as “the week of barricades.”527 That same month, Le Pen would be placed 
under house arrest after calling for de Gaulle’s assassination.528 In July of the same year, 
he founded the Front national pour l’Algérie française (FNAF), along with activists 
including Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, who would run for President in 1965 under Le 
Pen’s management, and Jean Dides, former head of the Légion française des combattants 
in Vichy France.529 The FNAF sought to establish Metropolitan ties with the Front de 
l’Algérie Française, which participated in legal and illegal opposition to decolonization 
in Algeria, and was a precursor to the OAS.530  
 After the end of the Algerian War, however, Le Pen developed a long-term 
strategy of gaining power for the far right through a slow burning political revolution, 
rather than illegal means, and the UNCAFN indirectly helped fuel the National Front’s 
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rise.531 The extreme right wing party, founded in 1972 by Le Pen and former OAS 
members, presented itself from the beginning as the gathering of all nationalists—
including Vichy collaborators and royalists—and appealed to the “vanquished” of 
history.532 The National Front presented itself as the home of the true right, as opposed to 
Gaullism since 1962.533 The Front thus found a particularly receptive audience among 
nationalist veterans of Algeria who shared the colonial nostalgia and memory of Gaullist 
betrayal cultivated by the UNCAFN. The party claimed a direct filiation with the OAS 
and offered veterans the chance to continue their combat in a mass political movement.534 
The Front co-opted the far right’s aggrieved memory of French Algeria and flattered 
nationalist veterans’ sense that their Algerian experience had given them the political 
insight necessary to save a dangerously misguided country. Moreover, the Front 
delivered its appeals in a brutal register—“social and military violence” was the 
“distinguishing feature” of Le Pen’s political rhetoric.535    
 Since its foundation, the UNCAFN had cultivated an image of nationalist veterans 
of Algeria as a civic elite, the “new steel” needed to lead France.536 The association’s 
leaders concluded that that “the end of the Algerian war was the price of cowardice.”537 
Convinced that only nationalist veterans had emerged from Algeria with honor, the 	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association frequently encouraged its members to enter local politics: it was “eminently 
desirable that the practice of camaraderie, moral uprightness, and sense of nationalism 
should lead to an official civic engagement.”538 French Algeria’s true believers in the 
UNCAFN joined a larger memory community that Benjamin Stora calls “les hommes du 
Sud” (men of the South), composed of “soldiers, pieds noirs, officers, [and] former OAS 
activists” who all bore “a certain conception of French Algeria” that informed their 
politics.539 Among veterans, “only the vanquished [French Algeria supporters] had a 
coherent and tenacious memory” of the war, which made them an important target 
demographic of the National Front in its early years.540 
 Feeling like so many “internal émigrés” in a decolonized France, these men 
tended to rally to the National Front in the 1970s and 1980s, whose growing strength 
came from its myopic portrayals of “Islam, North African immigrants, and the Algerian 
War.”541 As the war grew more distant in time, it came to appear an increasingly 
“foundational moment” in the lives of men who had believed in French Algeria, making 
references to the war more potent in National Front discourse.542 While it had no direct 
ties to the creation of the National Front itself, the UNCAFN offered an important vector 
of transmission of an embittered far-right memory of French Algeria and Gaullist 
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betrayal that the Front mobilized, and the association even trained “numerous local 
politicians,” helping to ensure the Front’s slow growth to political viability.543   
  By 1973, the National Front had established itself as the only real far right party 
in France, and Le Pen’s presidential campaign in 1974, although ultimately a failure, 
gave his party national visibility.544 The Front’s period of impoverishment and political 
isolation, which the French term “crossing the desert,” ended in the early 1980s.545 In 
view of the legislative elections of 1986, François Porteu de la Morandière quit his 
position as UNCAFN President in 1985 to campaign on a National Front list, joining 
1,521 candidates nationwide.546 This was the period that all of France seemed to take 
notice of the far-right party’s slow implantation through local elections. Porteu de la 
Morandière saw in the National Front the “great hope” of a party that represented the 
“right with conviction.”547 He would serve the Pas-de-Calais as a National Front deputy 
until 1988.548  
 By the end of the 1980s, the Front had become the third political force in a 
country long accustomed to the bipolar conflict between Communists and Socialists on 
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the left, and variations on Gaullism on the right.549 In 1992, François Porteu de la 
Morandière was elected regional counselor for the Pas-de-Calais at the head of a National 
Front list; indeed, this regional election season had been dominated by lists of “veterans 
of Algeria and OAS celebrities.”550 But he would leave the party in 1997, disappointed 
with the level of “aggression reigning in the National Assembly” between National Front 
deputies and members of traditional right wing parties.551 Porteu de la Morandière claims 
to have been attracted to the National Front because of its patriotism, but the party had 
been openly anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant since its foundation.552 While the UNCAFN 
co-founder observed the rules of his association by quitting his responsibilities to enter 
politics, he was following through on the model of “civism” that he had set for his 
members since 1958—testifying to the nation as a battle-hardened true believer in French 
Algeria.553  
 As for the FNACA, it transmitted an anticolonial narrative of the war that grew in 
public resonance over time. But because this association counted among the “victors” of 
the Algerian War, supporting decolonization from the beginning, it did not have to 
defend its politics as rigorously as did groups that opposed Algerian independence. 
Instead, the FNACA turned its energy and cohesive group identity toward lengthy mass 
campaigns for veterans’ status, eventually gained in late 1974, under the first post-	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Gaullist government of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. With this victory won, the FNACA 
embarked on “constructing a discourse of legitimation” around former conscripts of 
Algeria, who had been tarred by association with the OAS and the boasts of generals who 
justified torture.554 In the association’s logic, conscripts had been doubly victimized—
first, by being sent to fight an unjust war against their will, and later, by the rejection of a 
society that refused to understand them. In the 1980s the FNACA sought to create a 
reconciliatory view of veterans in the public eye, reframing the experiences of conscripts 
as a “permanent warning to future generations,” and creating a committee to study how 
the Algerian War was being taught in schools.555 The Guerre d’Algérie Jeunesse 
Enseignement [Algerian War Youth Education, GAJE] committee to this day engages in 
outreach with students, teachers, and journalists, and has produced several traveling 
exhibits.556  
 Veterans of Algeria frequently distrusted party politics, and “invested themselves 
little in the state [...].”557 But when members of the “Algerian generation” came to 
political power, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, the associations representing them had 
been disseminating a specific narrative of the Algerian War for decades.558 The FNACA 
was ahead of French public opinion, which would eventually come to agree that the 
Algerian War had been a grave misadventure, and the end of the war was a victory for 	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France. But the leaders of the UNCAFN insisted that nationalist veterans possessed 
valuable insights that no one was listening to, and claimed to represent a generation of 
“disabused witnesses, sickened by the fiasco with which they have been associated.”559 
 The association formed a sort of echo chamber that would contribute to the 
growth of the National Front in this period. These links between the UNCAFN and the 
National Front highlight the indirect but important ways that the experience and memory 
of the Algerian War “weighed on national political life, with the long internal exile of the 
vanquished of French Algeria and then the return” of the very theses that had justified 
colonialism.560 Since the UNCAFN has escaped much scholarly attention at all, its central 
role in cultivating a crucial voting demographic early in the National Front’s history has 
never been examined.   
 While French society and the state sought to forget Algeria in the decades after 
the war’s end, these veterans’ associations kept alive specific narratives of the war that 
later re-emerged to fuel political rhetoric and action in the post-Gaullist period. In 
elevating veterans as political witnesses and actors working toward commemoration and 
recognition, the FNACA and the UNCAFN had introduced many members of the 
Algerian generation to politics. Unlike the “sky blue Assembly” elected in November 
1919, or the World War II veterans and Resistance members who dominated the earliest 
governments of the Fourth Republic, the generation of veterans of Algeria had to fight for 
years to establish the value of their testimony, and their right to political authority.  
 Gaullist memorial politics, as well as the nature of political power in the early 
Fifth Republic, obliged the UNCAFN and the FNACA to deny the political nature of 	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their organizations in order to establish a foothold in politics for veterans. Yet eight years 
of a divisive and traumatic conflict had rendered impossible the democratic, 
reconciliatory center sought by the UDAA, and thus only the anticolonialist and 
nationalist extremes of the veterans’ movement survived. This early fragmentation of the 
veterans’ movement directly contributed to the polarization of France’s memory of the 
war that lasts to this day. The “impossible” task of building a collective memory of 
Algeria has not been examined through the window of the veterans’ movement, yet 
politicized veteran-activists felt honor-bound to defend what they believed the war had 
meant for themselves and for their country.561
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CHAPTER 3: LESSONS FROM THE MOUNTAINS: THE FOUNDERS OF THE 
ALGERIAN WAR VETERANS’ MOVEMENT 
  
 
 The pioneers of the Algerian War veterans’ movement—highly educated, 
politically informed, and older than most of their recruits—had served in a key phase of 
the war. In 1956-1957, mass conscription began, the combat was shifting from the 
countryside to the cities, and France’s repression of the war and systematic use of torture 
attracted criticism on the domestic and international fronts. The leaders of both major 
veterans’ associations drew a crucial lesson from this transitional period: they knew that 
opinion on the homefront was of primordial importance in determining the war’s 
outcome, especially in the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers. UNCAFN co-founder 
François Porteu de la Morandière created his association to support the combat for 
French Algeria just as public support for the colony was at its height.562 And FNACA 
President Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, riding a wave of anti-torture denunciations, 
federated his association just in time to protest the escalation of the war under de Gaulle.  
 But both men also worked as activists in their own right, independent but never 
fully separate from their associations. In 1958, the conclusion of the Algerian War was 
far from certain, and few of the most outspoken activists either for or against 
decolonization followed a straight path through to 1962. To support the cause of French 
Algeria, Porteu de la Morandière worked alongside future OAS members—such as Jean-	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Yves Alquier and Jacques Soustelle—but also collaborated with Alexandre Sanguinetti, 
who would later be tasked with dismantling the OAS. Although Porteu de la Morandière 
stayed on the legal far right, not all of his fellow travelers made this decision. And toward 
the goal of ending the war, Servan-Schreiber joined forces with activists such as Georges 
Mattéi, who would later go underground to aid the FLN, feeling that the FNACA was too 
moderate.563 But Servan-Schreiber refused to condone desertion, or support of the FLN. 
The very “unpredictability of paths” travelled by activists in this period suggests “that it 
was an entire system of values that had broken” as French society navigated this 
conflict.564 Yet the founders of these associations maintained their respective political and 
tactical positions on Algeria through the end of the war, and this merits further attention.   
 Despite a political enmity that sometimes became personal, these men shared 
many traits: “elders” of the generation that served in Algeria, they possessed the life 
experience to bring strong political opinions to the war. Their family backgrounds, access 
to education, and charisma facilitated their leadership of the Algerian War veterans’ 
movement. They served as reserve officers during the same phase of the war, and came 
back to France determined to testify, through the associations they created and through 
their personal engagements. Finally, they developed similarly ambitious programs to 
reorganize France in the wake of decolonization, and both entered national politics 
bearing the weight of their Algerian experiences. What are the political lessons that 
resulted from their military service and activism in this period, and how much can 
veteran identity explain these men’s national engagements in the Fifth Republic? To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563Martin Evans, The memory of resistance: French opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Oxford: 
Berg, 1997), 107.   	  
564Paul Thibaud, “Génération algérienne?”, 608-616 in dir. Rioux, 614.	  	  
	   131 
answer these questions, this chapter offers a comparison of the political biographies of 
François Porteu de la Morandière and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the pioneers of the 
Algerian War veterans’ movement. While it is difficult to disentangle the actions of these 
men with those of the associations they steered, the coverage will limit itself to those 
engagements bearing the personal imprint of the founders.    
 Both Porteu de la Morandière and Servan-Schreiber came from positions of 
wealth sufficient to have access to higher education, but their family backgrounds 
illustrate the clash between “old” and “new” money in mid-century France. Count 
François Porteu de la Morandière is descended from what he describes as an “old Breton 
family” that had held the fief of Prévôt des marchands in Rennes before the French 
Revolution.565 With such a position, his family is likely to have been relatively recent 
bourgeoisie under the ancien régime, and may have purchased its title of nobility.566 
Porteu de la Morandière grew up in Sèvres, a wealthy suburb southwest of Paris. After 
World War II, he received a doctorate in law at Sciences-Po preparatory to a career in 
business.567 Compared to his rival, Porteu de la Morandière had more education before 
fighting in Algeria.  
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 But Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, with a relatively lesser degree of education, 
had more life and work experience before his military service. He claimed that his great-
grandfather had been a secretary of Chancellor Bismarck’s who had emigrated from 
Berlin in 1869.568 Servan-Schreiber’s family found its status in French society through 
publishing; his father Émile and his uncle Robert had founded the newspaper Les 
Échos.569 Reflecting on his upbringing, Servan-Schreiber acknowledged the advantages 
of a middle class background and a solid “‘bourgeois’” education, but insisted that he 
“‘inherited nothing from [his] father, who had no fortune.’”570  
 He did, however, inherit his father’s success in journalism, and the media 
platform that he established. After World War II, Servan-Schreiber worked for a while as 
a foreign correspondant for Les Échos, and eventually became the youngest journalist 
working at Le Monde at age 25. In 1953, at the age of 29, he and his colleague Françoise 
Giroud, who would also be his companion until 1960, founded the newspaper l’Express 
over the course of several weeks—it initially appeared as a Saturday edition of Les 
Échos.571 Their avowed aim was to help bring Pierre Mendès-France to power and to 
promote his brand of Republican liberalism.572 Nothing like this weekly opinion 
newspaper had existed in France previously: it would trigger many imitations.573 
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However, l’Express would not be profitable until 1965, after it had become a weekly 
magazine following the model of Time.574  
 Unlike many of the conscripts they would end up leading in their associations, 
Servan-Schreiber and Porteu de la Morandière received distinct political cultures through 
their upbringings. Porteu de la Morandière came from a conservative family that viewed 
the Popular Front as the cause of the defeat of 1940, and he was strongly marked by the 
“threat of Communist disintegration” that unfolded across Europe after World War II.575 
Along with military pride and Catholic values, anti-Communism was a moral and 
political imperative for Porteu de la Morandière.576 As for Servan-Schreiber, he 
emphasized the invaluable political education he had acquired at his father’s dinner table, 
alongside prominent politicians, journalists, and press moguls of the Third Republic.577 
His father had been especially close with those leaders who were, as he later described, 
“‘in revolt against the society of the time, unrelentingly opposed to Hitlerism, indignant 
at the notion of the Maginot line, convinced that de Gaulle’s theories on armor were well-
founded.’”578 The rest of the political class in this period, Servan-Schreiber affirmed, 
were unconcerned with stopping “the fascist menace,” and acquiesced to the 
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establishment of the Vichy state.579 Servan-Schreiber’s antifascist sensibility would put 
him on a collision course with the anti-Communism that Porteu de la Morandière took 
with him to the Algerian War.    
 Although there were but four years of age between these men—Servan-Schreiber 
was born in 1924 and Porteu de la Morandière in 1928—they experienced the defeat of 
1940 and the Occupation differently. Porteu de la Morandière was twelve years old in 
1940, and lived in occupied Paris.580 He witnessed the death of a twenty-year old cousin 
and the grievous injury of his aunt due to an errant Allied bomb that fell in his front yard, 
but other than this lesson in the arbitrariness of death, the war did not seem to have been 
a formative experience or reference point for him.581 Certainly his father, a veteran of 
World War I, bore great respect for the aged hero of Verdun at the head of the Vichy 
state—“he would have slapped my face if I had referred to him as Pétain rather than 
Marshall Pétain,” Porteu de la Morandière recalls.582 But he was only a teenager when the 
war ended, and it had not been a source of great anguish or political reflection for him: 
“at the Liberation I thought it would all turn out well.”583  
 Servan-Schreiber’ adult life was just beginning when World War II broke out, so 
it was a more formative period for him. By 1942, he came to a somber realization: 
“‘France supported Pétain from one end to the other.’” He decided that “‘the bourgeoisie 
were traitors,’” and would henceforth feel a hostility toward and zero identification with 	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the entrenched political class, even though he came from the bourgeoisie himself.584 In 
1943 he gained admission to the elite École Polytechnique university to study 
engineering, and experienced the German and then the Italian occupation at Grenoble. 585 
Along with his father, Servan-Schreiber managed to escape France, and joined the Air 
Force branch of the Resistance in Spain, eventually training as a pilot in the U.S.A., 
although he did not see combat.586 He later confessed that he had chosen to train as a pilot 
rather than a tank commander out of fear of the physical suffering that would result from 
being in a tank hit by a mortar.587 Servan-Schreiber was proud to be one of only five 
members of his entering class at the Polytechnique who had rallied to de Gaulle.588 It was 
a family engagement. His sister Brigitte joined the internal Resistance, and was captured 
and tortured by the Gestapo at the age of 15.589  
 After beginning their adult lives in the new Fourth Republic, both men were 
recalled as reserve officers in Algeria, and came home seeking to testify, feeling that 
France was in the grip of indifference. In 1956, Porteu de la Morandière was remobilized 
as a reserve lieutenant, having completed his military service with the French occupation 
forces in Germany in 1953.590 In Algeria, he was assigned to the 56ème division blindée 
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des fusiliers de l’air, an armored infantry division in the Air Force.591 Porteu de la 
Morandière numbered among a cohort of reserve officers who were given command of 
hastily composed units in the Air Force as conscription accelerated in 1956—he found 
himself leading mechanics, radio operators, and desk jockeys in combat in Algeria, which 
was “frightful,” he recalls, “not a pretty sight.”592  
 Yet the work required to build esprit de corps in this motley band paid off: “we 
put our hearts into the Algerian War,” he remembers proudly.593 After his “baptism of 
fire” during a “very tough encounter,” he received command of thirty men in an isolated 
post by the seaside. But the anxiety of protecting these troops, among whom “there were 
not ten who were battle ready,” made him sleepless and ill, requiring a brief 
hospitalization.594 After recovering, Porteu de la Morandière returned to the original 
branch he had trained with during his national military service—the 1er spahis algérien, 
a storied colonial cavalry division—until his demobilization in 1957.595  
 The young lieutenant returned home to discover that, as he recalls, “Metropolitan 
France didn’t give a damn what was happening in Algeria.”596 He was sickened at the 
public’s ignorance of the FLN’s intimidation tactics: “When you see a guy get his throat 
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slit, you cannot stay indifferent.”597 Porteu de la Morandière was moved to pro-French 
Algeria activism out of nationalism, certainly, but more importantly a sense of duty to 
defend the troops from what he saw as “scandalous, inadmissible” calumny leveled by 
Communists and other activists who criticized the war effort.598 Soon after his 
demobilization, he began meeting with friends in Paris to discuss how best to support the 
cause of French Algeria on the homefront, eventually culminating in the creation of the 
UNCAFN in December 1957.599 
  Servan-Schreiber had been actively criticizing France’s Algerian adventure before 
his military service; his newspaper l’Express was a valuable platform for political 
commentary.600 L’Express presented a diversity of opinions, which was part of its 
novelty, but initially only one contributor, Jean Daniel, affirmed that full independence 
was “inevitable.”601 Supporting independence was a minority position even among 
intellectuals critical of the war effort at this point. For a time Servan-Schreiber believed, 
along with many liberal Republicans, that Algeria was an “‘integral part of the 
Republic,’” but that France should evolve toward “‘an intelligent and liberal politics’” in 
order to keep good relations with Algeria and deny the FLN its justification for 
revolution.602 When the magazine briefly became a daily in 1955, the goals of its first 
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issue were to bring Pierre Mendès-France back to power, and to resolve the Algerian 
crisis through encouraging reconciliation between the Algerians and the settlers.603  
 But his close involvement in the repression of the Algerian War led Servan-
Schreiber to refine his views. In July 1956, he was recalled as a reserve lieutenant for 
Algeria—not in retaliation for his editorial positions, as Françoise Giroud suspected at 
the time, but simply through the same process that mobilized millions of other 
Frenchmen.604 Studying at the École polytechnique had automatically rendered him a 
sub-lieutenant.605 Servan-Schreiber did not use his connections or celebrity to avoid 
service, taking a stand for the “‘elementary principles of equality before the law,’” and he 
had publicly opposed the calls for desertion emanating from some antiwar circles.606 He 
served in the 531e demi-brigade de fusiliers de l’air, an infantry unit attached to the Air 
Force. Both Servan-Schreiber and Porteu de la Morandière thus served as remobilized 
reserve lieutenants in the Air Force, during the dramatic escalation of the French effort, 
when most reserve units were reconstituted as infantry in great haste and 
disorganization.607   
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 And indeed, Servan-Schreiber perceived his work as “extraordinarily 
unpredictable and acrobatic.”608 Without any additional training, he was immediately put 
in charge of about 150 men on his arrival southeast of Algiers, in a small town called 
Rivet (present-day Meftah).609 He described his soldiers as having “a touching naïveté 
and a great honesty.”610 Servan-Schreiber embraced his role as an educated instructor of 
the young conscripts in his charge, attempting “bit by bit [to explain] to my company the 
reasons for discipline and the rules of such a complex mission that we all have been 
called to do.”611 But he found it difficult to build their motivation, since he did not 
believe in the mission himself; he needed to “invent the force of conviction,” and 
discovered it in the goal of saving his men’s lives.612 And he feared that his celebrity had 
the potential to harm unit cohesion and effectiveness. Even though Servan-Schreiber was 
well known among his troops for his work at l’Express, he tried “to make them 
understand with a smile and a wink that the best favor they could do for me is to forget 
who I am.”613 He even declined to share his political interpretations of the war, since 
some of his soldiers strongly supported French Algeria.614  
 Servan-Schreiber, despite his opposition to the Algerian War, ended up with 
greater command responsibilities than did Porteu de la Morandière, the true believer. He 	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“plunged deep into the task that they have made me do,” hoping to “do it better than 
others” had; this was his method to fight depression and avoid seeing “this adventure as 
utterly stupid.”615 His successes saw him promoted to battalion chief of staff, with 
indirect responsibility for nine hundred men.616 Servan-Schreiber was eventually selected 
to train the first teams of commandos noirs [black commandos], units that had a double 
mission of “pacification”: to establish friendly ties and trust with the local population, but 
also to fight the FLN with “an exemplary severity.”617 For his dutiful work, and perhaps 
also for the propaganda value of the gesture, the Army decorated Servan-Schreiber with 
the Cross of Military Valor.618   
 But his deep involvement in “pacification” only validated his “Parisian 
convictions [...] far beyond what is conceivable,” he recalled after the war.619 Servan-
Schreiber observed that “an army of occupation is not the instrument of a solution; it 
contributes directly to forging the national consciousness of the people [...], sustains the 
enemy, and nourishes the rebellion.”620 Like Porteu de la Morandière, Servan-Schreiber 
needed time to recover from stresses incurred during the war. After demobilization, he 
convalesced at a “bio” health clinic in Zurich, and converted to vegetarianism.621 When 
he returned to France in 1957, he used his celebrity as well as his eyewitness experience 	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as a veteran of Algeria to criticize France’s conduct and incoherent policies. In May 
1958, he was elected President of the Association des Anciens d’Algérie, which sought to 
organize “republican defense” in the wake of the May 13 coup, and which he would lead 
to federate with two other small associations to create the FNACA in September.622  
 Both men were very charismatic, able to lead and inspire people, and possessed a 
vigorous self-regard that drove their activism on the crucial national question of the time, 
the fight over French Algeria.623 Porteu de la Morandière had sought the community of 
veterans elsewhere before founding his own association. In January 1958, he wrote to 
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front national des combattants party, asking to be stricken from the 
membership for “an ensemble of personal reasons.”624 Perhaps he no longer needed to 
seek “contact with the largest number of veterans of North Africa possible,” since he had 
just created the UNCAFN in December 1957. Or maybe he feared that the FNC would 
devolve into illegal opposition to the Algerian War, since he desired to avoid crossing 
this boundary himself. The same day, he also sent a letter to the Association des Anciens 	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d’Algérie, resigning in “disappointment with its goals and its means.”625 He must have 
only recently discovered that the AAA was an antiwar association seeking a negotiated 
peace under the leadership of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. In any case, he could not 
remain in an association opposed to the war.626  
 But Porteu de la Morandière also sought common cause with groups fighting for 
French Algeria beyond the veterans’ world. In February, he joined the Union pour le 
salut et le renouveau de l’Algérie française (Union for the Salvation and Renewal of 
French Algeria, USRAF), a moderate civic association founded by Jacques Soustelle and 
Georges Bidault to raise public support for French Algeria.627 One of his first actions 
after becoming a USRAF Executive Committee member was to write letters of support to 
General Raoul Salan as well as Robert Lacoste, Minister of Algeria, promising that 
demobilized veterans of Algeria would continue “the combat for Franco-Muslim 
Community in a French Algeria, in the same spirit that united us while in uniform.”628 
Porteu de la Morandière agreed to write occasional articles for USRAF propaganda, to 
speak at the association’s press conferences—primarily in Brittany, where he conducted 	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much of his business—and also to give talks on “revolutionary war” at colloquia that 
Jacques Soustelle organized.629  
 Porteu de la Morandière also raised awareness about the cause of French Algeria 
through the auspices of the state. In 1958, Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas asked him to 
“pass” as a French student to attend a seminar of international students in Norway that 
was discussing colonialism in Algeria, with some FLN delegates in attendance. Porteu de 
la Morandière, accompanied by another Frenchman and a Muslim Algerian, attempted to 
convince the audience in Norway of the justice of France’s fight against the FLN, while 
the FLN delegates defended the movement’s combat for national independence. At the 
end of the seminar, the Muslim student in Porteu de la Morandière’s contingent invited 
anyone who was not yet convinced to come to Algeria and see for themselves. 
Apparently this generated a great deal of interest, for European ambassadors wrote to the 
French Defense Minister asking if such visits could be arranged.630  
 With the Defense Ministry’s aid, Porteu de la Morandière organized at least one 
visit of international students to Algeria in 1960.631 His goals were for students to see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629Correspondence between Simone Menut, member of the Executive Committee of the USRAF, and 
François Porteu de la Morandière, 28 February-25 March 1958, UNCAFN archives, “USRAF” folder; 
Porteu de la Morandière, interview, 15 February 2014. 
 
630Porteu de la Morandière, interview, 15 February 2015. Although I do not have documentary proof of 
these foreign ambassadors’ requests, I do not doubt the veracity of Porteu de la Morandière’s overall 
outline, as there is ample evidence to confirm that he did organize and undertake at least one trip. In the era 
before the French government’s official turn to a policy of decolonization, it is believable that the state 
would task the leader of a highly visible pro-war veterans’ association with such intelligence and 
propaganda missions.  
 
631François Porteu de la Morandière, form letter in English to “Dear friend” asking for confirmation of trip 
to Algeria between 16 and 26 August 1960, 2 August 1960, UNCAFN papers, “MRP” folder. Confirming 
that the students were foreigners, Porteu de la Morandière’s papers include a telegram from a Greek student 
who cancelled at the last minute, and a letter from a British student who has having trouble obtaining a visa 
in time. Kellas Anastasios, “My participation impossible,” telegram to UNCAFN headquarters, Athens, 
undated, UNCAFN archives, “Voyage Étudiants” folder; Brian Walsh, letter to François Porteu de la 
Morandière, 31 July 1960, UNCAFN archives, “Voyage Étudiants” folder.     
 
	   144 
Algerians armed to fight the FLN in so-called “self-defense villages,” to witness France’s 
“pacification” work in native schools and clinics staffed by specialized administrative 
units, and preferrably to see more Muslim soldiers than French ones.632 And indeed, the 
visit, lasting ten days, brought students on tours of Algiers to meet Algerian students and 
hear lectures on economic and political topics, to Hassi-Messaoud to discover France’s 
recent oil extraction project in the Sahara, and into the countryside to see a “self-defense 
village” and a school for Algerian children run by French officers.633  
 This project seemed to draw on a precedent set in 1959, when the French state 
began organizing brief visits of French university students to Algeria, to see the 
exploitation at Hassi-Messaoud and the work of rural administrative units, as well as 
sometimes the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers—including the late Ali La Pointe’s 
former hideout, which had been dynamited. This was an effort to raise public support for 
the Constantine Plan, which de Gaulle had promulgated in 1959—a last-ditch attempt to 
bring the kind of modern industrialization and economic development that had been 
lacking in Algeria since its colonization.634 Although international propaganda effects are 
unknown, Porteu de la Morandière’s field trip had some domestic visibility, as highlights 
were broadcast on French national news.635  	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633“Projet de programme du voyage no. 21 (Étudiants Étrangers),” not dated but written before 16 August 
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 A later television program featured interviews with several of the students—a 
Danish man, three German men, and a Canadian woman—after their return in late 
August 1960.636 The students’ testimony was a bit superficial since the interview was not 
conducted in their native languages, but Porteu de la Morandière’s propaganda goals 
were manifest in the students’ evocations of what interested them most. A German man 
and the Canadian woman discussed the specialized administrative units in rural Algeria, 
where “above all, the officers do human work [...] helping people with administrative 
tasks, and all the needs of daily life,” and where “the children like learning, and learning 
from French people.” Another German student described the oil exploitation at Hassi-
Messaoud as “very important for the French economy and all of Europe,” almost 
certainly parroting the thesis of a lecture that the students received.  
 But there was some nuance to the students’ testimony as well. The Danish student 
mentioned that the new housing construction in Algiers looked “more modern than any 
European town,” and had the benefit of reducing the unemployment rate among 
Algerians. But he pointed out the existence of “awful shantytowns” right behind the 
modern housing blocks, asking, “Why didn’t France build these new houses before the 
rebellion?” And one of the German students, asked to summarize the group’s experiences 
for the conclusion, observed that Algeria had transformed from a “battlefield into a site of 
reconstruction,” but expressed regret that they did not have time to discuss political 
questions.637  
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 Rather than secret missions and state-funded propaganda tours, Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber fought the battle on the homefront through the pages of his newspaper 
l’Express. This charismatic young journalist was variously celebrated and reviled for his 
activism against the war in Algeria and its excesses. He numbered among the “new 
Dreyfusards,” a term coined by the historian and antiwar activist Pierre Vidal-Naquet to 
describe liberal Republicans who opposed the war for its moral effects on France, rather 
than out of a fundamental critique of colonialism.638 While he eventually came to feel 
that independence was the only solution, initially he hoped that with an intelligent policy 
in Algeria, France could “succeed [...] in truly associating different people and races in a 
common task,” which would lead to an “American-style renewal,” and a humane 
Republican empire.639 Servan-Schreiber’s best remembered public critique of the war 
effort came with a short novel, Lieutenant en Algérie, published in 1957 by his friend 
René Julliard. The work originally appeared in l’Express in installments beginning in 
March 1957.640  
 A lightly fictionalized and cuttingly sarcastic account of Servan-Schreiber’s 
wartime experiences, the novel critiqued the incoherency of France’s war effort by 
tracing the downward spiral of violence in the revolution. For instance, it described how 
settlers responded to an attack by Algerian rebels with a series of lynchings, which the 
political authorities did little to prevent: “We just have to live with it. We get used to 	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it.”641 The work reflected the confusion of the French mission of pacification in 
Algeria—was it to win over hearts and minds, or to destroy the FLN? Servan-Schreiber 
implied that France could pursue one or the other goal, but not both. Since the adversary 
in a guerilla war was not “marked with a cross on the forehead,” it was necessary “to 
round up—or kill—four or five” Algerians in order to get “one real” rebel.642 This was 
already not a particularly flattering depiction of the French war effort.  
 But the second installment in l’Express, published on May 15, 1957, explicitly 
lamented French soldiers’ routine reprisals in response to “the exactions of the rebels”: 
“how many units, pushed all of a sudden by blind anger, give in to the worst excesses: 
pillage, murder, collective tortures, not to be outdone by those committed by their 
adversaries, and justifying all the opposition’s propaganda.”643 It was not because 
Servan-Schreiber wished for France’s defeat in Algeria that he published these details, 
but because, as one of his characters explained, “the Army in Algeria has become a 
national taboo, to which we can only render hommage. [...] We are in a vicious circle: 
soldiers, whose opinion on the conduct of the Army would have credibility, cannot 
express it; civilians, when they can speak on it, are discredited.”644 Servan-Schreiber, an 
educated and famous civilian temporarily transformed into a soldier, was attempting to 
breach this taboo. But on the pretext of the word “torture,” Defense Minister Maurice 
Bourgès-Manoury prosecuted Servan-Schreiber and l’Express for “moral injury to the 
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Army,” citing Article 76 of the penal code. For this offense, Servan-Schreiber faced ten 
years in prison.645 
 Servan-Schreiber’s trial coincided with growing public debate in France on the 
use of torture in Algeria. During his deployment, he had served under General Jacques 
Parîs de Bollardière, who would distinguish himself as the only general to have opposed 
the Army’s use of torture in Algeria by resigning.646 A friend and supporter of the 
general, Servan-Schreiber published de Bollardière’s protest letter explaining his 
resignation in l’Express.647 Furthermore, Le Monde published a letter from de Bollardière 
to Servan-Schreiber, which praised his work to raise awareness of “the fearful danger of 
our losing sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate efficacy, of the moral values 
which alone have defined the greatness of our civilization and our Army.”648 Thus the 
Defense Ministry’s pursuit of Servan-Schreiber unfolded in a larger context wherein the 
state had just decided to continue General Jacques Massu’s methods of severe repression 
used in the Battle of Algiers rather than heed General de Bollardière’s call to end 
torture.649 
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 However, Servan-Schreiber would not be cowed by the state’s prosecution, and 
viewed his trial as yet another platform to raise public awareness of torture.650 But 
nationalist veterans who supported the Army and its mission viewed the antiwar 
testimony of this rising celebrity as a threat. The French nationalist right excoriated 
Servan-Schreiber’s engagements as defeatist if not treasonous.651 In March 1958, 
knowing that Servan-Schreiber’s case would add to the growing public conversation on 
torture and raise questions on the justice of France’s mission, Porteu de la Morandière 
asked his friend Gérard Le Marec, the UNCAFN National Secretary, to help him identity 
some “solid guys” living in Paris who could testify that Servan-Schreiber had indeed 
“morally injured the Army.”652 Eventually, the Army’s case against Servan-Schreiber 
was dismissed, perhaps because the state wished to cease fueling the public polemic over 
torture.653 But the debate over the conduct of the French Army and its mission in Algeria 
translated into a heated personal rivalry between the two association founders, although 
Porteu de la Morandière seems to have been more preoccupied with Servan-Schreiber 
than vice versa.  
 In the summer of 1959, Porteu de la Morandière and several colleagues attended a 
public information session hosted by the FNACA Committee of Saint-Denis, a working-
class suburb outside Paris. Appalled by the antiwar themes of the meeting—which he 	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interpreted as “Peace in Algeria, the atrocities of the Army, France at war against the 
Algerian people, etc.”—Porteu de la Morandière stepped to the microphone to call Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber a liar. He explained the reasons to be proud of the Army and its 
combat, including the 120,000 Algerian soldiers and auxiliaries fighting for France. 
Ignoring the threatening noises emanating from the audience, the anti-Communist veteran 
asked the anti-fascist veteran if he was “ashamed to have used [his] writing to smear 
comrades who could not respond because they were still in uniform.”654 The FNACA 
decried the UNCAFN’s repeated “aggressions,” and used them to boost its profile—for 
instance, mentioning without surprise that members of the association had once again 
“savagely attacked” President Servan-Schreiber during a meeting in Lyon later the same 
year.655 
 These men’s wartime engagements made them highly visible public figures in 
France. In 1960, during the military trial of Francis Jeanson, the head of a network of 
French activists who collected money and forged documents for the FLN, Servan-
Schreiber’s newspaper was seized by the state for “inciting desertion” by simply 
reporting on Jeanson’s trial, as well as a secret press conference that Jeanson had held.656 
In the eyes of the state, Servan-Schreiber and his newspaper were guilty by association, 
even though he had on numerous occasions refused to support desertion, and condemned 
aid to the FLN. And in the increasingly divisive battle on the homefront, nationalists who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654“Soirée scandaleuse à Saint-Denis,” Djebel 9 (July-August 1959): 2.  
 
655Samuel Margolinas, “Agir de façon efficace pour la Paix en Algérie,” L’Ancien d’Algérie 4 (November 
196): 2. Because of the delightful imprecision of the French language, it is impossible to determine whether 
the “savage attack” was a physical or verbal aggression, but it was likely only verbal, as Servan-Schreiber 
did not file charges against Porteu de la Morandière or it certainly would have been noted in the FNACA’s 
newspaper.  
 
656Bothorel, 281. 
 
	   151 
supported French Algeria felt that either one could support the Army unconditionally, or 
one could support the FLN; there was no room for nuance.657 François Porteu de la 
Morandière organized a brief silent demonstration in front of the military tribunal 
building in Paris where the trial was being held, to protest testimony for the defense that 
had criticized the action of the French Army and justified that of the FLN.658 He invited 
numerous nationalist veterans’ associations allied with the UNCAFN and UNC.659   
 Throughout the war, both men navigated the increasingly slim margin between 
anti-Gaullism and anti-Communism, although their political priorities meant that they 
would never recognize each other as potential allies. While Servan-Schreiber opposed the 
Fifth Republic from its birth, Porteu de la Morandière tactically allied with Gaullists in 
1958 toward the cause of “saving” French Algeria. He organized a march in Paris on May 
13, 1958 to call for the return of General de Gaulle to power, whereas Servan-Schreiber 
joined the anti-Gaullist protest “For the defense of the Republic” from Nation to 
République in Paris on May 28.660 In Servan-Schreiber’s view, de Gaulle’s return on the 
wings of an orchestrated military coup was the “original sin” of the Fifth Republic, 
foretelling authoritarianism and perhaps even fascism.661 He felt that part of the mission 
of l’Express in the 1960s was to “gather the men who will form the team that will 	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succeed de Gaulle.”662 One concrete project toward this end was the launch in l’Express 
of a presidential campaign for “Mister X” in 1965, later revealed to be the Socialist 
Gaston Defferre, in an ultimately vain attempt to regroup the non-Communist left and 
some of the center.663 Servan-Schreiber celebrated de Gaulle’s departure in 1969, but 
would remain anti-Communist his whole life.664 And Porteu de la Morandière would 
definitively lose his illusions about Gaullism by 1961, when the government’s new policy 
of decolonization became clear.665 
 Finally, both men entered national politics after their engagements with veterans’ 
associations, and their understandings of the Algerian War would inform their political 
visions for France. Servan-Schreiber considered himself a “political man” above all, and 
claimed that he had only used journalism as an entry into national politics.666 He had been 
a “trusted advisor” and supporter of Pierre Mendès-France in his attempts to revitalize the 
Radical party, and had founded l’Express a little over two weeks before Mendès-France 
was seated as Prime Minister in 1953.667 Servan-Schreiber’s first electoral attempt was in 
January 1957, as a legislative candidate in Paris, but the Radical party rejected his 
candidature.668 In 1962, he lost a campaign to represent a district of the Seine-Maritime in 
the second round to the Gaullist candidate.  	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 After the above-mentioned failed campaign of “Mister X” in 1965, Servan-
Schreiber became more seriously interested in the reform of political institutions 
themselves. He saluted what he called “‘the awakening of France’” that he perceived in 
the nationwide revolts of summer 1968, and celebrated the final referendum after which 
de Gaulle left power in 1969.669 He rose to Secretary-General of the Radical party in 
1969, and was elected a Radical deputy representing Nancy in 1970. That year, he also 
stood as a mayoral candidate in Bordeaux, but failed in his attempt to unseat current 
Prime Minister Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas. From 1971 to 1979, Servan-Schreiber, 
now the President of the Radical party, attempted to “renew this old formation,” which he 
had desired since his time in the Algerian War.670   
 At the Radical party Congress of 14-15 February 1970, Servan-Schreiber 
presented a manifesto called “Heaven and Earth” with which he hoped to reinvigorate the 
party, and propose an ambitious reorganization of the French economy and political life. 
The first plank in the Radical manifesto called for the “separation of political and 
economic power.” This implied ending the practice of “artificial and ruinous state aid” to 
private companies, and channeling those funds to create “economic security” for citizens 
who had been sidelined by economic development.671 The second plank emphasized 
access to “social equality,” beginning with a reform of education to encourage civic and 
cultural formation in the home, even before formal schooling began.672 Instead of 	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“consolidating” social privileges, Servan-Schreiber hoped to use education to “attack the 
roots of social inequality.”673 Building social equality also implied, in his view, the 
replacement of obligatory national military service with a “civil, economic, pedagogical, 
and social” service, as well as ending the system of the higher education networks 
(“Grandes Écoles”) and civil service exams (“Concours”) that concentrated political 
power in a tiny bureaucratic elite (“Grands Corps”).674  
 Third, the manifesto sought to abolish “private hereditary power,” proposing to 
increase social mobility and encourage the competitiveness of private companies by 
ending the “heredity possession of the instruments of production.” Servan-Schreiber 
claimed that with the proper legislation, this could be accomplished in one generation.675 
Finally, Servan-Schreiber urged the “redistribution of public power,” arguing that 
France’s system of centralized, national politics no longer corresponded with economic 
realities. Between rising multinational corporations, who “establish their planetary 
empire beyond national political powers,” and the strictures of the “thick bureaucratic 
hierarchy” in France, ordinary citizens had less and less control over the decisions that 
affected them most directly.676 He proposed opening more spheres of politics to universal 
suffrage, “from small units (town or village), all the way to the European federation.”677 
Servan-Schreiber’s political platform revealed the paradox of his aspirations for France: 
privileged by a bourgeois background that allowed his entry into politics to begin with, 	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he sought to break the hold of the bourgeoisie on French political life.678 And the Radical 
party unanimously approved his manifesto.679    
 As head of the Radical party, Servan-Schreiber attempted to strategically 
reorganize the political landscape by gathering Socialists with moderate centrists. But the 
Socialists, under the leadership of François Mitterrand, refused this alliance, feeling it 
was their negotiation and alliance with the Communist party that gave them strength.680 
In the legislative elections of 1973, Servan-Schreiber’s centrist grouping won only 34 
seats. Showing his political orientation was more to the left than his strategic centrist 
positioning suggested, Servan-Schreiber only endorsed Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s 
presidential run three days before the election in May 1974.681 However, he briefly 
served as Minister of Reforms in Jacques Chirac’s first cabinet under Giscard, leaving 
after a week due to his outspoken opposition to upcoming nuclear testing.682 Chirac and 
Servan-Schreiber were the first veterans of Algeria to serve in national government. 1974 
marked the end of Servan-Schreiber’s formal political career, although he would continue 
to figure in national debates on many topics including nuclear power, the Concorde, and 
France’s need to embrace information technology.  
 Proceeding on a different timeline, Porteu de la Morandière remained at the helm 
of his association for twenty-seven years, attempting to inculcate civic values and the 
taste for political engagement in his members, as discussed in Chapter 2. Although he did 	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not enter national party politics until the 1980s, he began formulating a political vision 
for France as soon as he observed the government’s shift toward decolonization. In 
January 1961, de Gaulle’s referendum on Algerian self-determination was put to the 
country, and Porteu de la Morandière wrote an enraged manifesto in response. In July, he 
published a book speaking for the nationalist veterans who, “returning from the djebels, 
lean and hardened, [...] saw the bourgeois country from which we came, and [...] wanted 
to bite.”683 Drawing on the traditional right wing critique of French society as decadent, 
he insisted that the Algerian revolution was preying on “the weakness of our institutions, 
of our faith, and of our energy.”684 Porteu de la Morandière criticized his country’s lack 
of ideological commitment to Algeria, which he felt had handicapped France’s combat 
against the FLN: “Down there we came to understand the superiority of those who 
believe in something over those who do not believe in anything, and we returned to a 
country that believes in nothing.”685 
 Porteu de la Morandière’s diagnosis of France also drew on the traditional right-
wing critique of parliamentary politics, calling “the mechanism of French domestic 
politics [...] indisputably dead,” since the most important political forces were outside of 
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Parliament, and political parties offered nothing to men under the age of forty.686 He 
desired to rid France of “its old notions and traditions such as the right and the left which 
are now [only] social signifiers [...].” The shifting political sands of the Algerian War had 
taught him that these labels had lost their political meaning, since one could be a Socialist 
and oppose independence, or one could be a right wing Gaullist and support 
independence.687 Porteu de la Morandière described his vision for France as “neither a 
monarchy nor a dictatorship, but a Republic that is democratic and simply 
rejuvenated.”688 He explained that he was proposing the very “political reconstruction 
from the ground up” that veterans of Algeria had expected but not received from de 
Gaulle’s Fifth Republic.689 Expressing the worldview born of his wealthy and noble 
background, he suggested that “it is not harmful to equality to help define a moral and 
national hierarchy.” And, in his view, the group best prepared to form the country’s new 
“civic elite” were veterans, as long as they had not been distracted from their national 
duty with either militant goals or a myopic fixation on commemoration.690   
 Porteu de la Morandière proposed a model for a tripartite Parliament, consisting 
of a nationally elected political assembly combined with two apolitical structures—a 
“pyramid of territorial representation from the town to the national level,” and a 
“corporate” body to represent voters through affiliations of religion, family, intellectual 
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tradition, and social class.691 This corporatism clearly harkened back to the model of the 
Vichy state. Rejecting what he perceived as the institutionalization of demagogy, Porteu 
de la Morandière advocated ending the presidential regime, but maintaining universal 
suffrage, so that citizens voted more often and were better represented by the three 
corporate bodies he proposed.692 While defending private property as “one of man’s most 
profound instincts,” and decrying the estate tax as “having no justification other than its 
profitability for the state,” Porteu de la Morandière declared that “capitalism is dead,” 
since it “constituted a materialist oppression almost as strong as that of the Communist 
world.”693 He envisioned the “very delicate balance” of a “Western economy with a 
socialist coloration” as France’s best economic path.694  
 Porteu de la Morandière advocated decentralization “in the framework of a certain 
regionalism.”695 And he included Algeria in his vision of a renewed France, writing that 
“Islam must be able to make its voice heard” in the corporate structure of government. He 
even allowed that Algeria could vote for independence if it wished, but affirmed that 
under his plan, there would be no need for this separation, since the country’s 
“personality” would be “perfectly expressed on the regional level.”696 He reveals his 
perspective as an anti-Communist Cold Warrior with his description of democracy as “a 
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certain Christian and Western conception of man, far beyond the political use of 
votes.”697   
 Although he was not a believer, and always considered himself a “‘man of the 
left,’” Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber ended up sharing a surprising number of political 
critiques with Porteu de la Morandière.698 He did not make the Algerian War the center of 
his political discourse, as pro-French Algeria politicians tended to do, but the war 
remained an important frame of reference. In 1970, addressing the Radical party in 
Nancy as a newly elected deputy, he used the discourse of the Algerian War to promote 
political decentralization. If the state would not negotiate with local forces and cede 
enough power, he foresaw Frenchmen turning into “‘fellaghas’”—the Arabic word for 
“peasant” had become a common shorthand for FLN fighters during the war. Servan-
Schreiber decried the power and omnipresence of representatives of the State, who gave 
him “‘the impression that we are in the colonies.’” He continued that “‘Colonial war is 
now in France. [...] We must encourage the French to take the power where they are, 
before we end up with guerilla warfare. This is the new French revolution, without 
violence, or destruction, or purges.’”699  
 Against the excessive centralization of French politics and its domination by the 
mandarinat, a tiny minority of bourgeois educated in exclusive schools such as the École 
nationale d’administration, Servan-Schreiber proposed “‘the right to political life for the 
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whole of the population, and political participation in the broadest sense of the term.’”700 
Servan-Schreiber, like Porteu de la Morandière a decade earlier, criticized what he 
perceived as an ossified democracy in France. They both lamented the “crisis of parties” 
or the death of “the mechanism of French domestic politics” during the war, blaming the 
quagmire of parliamentary maneuvering for France’s inability to lead a coherent policy in 
Algeria.701  
 But their proposed solutions to this political stalemate were quite different. Porteu 
de la Morandière sought to depoliticize public life by corporate representation and the 
creation of a new elite, evidenced by his efforts to encourage civic engagement among 
UNCAFN members, and his eventual tenure as a National Front politician. He feels that 
he has been successful in “constructing a useful force for our country, making the 
‘generation of the djebels’ fully enter into French associational life.”702 And he cites the 
UNCAFN’s “training of numerous local elected officials” as an example of “concrete 
civism.”703 Servan-Schreiber, however, sought to break the traditional hold of the elite on 
politics by introducing as many citizens as possible to political life. In 1971, he explained 
that he would consider his political mission accomplished if he succeeded in having 
inspired “‘a great number of men and women to politics who can themselves, together, in 
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a team, with me or without me, achieve this new democracy that we are attempting to 
create [...].’”704  
 The life paths of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and François Porteu de la 
Morandière demonstrate how the war radicalized educated veterans and informed their 
political engagement in the Fifth Republic. Veteran identity was central to Porteu de la 
Morandière’s self-concept and political ambitions, both because he was younger during 
his military service, and because he believed in his mission, making it a strongly 
formative experience. He became the Honorary General President of the UNC after its 
fusion with the UNCAFN, and this title remains important to how he presents himself to 
the world.705 But for Servan-Schreiber, who had distinguished himself as an intellectual 
leader before Algeria—a political man who took up journalism as a way to enter the 
national discussion—the important experience seems to be his critiques of the war and 
the consequences of his engagement, rather than his identity as a veteran.  
 Servan-Schreiber quit the presidency of his veterans’ association in 1965, and the 
FNACA distanced itself somewhat from his legacy, in part because it sought to present 
itself as apolitical after the war, which it certainly was not under his leadership.706 He had 
assembled the Federation in order to press for a negotiated end to the war. After 1962, he 
was not thoroughly involved in the “life of the association,” focused on his work for 
l’Express as well as his nascent political career.707 In 1965, he handed over the reins to 	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former Seine Committee President Jacques de Jæger on the condition that the Federation 
“retain its independence and never fall into the hands of a political party.”708 He did, 
however, attend the fortieth anniversary celebration of the FNACA’s foundation in 1998, 
in the same building where it was federated in 1958, at the Place de la République.709 By 
this time, he was already suffering from a degenerative disease, and he died in 2006. 
Although Servan-Schreiber is recognized for his profuse public engagements in French 
political life from the 1950s through the 1980s, his contribution in founding what would 
grow to be the largest national association for veterans of Algeria in France has gone 
almost completely uncommented to this day.710    
 Of these two pioneers of the Algerian War veterans’ movement, Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber was by far the better known. In the 1960s and 1970s, between 75 and 
80 percent of the public could identify him—rivaling only the fame of Charles de 
Gaulle—and he often went by his initials, JJSS, in imitation of John F. Kennedy.711 But 
both men had equally weighty impacts on the Algerian generation, and French politics in 
general. Along with inspiring the creation of what became the largest association in the 
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Algerian War veterans’ movement, Servan-Schreiber validated progressive, modernizing 
opinions in l’Express, and attempted to rebuild a non-Communist liberal center by 
revitalizing the Radical party. And Porteu de la Morandière, through his example of pro-
war activism and his cultivation of an anti-Gaullist and pro-French Algeria memory 
through the UNCAFN, helped introduce a generation of nationalist veterans to politics—
indirectly fueling the rise of the National Front, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 They had both served as leaders of men during the dramatic escalation of the 
Algerian War in 1956-57, and they learned the importance of public opinion to the 
outcome of France’s war effort. After their service in Algeria, both veterans sought to 
reorganize French democracy in order to fight the weaknesses that they believed had 
caused France’s predicament in the war. Military service did not lead either François 
Porteu de la Morandière or Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber to deviate from the political 
orientations acquired during their youth—Catholic-informed anti-Communism and anti-
fascist Republicanism—but these orientations, combined with their Algerian experiences, 
gave them the frame of reference for a political vision for France with deeply personal 
significance. This comparative political biography underscores the disproportionate 
impact that the older, more educated, and politically experienced leaders of the Algerian 
War veterans’ movement had on the shape and aims of their associations. Chapter 4 
provides a comparative institutional history of the two associations that these men formed 
after their own images.
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CHAPTER 4: RIGHTS VERSUS DUTY: ORGANIZING CITIZENS IN 
ALGERIAN WAR VETERANS’ ASSOCIATIONS 
  
 Almost a decade after the end of the Algerian War, the two main French 
associations for veterans of the war were still engaged in combat—with each other. In 
1971, the nationalist UNCAFN compared its competitor to the envious frog in La 
Fontaine’s fable, who puffed itself up hoping to become as big as a bull.712 In response, 
the left-wing FNACA proclaimed itself “the permanent nightmare” of its rival, which 
was little better than a “phantom” association anyway.713 This was only one of many 
hostile exchanges that these two associations traded over the years. Since the late 1950s, 
both organizations had campaigned for the moral and material rights of veterans of 
Algeria in France. But the contest to speak for the “Algerian generation” was so heated 
because the two warring associations represented fundamentally opposed conceptions of 
veterans and their relationship with society. The Algerian War was the last time that 
France sent conscripts into battle in the twentieth century, and the war between these two 
veterans’ associations presents a debate in microcosm over the nature of French 
citizenship and the meaning of military service.
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 During the war itself, two main associations competed to speak for veterans of the 
“war without a name.” The nationalist UNCAFN was founded by conservative veterans 
and backed by prominent politicians to support the war effort. The left-leaning FNACA 
was created by conscripts and reservists who opposed the war. How did the FNACA, 
impoverished and isolated at its creation, manage by the early 1970s to pose a threat to its 
rival UNCAFN, which had the initial advantage of far greater funding, political access, 
and prestige? This chapter examines the institutional characteristics of both 
associations—their foundation, political culture, recruitment, and organizing tactics—to 
determine why the FNACA was able to grow much more successfully than the 
UNCAFN.  
 Associational life was a central feature of French civil society through the 
twentieth century, but the history of the Algerian War veterans’ movement has not been 
written.714 The World War I veterans’ movement set the example for all subsequent 
attempts to group veterans in France. Antoine Prost, himself a veteran of Algeria, depicts 
the World War I veterans’ movement as the bulwark against fascism in interwar France, 
arguing that veterans’ principle role in society was as moral witnesses.715 The veterans of 
World War I also established the “fetish” of the veterans’ card in 1926, which extended 
material benefits such as loans, priority medical care, and a pension.716  
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 But several obstacles prevented the generation of Algerian War veterans from 
simply adopting wholesale the precedent of the veterans’ movement established by their 
grandfathers. As discussed in Chapter 2, the memorial politics of Charles de Gaulle after 
World War II discouraged “the cult of veteranism as a social movement.” More specific 
to the Algerian generation, however, since Algeria had been administered as French 
territory, the state refused to acknowledge that Algeria had been a war.717 Since there had 
been no war, there could be no veterans—only individuals who had fulfilled their 
national military service in an overseas department, and professional soldiers who had 
also happened to serve in North Africa. Veterans fought for years to force the state to 
recognize them officially, which only occurred in 1974. In view of the state’s long 
reluctance to acknowledge these veterans and their war, a close study of the competing 
associations aiming for official recognition will help us understand how the interest-
group of veterans of Algeria “was constituted in regard to public authorities.”718  
 Even at their height, veterans’ associations represented a small fraction of all of 
the soldiers who served in North Africa between 1954 and 1962. Many veterans did not 
develop the “veterans’ syndrome,” because they did not feel themselves the equals of the 
archetypal World War I veterans, or because they preferred to leave the past behind and 
did not wish to associate with other former soldiers.719 It appears that veterans often 
joined associations after state recognition in 1974 in order to receive benefits, but 
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neglected their membership obligations.720 But examining the veterans’ movement before 
the period when material benefits served as an inducement allows us to understand how 
the two associations seeking veterans’ recognition rallied competing images of veterans 
to further their cause.  
 Because silence was inscribed into the Algerian War from its beginning, the 
reservists, draftees, and professional soldiers who returned to France were met with 
attitudes ranging from indifference to disdain.721 To fight feelings of isolation and 
neglect, but also to promote a certain vision of the war they had fought, veterans 
assembled small clubs and groups, which would coalesce into a confrontation of two 
major associations, both of whom claimed to speak for the Algerian generation.722 The 
FNACA and the UNCAFN represented two mutually exclusive narratives of the Algerian 
war. But, as we will see, the associations also reflected clashing interpretations of the 
legacy of the World War I veterans’ movement, which had led veterans to expect 
material benefits as a right, but which also consecrated veterans’ political engagement as 
a duty.723 	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 The UNCAFN was born in 1957 of two parallel attempts to organize nationalist 
veterans of Algeria with the support of military and political elites. The Union Nationale 
des Combattants (National Union of Soldiers, UNC) had been created by Father Daniel 
Brottier and other Catholic militants in 1918, with financial support from Georges 
Clemenceau.724 The association became a conservative national force in favor of 
“consolidating the social order,” for which it would earn the respect of the government.725 
As the rebellion in Algeria grew, the UNC urged returning veterans to join its ranks; one 
of its young recruits insisted in an appeal to his comrades, “this association, already old 
and experienced, [...] will offer us excellent guidance.”726  
 Members of the UNC created the Comité des rappelés d’Afrique du Nord 
(Committee of Reservists Deployed in North Africa) in late 1956, under the presidency of 
Gérard Le Marec.727 He hoped to “rejuvenate” the UNC with the energy of young 
veterans, and in its first month of existence, the filial gained almost five thousand 
recruits.728 But veterans of the World Wars still dominated the association, figuratively 
and numerically; veterans of Algeria were often uninterested in joining, or felt 	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unwelcome. The leaders of the Committee wondered how to recruit more of the Algerian 
generation: “If the Veterans of Algeria do not come to us, we must go to them, convince 
them, tear them away from their indifference.”729   
 At the same time that young recruits to the UNC were forming their Committee, 
nationalist veterans built an external association with high-level government support. 
Early in 1957, veteran reservist François Porteu de la Morandière met with friends and 
colleagues, all recently returned from the war, to discuss how to defend the dignity of the 
troops and support their cause. One of his former university classmates, the veteran 
paratrooper Jean-Marie Le Pen, proposed forming a new political party, but the idea did 
not raise much interest, and the meeting ended without a clear resolution.730 Another of 
Porteu de la Morandière’s former classmates and friends, Jean-Yves Alquier, was soon 
convened to a meeting with Defense Minister Jean-Jacques Chaban-Delmas. The 
Minister said that he appreciated Alquier’s recent book defending the success of the war 
effort, and he encouraged the young veteran to create a national organization in support 
of French Algeria.731    
 Accordingly, in a room at the Palais d’Orsay in December 1957, Porteu de la 
Morandière, Le Marec, Henri Bohly, and J. Merlin announced the formation of the Union 
nationale des combattants d’Afrique du Nord, which enfolded the UNC’s Committee of 
Veterans of North Africa, existing regimental associations, and Porteu de la Morandière's 
newly chartered but inactive Association des décorés de la valeur militaire (Association 	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of those Decorated for Military Valor).732 In June of the next year, a separate far right 
veterans’ group, Ceux d’Algérie (Those of Algeria), would also merge with the 
UNCAFN.733 Alquier’s employers at the French Petrol Company soon pressured him to 
step down as President of the association, as it seemed a conflict of interest for him to 
defend the war in Algeria, since oil had recently been discovered in the Sahara.  
 Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas then pushed Porteu de la Morandière to assume 
the presidency, promising him logistical aid and funds.734 He accepted with hesitation, 
but would hold this post uncontested for almost thirty years.735 The new UNCAFN 
president discovered a “marvelous” supporter in UNC President Alexis Thomas, but the 
UNC headquarters did not initially have space for UNCAFN leaders to meet.736 So Porteu 
de la Morandière sought help from the former Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques 
Soustelle, who offered the UNCAFN a rent-free apartment in Paris for its headquarters as 
well its first permanent employee.737 The UNCAFN was thus born of private contacts 
between conservative veterans and political elites.     
 The UNCAFN’s aims expressed the military pride, nationalism, and imperial 
worldview of its founders. The association sought foremost to “continue the combat for 	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Franco-Muslim Community in French Algeria, in the same spirit that united us while in 
uniform.”738 Other aims included “strengthening the ties between veterans of North 
Africa,” and “the defense of material and moral interests of all those who fought in North 
Africa: mutual aid in all its forms [...].”739 The association was founded just after the end 
of the Battle of Algiers in 1957, and during the high-water mark of support for French 
Algeria, so the UNCAFN began from a position of confidence that the war in Algeria was 
winnable.740 
 By comparison, the foundation of the FNACA in 1958 was hardscrabble, 
illustrating the fragmented state of the antiwar position at this point, and the challenges 
facing a movement that lacked establishment ties. This association also resulted from 
several smaller groups, whose grassroots nature and collectivist vision would determine 
the political culture of the FNACA. The left-Socialist Groupement des Rappelés et 
Maintenus (Grouping of Reservists and Soldiers Deployed Beyond the Legal Limit, 
GRM), created in late 1956, was formed to testify against torture and atrocities occurring 
in Algeria, and to save “the hundreds of thousands of young Frenchmen exposed to 
racism and violence” from manipulation by “official veterans’ associations steered by 
civil and military authorities.”741 The Association des Anciens d’Algérie (Association of 
Veterans of Algeria, AAA), founded in early 1957 by left Catholics and Radicals and 
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counting members from “all classes of society,” opposed the continuation of the war.742 
Finally, the Association Nationale des Anciens d’Algérie (National Association of 
Veterans of Algeria, ANAA), a grouping of Communist veterans formed in early 1958, 
lobbied energetically for veterans’ rights and peace in Algeria.743 On September 21, 
1958, at the Hôtel Moderne in Paris, near the Place de la République, two hundred sixty 
delegates from these three associations met to constitute the FNACA under the leadership 
of AAA President Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, known for his outspoken engagements 
against the war as a veteran and as director of the news magazine l’Express.744  
    The FNACA opposed the war from its foundation, both for its injustices and for 
how it affected soldiers. It held that ending the war was the first step toward defending 
veterans’ rights. The Federation’s leaders viewed the war as a dangerous misadventure; 
its first program in 1958, written in Servan-Schreiber’s strident rhetoric, called for “a 
negotiated solution” in order to defend “the moral values, the honor of our Army, and the 
prestige of France.”745 The FNACA thus represented the politics of the “new 
Dreyfusards,” liberal Republicans who criticized the Algerian War foremost for its moral 
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effects on France.746 This portrayal of the war probably appealed to a wider section of the 
French left than an outright denunciation of colonialism would have at the time. 
 The identities of these organizations thus emerged from diametrically opposed 
narratives of the Algerian War. While claiming to speak for the generation of French 
citizens who fought in the Algerian War, both associations conceived of veterans’ 
citizenship in dramatically different ways. The FNACA portrayed veterans’ citizenship as 
an exchange with the government, wherein the suffering of conscripts had earned 
veterans “our right to reparation” through the veterans’ card.747 The UNCAFN, on the 
other hand, considered military service as a duty of citizenship, and demanded that 
society welcome the civic engagement and respect “the soul of the generation of the 
djebels.”748    
 These fundamentally different views of military service as an honor or a burden 
expressed themselves in the very names of the associations. The “National Union of 
Soldiers of North Africa” (UNCAFN) acknowledged the French empire’s legitimacy, 
since the French name for colonial North Africa was “Afrique française du nord,” 
abbreviated “AFN.” The Union’s name also emphasized military pride, since its members 
were not “veterans” but “soldiers,” suggesting that their combat for French Algeria did 
not cease with the end of their military service. Meanwhile, the “National Federation of 
Veterans of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco” (FNACA), underscored the specificity of a 
foreign military experience that marked a whole generation, for which it deserved 	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recognition and compensation. The common thread was shared suffering, in North Africa 
and afterward, not support for Algérie française or pride in military service. Finally, the 
titles of the newspapers of each association also conveyed divergent institutional 
identities. The UNCAFN’s newspaper Djebel was named after the Arabic word for 
“mountain,” suggesting the mystique of a foreign military experience that transformed 
soldiers into a worthy civic force, ready to testify and act on behalf of the nation. The 
FNACA’s newspaper title—L’Ancien d’Algérie means “He who has experienced 
Algeria,”—simply connoted passive participation in the Algerian War, without any 
exoticism or trappings of colonialism.   
 These competing narratives of the war attracted different member demographics. 
Most of the founding leaders of both associations were conscripts or reservists, rather 
than professional soldiers. But the targets for recruitment at the rank-and-file level were 
quite different. Because it supported the war, the UNCAFN appealed more to officers and 
career military, who tended to be politically conservative and hesitant to critique the 
decisions of military leaders. The UNCAFN’s members and leaders were mainly 
employed in farming, small business, and white collar jobs, while the FNACA was 
primarily composed of former conscripts with young families—laborers, shop 
employees, farmers, and office workers, who would be more interested in the promise of 
benefits and a pension.749 There was thus a significant class difference between the two 
associations, as veterans from different backgrounds self-selected into an organization 
honoring military duty and pride, or one lamenting the suffering and disruption of an 
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unwanted war. While the leaders of the FNACA drew on the specific culture developed 
through the conscript experience—one that often bred skepticism and 
antiauthoritarianism—the leaders of the UNCAFN promoted the patriotic, nationalistic 
culture of career military, honed in World War II and Indochina.750 
 Reflecting the conscript versus career military divide, the FNACA and the 
UNCAFN responded differently to the demands of organizing. From the outset, the 
FNACA proclaimed itself the only association unique to veterans of Algeria. The 
UNCAFN, on the other hand, was proud of its union with its “elders,” through 
collaboration with the UNC. This alliance developed over time, from informal 
cooperation in 1957 to a shared headquarters in 1960. UNC President Alexis Thomas told 
his association’s Congress in 1961 that he had “daily contacts” with the UNCAFN 
leaders, with whom the UNC was “close morally as well as materially.”751 The two 
Unions formalized their union with a 1971 protocol rendering membership 
interchangeable between them, and allowing UNCAFN members to hold positions at all 
levels of the UNC hierarchy.752 
 The UNCAFN’s alliance with the UNC proved an initial advantage. The 
UNCAFN’s intergenerational model meant that the association could rely on the UNC’s 
resources—sharing its headquarters, national congress venues, networks of contacts, and 
its nationalist credentials. It also, however, opened the threat of intergenerational conflict 
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and a lack of institutional dynamism. Veterans of both World Wars often hesitated to 
welcome veterans of Algeria into the family of combatants: the decolonization conflict 
did not seem as “real” to many of them as the hecatombs of the World Wars.753 And 
while the FNACA benefitted from singleness of purpose in its unique war model, it was 
forced to build its movement and network of allies entirely from scratch. But in the long 
term, the Federation’s commitment to independence proved an advantage. Fully aware of 
the obstacles they faced, its leaders knew they had no choice but to organize and recruit 
vigorously.  
 Because they were on different sides of the war, represented fundamentally 
different conceptions of military service, and were looking to recruit from the same mass 
of conscripts, both associations distrusted each other from the start. A 1958 UNCAFN 
editorial warned against other associations created “at the instigation of extremist 
parties,” thinly veiled code for Communist maneuvering.754 Although the FNACA had 
not yet been constituted, the UNCAFN leadership was alarmed by the emergence of 
small antiwar associations that would merge to become the Federation. The FNACA 
came out fighting, accusing the UNCAFN of exploiting veterans, and of being “in tight 
relation with the activist elements of the Army and the partisans of French Algeria.”755 
Each association feared that the other would exploit veterans to support the wrong side of 
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the war. After the war’s end in 1962, both associations turned to disputing the proper way 
to commemorate the war, and how the government should recognize veterans.756  
 By the late 1960s, as veterans’ recognition became a more plausible reality, the 
two associations came to seem more and more odious to each other. The FNACA 
criticized the UNCAFN’s leadership for being obsessed with medals and awards for “the 
most deserving among us,” yet caring little about veterans’ rights.757 The Federation even 
referred to its rival as a “rump-association,” presumably because it rode the coattails of 
the UNC.758 To the UNCAFN, the collective militancy of the FNACA meant it was a 
mere “sub-union,” unconcerned with the future of the nation, and contributing to the 
“devalorization of the image of the family of veterans.”759 The leaders of the FNACA felt 
veterans had earned rights that needed to be defended, while the UNCAFN leaders 
believed that moral recognition—in the form of medals if necessary—would confer the 
respect veterans needed to be able to testify in society, which they held as a duty.  
 The political schism between the associations came to a head in 1973, when 
UNCAFN President Porteu de la Morandière denounced the supposed Communist 
elements in the FNACA, labeling its Secretary General, Maurice Sicart, and its Legal 
Adviser, Guy Ramis, “notorious Communist militants.”760 Not dignifying these 	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accusations with a response, the FNACA simply dismissed the UNCAFN as jealous of its 
“fruitful action,” implying the nationalist group was self-congratulatory and unconcerned 
with veterans’ rights.761 
 Both associations bore the imprint of energetic and devoted leaders. While the 
FNACA’s most visible official was Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, its National President 
from 1958 to 1965, he was not deeply involved in the “internal life of the FNACA.”762 It 
took militants with a background in political organizing to begin the hard work of 
building the Federation from the ground up. The most influential activist in the FNACA’s 
early years was Maurice Sicart, its Secretary-General from 1961 to 2008. He had begun 
his militancy as a young man in the Communist-affiliated Union des jeunesses 
républicaines de France (Union of Republican Youth of France, UJRF), protesting the 
war in Indochina.763 He joined the FNACA in 1960 soon after returning from his military 
service in Algeria.764 He thus committed to the association when its primary goal was to 
end the war, but remained a true believer in the FNACA afterward. Sicart had a 
persuasive and energizing effect on others, and steered the association toward the goal of 
building “a huge organization to defend [veterans’] rights.”765 Indeed, in the words of 
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National President Jacques de Jæger, Sicart gave the association its “road map” to 
undertake aggressive recruiting throughout France.766  
 The UNCAFN official who provided the association its road map was 
indisputably its National President, François Porteu de la Morandière. He returned from 
military service as a reservist in 1957 desirous to support his comrades who were still 
fighting, and seeking to mold veterans of Algeria into a “useful force for our country.” In 
co-founding the UNCAFN, he aimed to bring the Algerian generation “fully into French 
associational life.”767 To do so, Porteu de la Morandière sought cooperation with veterans 
of World War II and Resistance members, “great men who believed in France,” whom he 
had met in pro-French Algeria activist circles.768 He led the UNCAFN to ally informally 
with the UNC in 1960, became elected Vice-President of the latter association in 1962, 
and oversaw the strategic accord in 1971 to “assure the continuity of the veterans’ 
world.”769 Porteu de la Morandière set the example for his association by representing his 
generation at patriotic events, such as the Armistice Day and Bastille Day ceremonies at 
the Arc de Triomphe.770 He sought to present veterans of Algeria as a civic force in the 
nation and to testify on their behalf, rather than to wrest reparations from the state.          
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 The political orientations, member demographics, and organizational models of 
these associations expressed themselves in opposing internal structures. The FNACA’s 
national officials expected informed participation at all levels. To this end, the association 
developed a sophisticated communication structure, establishing in 1969 a monthly 
bulletin to communicate with leaders of national commissions, and presidents, 
secretaries, and treasurers on the departmental and local levels.771 The Federation also 
encouraged a democratic culture. For instance, during a phase of intense militant action 
and recruitment in 1970, the FNACA announced that since “it is not PARIS who leads, 
but the whole of France,” it would elevate new permanent employees of the most 
dynamic departmental sections to join the National Secretariat.772 But the national 
leadership kept close track of local activism, encouraging departmental committees to 
compete in frequent petition campaigns for veterans’ recognition.773  
 The UNCAFN’s leadership, following a more traditional, elite-based political 
culture, tended to issue pronouncements from on high through cadres’ bulletins and 
memoranda, with little follow-through on lower levels. The National Committee did keep 
close watch over the efficacy of local leaders; for example, in 1962, President Porteu de 
la Morandière pressured the leader of the section in the Nord to quit, and personally 
chose his successor.774 But when it came to activism, the UNCAFN’s national leaders did 
not provide concrete avenues for participation. In a late stage of the campaign for 
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veterans’ recognition, President Porteu de la Morandière visited with the Veterans’ 
Minister numerous times, but to his own members only suggested that local UNCAFN 
sections should show “great energy to remind [the deputies] of this little problem of 
ours,” giving no guidance on how this should be accomplished.775 
  Financial circumstances had opposed the associations from the start. The FNACA 
was impoverished by any standards, and especially compared to its rival. In its early 
years the Federation could not afford heating oil for its headquarters, forcing members to 
warm themselves by burning “rickety old chairs” during one particularly bitter winter.776 
Its national leaders sometimes had to share beds when they traveled to visit local 
committees, so that the newspaper’s Chief Editor Michel Sabourdy could boast of having 
“‘slept’ with Maurice Sicart.”777 While the UNCAFN published its monthly newspaper 
with funds from the Ministry of Defense and the aid of prominent French Algeria activist 
Léon Delbecque, who had helped the association find a printer, the FNACA was unable 
to produce a second issue of its newspaper for seven months, and only in 1972, fourteen 
years after the association’s founding, did its newspaper begin to appear on a predictable 
monthly basis.778  
 The UNCAFN also had initial logistical support from Jacques Soustelle’s pro-
French Algeria association, the USRAF, as well as potential recourse to some of the four 
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million Francs in the UNC’s coffers.779 However, the FNACA relied on membership 
subscriptions to fund its services and its newspaper, which was “eternally” beleaguered 
by financial problems.780 In 1963 it began a tradition of holding yearly festivals in 
support of the newspaper, with shows, musical performances, and a raffle.781 The 
association also needed to pay its small permanent staff, and frequently reminded local 
leaders to ensure members signed up again the next year to avoid potential disaster. But 
these financial imperatives gave the isolated Federation no choice but to grow stronger, 
while the UNCAFN, well-heeled at its foundation, knew increasing difficulty once it lost 
the support of the Defense Ministry and pro-French Algeria groups, when the political 
tides turned in favor of decolonization. The UNCAFN was eventually unable to pay for 
its own newspaper, even with advertising.782 Its once independent Djebel became the 
diminutive La Voix du djebel, a one or two-page insert in the UNC’s newspaper, La Voix 
du combattant.783 UNCAFN leaders admitted that the lack of a national newspaper was 
“our weakness vis-à-vis the FNACA.”784 
 The financial circumstances of these associations, as well as the respective 
political cultures from which they emerged, expressed themselves in opposing 	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recruitment strategies. The difficulty of earning and then maintaining the trust of 
skeptical members meant that both associations had to spend much energy on 
propaganda.785 The UNCAFN initially felt at leisure to assemble French Algeria’s true 
believers rather than recruiting out of financial need or isolation. During the war, 
Minister Chaban-Delmas sent President Porteu de la Morandière on several trips to 
Algeria, where he promoted his association among active soldiers about to be 
demobilized.786 The Defense Ministry paid his airfare so that he could appear in uniform 
before junior officers to distribute UNCAFN pamphlets printed by the Army, giving 
enormous advantages to his group’s early recruitment.787 This method of recruitment 
accorded neatly with the UNCAFN’s founding logic: an elite-based appeal to military 
honor and supporting the troops and their war effort.  
 However, once the UNCAFN lost its Defense Ministry support in 1961, the 
association’s growth stagnated.788 At a meeting in 1968, cadres identified the “major 
concern” of the association as recruitment and developing local leaders; a National Vice-
President lamented the number of isolated sections “without any intermediary with the 
National Headquarters.”789 Indeed, national UNC leaders felt the need to instruct local 
section heads to stop reporting on meetings held by the FNACA, which suggests a certain 
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lack of dynamism in local UNCAFN meetings.790 Leaders of provincial UNC sections 
requested talking points and propaganda helpful for recruiting veterans of Algeria, 
especially faced with “the competition of Communist groups” such as the FNACA.791 In 
1970, the Vice President confessed that the “association recruits, but we do not 
‘structure’ well enough.”792 
 From the start, the hard-up FNACA had been forced to prioritize propaganda and 
vigorous mass recruitment to compensate for its lack of establishment support. Aware 
that “the military hierarchy favor[ed] the development” of its rival, the FNACA steeled 
itself to save veterans from the machinations of the UNCAFN, in its view tainted with a 
“politics that has the consequence of worsening the Algerian War.”793 Its militants cast as 
wide a net as possible in towns around France, holding meetings to which they invited all 
men born between 1932 and 1943 and thus subject to be drafted, whose names they 
discovered on the electoral lists posted at town hall.794 Local FNACA chapters also 
organized public information meetings to sway public opinion in favor of the young 
veterans and against the war.795 Militants stressed that a whole generation was at stake: 
wounded and neglected, young conscripts needed to band together to demand their 
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rights.796 This rhetoric expressed the collectivist vision derived from the FNACA’s 
Communist, Socialist, and left-Catholic predecessors.   
  The associations expressed their diverging views of citizenship through opposing 
attitudes toward services for veterans. Deployment had put conscripts without family 
wealth in a precarious financial position; they were in the same situation as unemployed 
people in France subsisting on minimum state aid. Pay for conscripts was only 900 
Francs per month, which barely covered the costs of daily necessities, and was not 
enough for transport costs to take advantage of their 25 days of leave.797 The FNACA 
expressed its concern for protecting vulnerable conscripts by offering technical services, 
including medical and administrative advice, as early as 1958.798 It also began providing 
legal consultations in 1959.799 These services reflected the mission of an association 
focused on aiding demobilized conscripts, who were young, poorly educated, and at the 
start of their careers—thus liable to be overwhelmed by bureaucratic procedures with 
high stakes.800 The UNCAFN, on the other hand, was unconcerned with establishing 
formal structures to aid veterans; a notice in the association’s newsletter in 1963 stated, 
“if you need information, advice, or help, come see us or write us.”801 The association’s 	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leaders were so reluctant to resemble “professional militants” that they did not even seek 
out a specialist in veterans’ rights until 1966.802 The associations had different 
institutional priorities—material support for conscripts, versus moral support for true 
believers in French Algeria, who tended to be officers or career military, and more 
confident about navigating military administration.  
 Through the course of their development, both associations ended up losing 
leaders for ideological reasons. The UNCAFN faced conflicts over how best to support 
French Algeria, and whether to sanction illegal actions. The Union’s first major attrition 
was in 1960, when Dr. J.-F. LeMaire left the National Administration in protest of the 
association’s support of a civilian colonists’ revolt in Algiers known as the “week of 
barricades.”803 The UNCAFN had decided to tacitly support the attempted civilian 
insurrection, and thus swung further to the right than some of its members were willing to 
go. After the war’s end, the association maintained a decidedly anti-Gaullist line, but still 
sided with the state when the political left posed a threat. When the UNCAFN held a 
“reparative ceremony” at the Arc de Triomphe in May 1968 to show veterans’ respect for 
the flag and the nation, another national leader quit, feeling that the ceremony manifested 
political support for President de Gaulle and violated the association’s avowed political 
neutrality.804 These appear to have been the only high-profile resignations from the 
UNCAFN, suggesting a high level of ideological unity among its national leaders at least.  	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 The FNACA lost far more national figures, as its leadership tried to navigate the 
ideological and tactical differences among the members of its founding antiwar coalition. 
In 1959, with a vote of twenty-two against sixteen, the National Board ejected Adjunct 
Secretary General and founding member Georges Mattéi. His offense was having 
testified on behalf of FLN members accused of attempting to assassinate the pro-French 
Algeria activist and former Algerian Governor-General Jacques Soustelle in Paris on 
September 15, 1958.805 The National Board decided that Mattéi’s “methods of action [...] 
endangered the existence and the goals” of the FNACA.806 On Mattéi’s exclusion, six 
members of the National Board also left to form a separate veterans’ association.807 This 
splinter group appears to have been short lived because that very year, Mattéi went 
underground to join the “Jeanson network,” composed of French citizens working to aid 
the Algerian National Liberation Front.808  
 Once the FNACA excluded him, Mattéi had come to see all legal opposition to 
the war as futile.809 He had joined the association after drawing national attention to 
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torture with an article, “Les jours kabyles,” published in Les Temps Modernes in 1957.810 
Despite the FNACA’s steadfast opposition to the war, it had no place for veterans like 
Mattei, who sought more radical methods than diplomatic negotiation, which the 
association considered “the only possibility to reestablish peace in Algeria.”811 On the 
other side of the aisle, founding Secretary General Jean-Pierre Prouteau quit the 
Federation around 1961 because of its supposed Communist leanings. He became 
founding President of the Union démocratique des Anciens d’Algérie, which aimed for 
peace in Algeria, but sought to assemble a broad, democratic centrist coalition that 
excluded Communists.812  
 As national attention focused on the FNACA thanks to its ceaseless campaigns for 
the veterans’ card, the association was forced to distance itself from increasingly 
aggressive accusations of Communist influence.813 In 1970, Jean-Claude Citerne resigned 
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Independent Republican deputies than from Communist deputies. Jean Bothorel, Celui qui voulait tout 
changer: les années JJSS (Paris: Laffont, 2005), 92; Julian Hage, “La guerre d’Algérie et les publications 
communistes en France,” 195-213 in dir. Hervé Bismuth and Fritz Taubert, La Guerre d’Algérie et le 
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his post as Editor in Chief of the Federation’s newspaper. His campaign on a Communist 
list for departmental counselor in the Val-du-Marne—for which he cited his work for the 
FNACA on posters—attracted a smear campaign against the association. Henceforth all 
FNACA members would be prohibited from advertising their membership for the benefit 
of any political campaign.814 Yet despite such high-profile institutional losses over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
monde communiste (Dijon: Éditions universitaires de Dijon, 2014), 201; “Action auprès des élus,” 
L’Ancien d’Algérie 66 (December 1969): 3.  
 
An informed, although biased, insider view is provided by Jean-Pierre Prouteau, who quit the FNACA as 
its founding Secretary General to found the UDAA in 1961. He writes that the FNACA functioned “on the 
basis of a contract of non-Communist majority in the national leadership,” but the majority of rank-and-file 
members were Communist, and thus “the body of the organization [was] not proportional to the head.” 
Jean-Pierre Prouteau, “L’UDAA a été présentée à la presse le 18 décembre 1961,” La Tribune des Anciens 
d’Algérie 1 (February 1962): 1, BNF, FOL-JO-12655. However, I have been unable to find any 
corroboration of such a contract, implicit or explicit, from the FNACA newspaper and archives; the 
association’s archival gatekeepers were very squeamish about allowing me access to internal documents, 
perhaps because the association has had a culture of secrecy and has contended with anti-Communist 
attacks since its foundation.   
 
My interpretation is that Maurice Sicart and other early leaders were inclined by their militant backgrounds 
to steer the FNACA as if it were a Communist “mass party” for veterans of Algeria—civic associations in 
France created to promote the PCF’s goals among certain demographics, such as youth, renters, or women, 
while maintaining plausible deniability of direct connections with the Party. René Dazy, La partie et le 
tout: le PCF et la politique franco-algérienne (Paris: Syllepse, 1990), 84. The FNACA’s Communist 
predecessor association, the Association Nationale des Anciens d’Algérie, was likely created by the PCF as 
a “mass party.” Indeed, Georges Mattéi, who was ejected from the FNACA in 1959, recalls that both the 
PCF and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber himself, treated the FNACA as a “pressure-group” to protect 
veterans’ rights. Evans, The Memory of Resistance, 105.  
 
This “mass party” approach influenced the association’s rhetoric and organizational style, and individual 
veterans who were Communists or fellow travelers would tend to self-select into an antiwar association 
with an ethos of collective action and mutual aid. But by no means were all members of the FNACA 
affiliated with the French Communist Party, and the PCF seems to have had no direct influence in the 
association’s conduct. The FNACA has increasingly distanced itself from any appearance of Communist 
orientation over the years, because its main goal after veterans’ recognition was to become the largest 
association for veterans of Algeria, so it had to appeal to as wide a demographic as possible. I was not yet 
able to come up with such a nuanced response when the FNACA’s newspaper Editor in Chief, Michel 
Sabourdy, jokingly asked me at the end of our interview, “‘So, you’re not going to ask if we are a bunch of 
Commies?’”  
  
814Frédéric Rouyard, “La bataille du 19 mars,” 545-552 in dir. Jean-Pierre Rioux, La guerre d’Algérie et les 
Français (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 547; Roger Lajoie-Mazenc, La guerre de là-bas: Anciens d’Algérie: un 
demi-siècle de parcours du combattant (La Primaube: Graphi Imprimer, 2009), 192; “Jean-Claude 
CITERNE: Chimiste 34 ans, Responsable national des anciens combattants d’Afrique du Nord, candidate 
du Parti Communiste Français pour l’Union des Forces de Gauche et Démocratiques,” undated campaign 
poster, François Porteu de la Morandière’s personal papers, Sèvres.  
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years as the association sought to present itself as more centrist, the unity of purpose of 
the FNACA meant that this association was able to recruit and activists who were deeply 
committed to building the association. Thus, an “active minority” of true believers in the 
FNACA’s mission gave the association the “cohesion” it needed to pursue its goals.815 
 In terms of numbers, the deck had been stacked against the FNACA from the 
beginning. This was in part because French opposition to the war grew very gradually—
in 1954, there was a general consensus that Algeria was and should remain French, and 
even by summer 1958, Metropolitan opinion was still in favor of French Algeria by a 
slight majority.816 But the numerical discrepancy also persisted because the FNACA had 
to build itself from scratch, rather than riding the coattails of an existing association. By 
1961, the UNCAFN claimed 80,000 members and a readership of 200,000, while the 
FNACA had approximately 2,200 members.817 Even in 1967, the Federation had grown 
to a mere 20,000 members, and a national Congress in 1968 only attracted two to three 
hundred delegates.818 
 The FNACA grew steadily because it had no choice, and because membership 
growth was central to achieving its legislative aims. Through the course of the 1960s, the 
association’s membership had multiplied by a factor of 35, as an internal cadres’ bulletin 
reported in 1970. In 1961, it only had two departmental sections with over 300 members, 	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817“Pour maintenir la sérénité de la cohésion nationale, le Gouvernement a interdit la manifestation «pour la 
paix en Algérie» organisée le 27 octobre place de la Bastille,” Le Monde (21 October 1960): 1;	  
 “Caracteristiques des 200,000 lecteurs de Djebel,” Djebel 19 (May 1961): 5; Annick Sicart, Tous à jour de 
leur cotisation!, 69.  
 
818“Partis, syndicats, et mouvements divers,” Paris Police Prefecture Archives, Gd18, September 1967, 45; 
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while by 1971 fifty-nine sections were of this size.819 In 1972, after years of devoted 
outreach and recruitment campaigns, the FNACA was within sight of its goal of 200,000 
members, which it hoped would make it “even stronger, to defend our generation.”820 
That same year, a government commission created to study the topic of veterans’ 
recognition gave equal representation to the FNACA and the UNCAFN, seating two 
delegates each, and vindicating the FNACA’s sustaining belief that membership size 
could eventually compensate for lack of political access.821  
 Thus, the FNACA gained the national platform it desired to advocate for 
reparations for veterans of Algeria, which it had been demanding since 1958, while its 
rival would continue to push for moral recognition. The FNACA had finally overcome 
long-term disadvantages of finances and political access through achieving the pressure 
of numbers. While the fierce rivalry between the two poles of the Algerian War veterans’ 
movement might have sapped the effectiveness of its activism and prolonged the fight for 
veterans’ status, it proved a recruitment tool that ultimately benefitted the FNACA.822  
 These two associations represented diametrically opposed conceptions of French 
citizenship, views of military service, and lessons drawn from the war. The difference in 
their organizational growth occurred because they bore fundamentally different political 
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cultures, and drew on divergent legacies of the World War I veterans’ movement. The 
FNACA, despite its initial handicaps, grew so vigorously because of true believers’ 
guiding idea that veterans were citizens who had earned reparations in exchange for their 
wartime service, and that they could only defend these rights by the strength of numbers. 
In the minds of its leaders, the growth of their organization was inextricably linked with 
the goal of achieving the veterans’ card. The Federation functioned almost as a ‘union’ 
for veterans of Algeria, with the stubborn unity of purpose that a single-issue association 
could afford. Some of the most influential militants early in the FNACA’s history had 
come of age in Communist-affiliated civic associations, giving resonance to the 
association’s rhetoric on rights and reparation, and lending greater organizational 
experience to the young association.  
 The UNCAFN, conceiving of citizenship in the framework of duty, sought to 
have a public presence, and testify to the nation on behalf of veterans of Algeria, but as 
discussed above, it was relatively unconcerned with membership growth or efficient 
organization. It began its existence in a position to take for granted prestige and political 
access, and never felt the need to validate itself through numbers. In strategy and conduct 
it was more akin to an officers’ club than a union—social groups that already consider 
themselves elite and powerful generally do not undertake massive recruitment. These 
differing attitudes toward institutional growth meant that the UNCAFN was very 
politically active in its early days but would rest on its laurels afterward, while the 
FNACA gradually gained in political power as its membership increased after the war’s 
end.  
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 As a majority of the French population came to oppose the war, and then to 
remember the war as a mistake, the UNCAFN consecrated most of its public speech and 
action to mourning French Algeria and perpetuating a narrative of Gaullist betrayal, 
while the FNACA, opposed to the war and an outsider from the start, was free to focus on 
political campaigns for veterans’ rights, benefiting from the energetic recruitment and 
organizational methods it had learned in its early years of hardship. We will see this 
pattern unfold in Chapter 5, which examines the political activism of both associations 
from their foundation to the end of the war, and in Chapter 6, which assesses both 
associations’ campaigns for the recognition of veterans of Algeria.
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CHAPTER 5: THE BATTLE IN THE METROPOLE: VETERANS’ 
ASSOCIATION POLITICS DURING THE WAR 
 
 When the FNACA was formed in September 1958, it faced an uphill battle to its 
goals of a negotiated peace in Algeria and rights for veterans. In summer 1958, four years 
into the Algerian War of Independence, French public opinion was still in favor of 
maintaining French Algeria by a slight majority, although Metropolitan opposition was 
increasing, in part because of coverage by leftist journals such as L’Express, created by 
FNACA founder Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.823 The UNCAFN, founded in late 1957, 
was much better situated to pursue its goals: building support for French Algeria and the 
soldiers fighting in its defense. This well-funded association had ties to the government 
and prominent Gaullists, in addition to the support of established veterans’ and nationalist 
associations. Yet by the war’s end in 1962, the UNCAFN had become discredited and 
became less overtly political, while the FNACA began a period of growth that would 
earn it legitimacy to militate for a generation of veterans.      
 This chapter examines the political stances and strategies of these two 
associations, each vying to be the voice of the Algerian generation, and investigates the 
reasons their power began to reverse by the end of the war. It argues that the initial 
conditions of these associations’ creation, and the political cultures they bore, largely 
determined their reactions in the changing domestic political climate during the war, and 
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thus their level of political power at the war’s end. Both associations emerged 
surrounding the “1958 moment” and de Gaulle’s return to power, and the evolution of his 
Algerian politics would strongly influence their trajectories during the war. This story 
reflects not only the victory of the anticolonial narrative of the Algerian War in French 
society, but also reveals the waning of Gaullist networks and the rejection of militaristic 
nationalism that would come to characterize contemporary French politics.  
 The French Fourth Republic (1947-1958) offered few distinct ideological choices 
to politicized veterans desirous to engage on the subject of the war. In the early years of 
the Algerian war, political parties differed only in the degree of proposed solutions to the 
situation, reflecting the broad consensus in France in the 1950s that Algeria was and 
should remain French.824 The non-Communist left generally opposed Algerian 
independence in the name of the indivisibility of the Republic, while urging greater 
assimilation of Algerian Muslims.825 A small but growing fringe of left-wing intellectuals 
including Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir did speak and organize against the 
war, denouncing the government’s use of torture and summary executions, and 
newspapers like the new liberal L’Express and the left-Catholic Témoignage chrétien 
raised public awareness of these violations of human rights and French republican values. 
 However, the French Communist Party (PCF)—maintaining a Stalinist line after 
1953 and remaining dismissive of nationalism in the colonies—voted in 1956 for special 
powers for the government to expand the war effort. After years of internal divisions, the 
PCF openly opposed the war in Algeria only in 1960, when the Soviet Union recognized 	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Decolonization: the Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006), 7.  
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the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).826 The center-right party 
Centre national des indépendants et paysans (National Center of Independents and 
Farmers, CNIP) was largely backed by the colonial lobby and thus supported the war. 
Finally, the Gaullist Rassemblement du peuple français (Gathering of the French People, 
RPF), and its successor, the Union pour la nouvelle république (Union for the New 
Republic, UNR), as well as Gaullists outside of these parties, saw the preservation of 
French Algeria and the return to power of General de Gaulle as inextricably linked.827 
This political constellation would change considerably through the course of the war, as 
we will see, but such were the conditions under which the two main veterans’ 
associations emerged.  
 The associations’ positions on the war determined their stances toward the 
government, and the reception they would receive from legislators and especially the 
Ministry of Veterans. The UNCAFN and its ally the UNC considered themselves 
privileged partners of the state, invoking their patriotism and their support of the war 
effort to justify their political demands. The occasional use of sharp criticism, such as 
“Our most elementary rights have been ignored by Governments,” only underscored the 
nationalist veterans’ expectation of a reciprocal relationship with the state.828 Moreover, 
Raymond Triboulet, the Minister of Veterans and War Victims from 1959 to 1962, was a 
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next-door neighbor and family friend of the UNCAFN President, and much more likely 
to lend the nationalist veterans his ear.829  
 The FNACA, however, began from a confrontational outsider position, skeptical 
of the government. The fact that Minister Triboulet was an “active member” of the pro-
war UNC illustrates the political challenges and isolation facing the FNACA in its early 
years.830 Triboulet received a delegation from the leftist association as early as June 12, 
1959, promising to study some of its concerns, but never paid the group the same heed 
that he did the UNC and UNCAFN.831 Pro-French Algeria politicians were much more 
likely to be sympathetic to the nationalist veterans, and Triboulet was both pro-French 
Algeria and an ardent Gaullist. 
 The political tactics the associations used to pursue their goals followed naturally 
from their position vis-à-vis the government, and their respective political cultures, 
discussed in Chapter 4. Benefitting from the prestige of its venerable parent, and 
confident of its own respectability and patriotism, the UNCAFN relied primarily on press 
releases, elite delegations, and networking with other nationalist and far-right 
associations to achieve its aims.832 The FNACA, however, much less certain to be 
‘respectable’ in the era of its founding, sought to use the power of numbers and direct 
action to appeal to elected officials and the government. The rest of this chapter will 
examine manifestations of these respective political cultures—elite networking versus 
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collectivist mobilization—during the war, and discuss why the UNCAFN’s methods were 
more successful in this period, but also more vulnerable to changing political currents. 
 Months before the FNACA emerged, the UNCAFN was heavily involved in 
networks militating for the return of General de Gaulle. Its President, Porteu de la 
Morandière, similar to many nationalists and Army officers at the time, was a Gaullist by 
pragmatism: he believed that de Gaulle was “the only man capable” of saving French 
Algeria and ending the Fourth Republic’s impotence.833 To this end, the UNCAFN found 
natural allies with Soustelle’s Union pour le salut et le renouveau de l’Algérie 
française.834 A moderate civic association in favor of Algerian integration, the USRAF 
became the intellectual wing of the movement to return de Gaulle to power, launching 
propaganda and conferences at a feverish pace.835 UNCAFN President Porteu de la 
Morandière sat on the Executive Committee of the USRAF, and frequently plugged for 
the association in the UNCAFN’s newspaper.836 The USRAF even permitted itself to 
boast of the UNCAFN’s foundation as one of its accomplishments; this was of course an 
exaggeration, although Soustelle had contributed its first headquarters and permanent 
employee.837   
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 The UNCAFN would do more than network behind the scenes, however. In early 
1958, it signed on with the revolutionary Comité d’action des associations nationales 
d’anciens combattants (Action Committee of Veterans’ Associations, CAANAC), which 
shared a headquarters in Paris with the USRAF.838 Alexandre Sanguinetti, a fiery World 
War II commando as famous for his far-right revolutionary fervor as for a clanking metal 
leg that replaced the limb he had lost at Elba, presided over the group.839 The CAANAC 
assembled twenty-six associations of veterans of the World Wars and Indochina, 
including the UNCAFN in February 1958.840 On March 27, 1958, Sanguinetti led a 
delegation of veterans representing all the wars to meet with General de Gaulle, and 
asked Porteu de la Morandière to attend.841  
 The young veteran felt as intimidated as if he were being taken to “go see the 
pope,” but he posed a pointed question to the venerable General: “I would like very much 
for you to return, but if you come back, will you save French Algeria?”842 de Gaulle, 
typical of his obfuscatory speaking style that helped convince diverse interlocutors he 
agreed with them, reportedly responded, “‘Yes, but you see, France is a very difficult 
place to govern. [...] I say that because France is the rapprochement of a Left that never 
wants to have a politics of strength, and a Right that never wants to have a politics of 
generosity. [...] But, I think we can save French Algeria if we change the Constitution, in 	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order to give me the means for a solid politics.’”843 This response, of course, only 
strengthened the resolve of the UNCAFN President and his colleagues to work toward de 
Gaulle’s return.      
 The CAANAC used the threat of the street to achieve its goals of defending 
French Algeria and installing de Gaulle. Civic veterans’ associations like the CAANAC 
had a disproportionate weight in Algeria at this time, because the Algerian departments 
had been denied political representation for two years under the state of emergency, and 
veterans’ associations there and in the Metropole had developed “a sort of civic cult of 
Franco-Muslim brotherhood of arms” based in the memory of shared sacrifice in the 
World Wars.844 In July 1957, delegates of CAANAC, including UNC President Thomas, 
met with General Raoul Salan in Algiers to compose an oath that swore “opposition [...] 
to any measure that would threaten the integrity of the territory and French unity,” 
Sanguinetti insisting upon adding the revolutionary clause “by any means necessary.”845 
The UNCAFN was not yet a member of CAANAC when veterans in Paris and Algiers 
swore the oath, but would join soon after Sanguinetti’s deliberate turn toward this 
insurrectionary rhetoric. The UNCAFN thus made common cause with “the most 
dangerous” of all Gaullists seeking to overturn the Fourth Republic, the most likely to 
lead a mob in Paris, and the greatest supporter of revolutionary violence.846 
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 The CAANAC coordinated with Gaullist activists in the Metropole and Algeria to 
seize an event that had the potential to topple the Fourth Republic.847 It seemed inevitable 
that the spark would come from Algiers, where the FLN’s terrorism campaign was 
sowing “fear and despair” among the settlers.848 On May 13, two separate demonstrations 
were planned in the Algerian capital—one, organized by military and political officials, 
in memory of three French soldiers recently executed by the FLN; and the second, 
organized by civilians in anger at the French government’s handling of the war.849 This 
date seemed propitious for fomenting a revolt: settlers’ emotions were hot in response to 
the soldiers’ execution as well as the recent dismissal of pro-French Algeria Governor-
General Robert Lacoste, and the National Assembly was due to swear in Pierre Pflimlin 
as President of a new government that same day.850   
 When a French Algerian activist telephoned Paris to alert the USRAF of the 
demonstration planned in Algiers, a CAANAC meeting was taking place in the same 
building.851 On hearing the news, Max Vignon, a UNC delegate and President of Les 
Jeunes de l’UNC (the UNC’s youth branch), proposed that CAANAC plan a 
demonstration in Paris too, and Sanguinetti insisted that it should be the same date and 
time as in Algiers.852 The CAANAC widely publicized a call for protestors on the radio 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847Berstein, Histoire du gaullisme, 207.  
 
848Merry and Serge Bromberger, Les 13 complots du 13 mai: ou la délivrance de Gulliver (Paris: Fayard, 
1959), 86.  
 
849Danielle Tartakowsky, Les Manifestations de rue en France, 1918-1968 (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1997), 650-651. 	  
850Nick, 359-360; Berstein, Histoire du gaullisme, 208.  
 
851Nick, 360.  
 
852Max Vignon, “Les Jeunes de l’UNC «Unis comme nos pères»,” La Voix du combattant 1241 (November 
1958): 5; Nick, 360. 
	   202 
and in the press. The police in Paris feared a large attendance and the possibility of 
“incidents”: CAANAC leaders might organize and direct “commandos” to attack 
buildings of the leftist press, embassies of countries that had criticized France’s conduct 
in the war, or even the National Assembly or President of the Republic.853 As it turned 
out, no great riot occurred in Paris, but leading Gaullists involved in the USRAF and the 
CAANAC did intend to “seize the event to impose [...] a Committee of Public Safety.”854 
This came to pass in Algiers, where pro-French Algeria activists and soldiers, encouraged 
by the civilian demonstrators present, rioted and seized the Government-General 
building, and General Jacques Massu announced the creation of a Committee of Public 
Safety. This would lead the French Interior Minister to declare a state of emergency.855 
And just as this riot in Algiers was bringing the French Fourth Republic to its knees, 
young nationalist veterans of Algeria stood in solidarity in the Metropole.     
 On the same day, officials and members of both the UNCAFN and the UNC 
joined a demonstration in Paris that gathered between the Place de l’Étoile and the Arc de 
Triomphe.856 This protest took up the legacy of right-wing demonstrations from the 
1930s—brandishing the threat of insurrection yet legitimizing itself with traditional 
symbols of nationalism, such as the French flag and the location of l’Etoile.857 The 
departmental councils of Paris and the Seine showed their support by sending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
853“A.S. de la manifestation organisée place de l’Étoile par le ‘Comité d’action des Associations Nationales 
des Anciens Combattants’ (C.A.A.N.A.C.),” APP, Ba.2453, “Manifestation des CAANAC le 13 mai 1958” 
folder, 13 May 1958; “A.S. de la manifestation organisée, à 18h.30, Place de l’Étoile,” APP, Fd carton 4, 
“Manifestation des CAANAC le 13 mai 1958” folder, 13 May 1958. 
 
854Kauffer, 29.  
 
855Tartakowsky, 651.  
 
856“A.S. de la manifestation organisée à 18h.30, Place de l’Étoile,” op. cit. 
 
857Tartakowsky, 650.  
 
	   203 
delegations.858 Prominent attendees included Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jean-Maurice 
Demarquet, founders of the Front national des combattants, Yves Gignac, representing 
the extreme far-right Association des combattants de l’Union Française (Association of 
Veterans of the French Union, ACUF), and Jean-Baptiste Biaggi, founder of the Parti 
Patriote Révolutionnaire (Patriotic Revolutionary Party, PPR). About nine hundred 
protestors gathered initially, and when the Eternal Flame was re-lit under the Arc de 
Triomphe, demonstrators cried “French Algeria,” “Down with the Republic,” “Long live 
de Gaulle,” and even “Deputies in the Seine!”859 UNCAFN President Porteu de la 
Morandière and leaders of other associations placed wreaths on the Sacred Tile under the 
Arc, as is traditional for the flame lighting ceremony.860  
 At about 6:50 pm, the demonstrators had grown to number about fifteen hundred, 
and Le Pen and Demarquet encouraged a contingent to march to the Palais Bourbon, the 
seat of the National Assembly. These demonstrators overturned a police barricade and 
marched up the Champs-Elysées.861 Some protestors heaving cobblestones at the 
windows of the Le Figaro headquarters and others launching firecrackers at the police, 
the march continued, overturned more barricades, and eventually dispersed at the Place 
de la Concorde.862 However, some individuals attempted to continue the protest—jeering 	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at the headquarters of the Communist newspaper L’Humanité, rallying around the statue 
of Jeanne d’Arc, breaking the windows of the Tunisian embassy.863 In total, the police 
arrested fifty demonstrators that day, and four police officers were injured.864 The May 
13 protest in Paris was met with such enthusiasm from passers-by that the police worried 
about a follow-up demonstration on the 14th, and the possibility of attacks against the 
Elysée, the Hôtel Matignon, the headquarters of the newspaper L’Express, or communist 
associations.865    
 Throughout the country, radicalized rightist veterans joined in the spirit of May 
13. UNCAFN-Paris had asked departmental sections to pressure local legislators to 
secure the resignation of the Pflimlin government.866 Some individual leaders even took it 
upon themselves to follow the example of Algiers. A Monsieur Boutet, founder of the 
UNCAFN chapter in the Aude, announced a Committee of Public Safety, organized a 
demonstration, and was subsequently arrested; a UNCAFN leader in the Gard undertook 
a similar mission.867 Back in the capital, the CAANAC held a plenary session on May 14, 
declared itself a Committee of Public Safety, and demanded a Government of Public 
Safety under de Gaulle, “ ‘the only savior of republican legality.’”868 The next day, the 
UNCAFN President wrote a letter to President René Coty, asking him to call for General 	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de Gaulle “in the respect of republican legality.”869 Although the UNCAFN would 
eventually leave the CAANAC following a dispute with Sanguinetti, it stood solidly with 
the Committee during the death-throes of the Fourth Republic.870 The events of May 
presented a rupture in more ways than one: not only did they bring down the French 
regime, but they were the high-water mark of widespread Euro-French support for French 
Algeria.871 The Metropole’s support for the war would only decline from this point, and 
as we will see, the new regime’s policies in ensuing years would disappoint and enrage 
many of the ‘men of May 13.’      	  	   While the crisis long-desired by Gaullists erupted in Algiers, not Paris, the 
CAANAC and its collaborators had played their part in a carefully laid plan to return the 
man from Colombey to power. At a press conference on May 19, Charles de Gaulle 
criticized the inability of “‘the exclusive regime of the parties’” to resolve the problems 
in Algeria, declaring himself ready to reassume leadership of the government “‘if the 
people want it.’” He promised to respect “‘fundamental public liberties,’” just as he had 
“‘restored’” them at the end of World War II, ending with what he hoped was a 
reassuring quip: “‘You think at the age of 67, I’m going to start the career of a 
dictator?’”872 Press reports of paratrooper divisions based in Corsica planning to invade 
mainland France indeed made it seem as though only de Gaulle’s return could save the 
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Republic from a military takeover.873 On May 29, President René Coty called on Charles 
de Gaulle to return under exceptional conditions, until the Constitution for a Fifth 
Republic could be drawn up. The nation in its “immense majority” gratefully accepted 
“the founding myth of the Fifth Republic,” that de Gaulle had saved the nation from the 
brink of civil war.874  
 But some citizens would not acquiesce to this reassuring theater. Along with the 
widespread appeal to General de Gaulle, the coup of May 13 also “provoked a reflex of 
republican defense” among certain sectors of the population that feared the ascent of a 
conservative military strongman backed by the Army.875 On May 28, the French 
Communist Party, the Confédération général du travail (General Confederation of Labor, 
CGT), and the Union de la gauche led a march “in defense of the Republic” between the 
Place de la Nation and Place de la République in Paris, a symbolic route for populist 
republican demonstrations.876 Despite lacking a coherent political proposal, the 
participants in this demonstration united in one reaction: Charles de Gaulle posed a threat 
to the Republic.877 Indeed, representatives of the Communist-leaning Association 
nationale des anciens d’Algérie, one of the FNACA’s predecessors, had presented a 
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motion “for the Salvation of the Republic” at the Hôtel Matignon on May 17, 1958.878 
The FNACA was born in the shadow of de Gaulle’s return, and the date of its constitutive 
congress was highly symbolic: one week before the heavily promoted September 28, 
1958 referendum on de Gaulle’s proposed Constitution for a Fifth French Republic. 
 Both veterans’ associations regarded the referendum on de Gaulle’s constitution 
as a plebiscite on the man himself, and on the continuation of the Algerian War. The 
FNACA at its constitutive congress described the referendum as “the plebiscite of the 
politics of the government and the military authorities in Algeria.” The newborn 
association declared “its categorical opposition to [...] the unlimited pursuit of the war,” 
denouncing “the intervention of the army in national politics, even if it is under the 
authority of General de Gaulle.”879 Moreover, the FNACA worried that the proposed 
Constitution posed obstacles for the veterans’ movement: it feared that “the reduction of 
Parliament’s powers and the reinforcement of governmental prerogatives” would weaken 
the voices of veterans’ supporters in politics.880 Scarce documentation remains from the 
FNACA in the period before the referendum, but the association’s newspaper decried the 
manipulation of the electorate, comparing the forceful and pervasive Gaullist “OUI” 
campaign to the new subliminal messaging techniques of American marketing, albeit 
“less intelligent and more vulgar.”881   
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 The UNCAFN also understood that the results of the referendum would indicate 
France’s willingness to continue the war, and proceeded with hesitation. President Porteu 
de la Morandière affirmed at a Congress meeting in July 1958 that for the present, his 
association would “continue to consider that there is an identity of views between the 
[pro-French Algeria] movement of May 13, [...] and the current position of the 
government,” but numerous leaders feared the referendum, knowing that the will of the 
majority could turn against them.882 Capeau, leader of the Algiers chapter of the 
UNCAFN, privately voiced his preference of an authoritarian solution: “We want de 
Gaulle to say ‘it’s like this,’ without a referendum.”883  
 In general, the UNCAFN seemed uneasy regarding the advent of popular 
democracy under de Gaulle’s proposed Constitution. Secretary General Gérard Le Marec 
observed that he “[did] not like democracy,” but did not want the association to stand idly 
by before the vote in two months.884 As it turned out, the UNCAFN had nothing to worry 
about for the moment, as the “OUI” campaign succeeded handily, with 79.3 percent of 
votes cast.885 The majority of the French right voted in favor of the referendum, with 
most of the opposition coming from the left.886 With the result of his first referendum, 
President de Gaulle felt he had a mandate to pursue his Algerian politics.  
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 De Gaulle became the central figure of the Algerian War, the person around 
whom all “hopes and disillusionments” would form.887 The evolution of his policies on 
Algeria had both immediate and long-term political consequences. He had come to power 
in 1958 backed by pro-French Algeria activists and officers, and could not immediately 
alienate this bellicose base; at first he “had absolutely no room to maneuver.”888 
However, in the longer view, de Gaulle considered Algeria an obstacle to his plans to 
restore France to its “greatness,” and he sought to end the conflict as soon as possible, 
although not necessarily on the terms originally promised.889 He needed to tread very 
carefully, responding to immediate military and political events while also keeping his 
long-term aim in mind.  
 In the first years after his return to power, de Gaulle relied on his authority as a 
military hero, drawing on his celebrated role as leader of the Free French Forces. Algeria 
had been home to the Provisional Government of the French Republic during the Second 
World War and had provided many troops to liberate France, and de Gaulle needed to 
acknowledge this legacy. In June 1958, he visited Algeria dressed in his military uniform, 
and gave speeches to reassure the settlers, uttering the now notorious phrases “I have 
understood you” in Algiers, and “Long live French Algeria!” in Mostaganem.890 Yet in a 
press conference in October of the same year, de Gaulle called for a “brave men’s peace,” 
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inviting the FLN to put down its arms “without humiliation.”891 This appeal to the honor 
of the FLN suggested that the French Commander in Chief’s stance on the conflict in 
Algeria was more flexible than many of his supporters had expected.  
 The watershed moment in de Gaulle’s Algerian trajectory, however, was the 
“self-determination” speech that he gave in September 1959. Regretting “‘the odious 
combat and fratricidal attacks’” in the colony, de Gaulle asserted that “‘the future of 
Algerians belongs to the Algerians, not as the knife and the machine gun would impose it 
on them, but according to the will that they will legitimately express by universal 
suffrage.’”892 By acknowledging Algerians’ right to self-determination and the possibility 
of seceding from France by a vote, de Gaulle was removing the FLN’s major justification 
for the rebellion, but he was also explicitly renouncing the principle of the territorial 
indivisibility of the French Republic.893  
 This was a grave departure from republican tradition, but de Gaulle presented his 
decision as the result of international political pressures: “Given all of the circumstances 
in Algeria, the nation, and the world, I consider [this] necessary [...].”894 The FLN had 
succeeded in internationalizing the conflict through yearly debates at the United Nations, 
much of the international coverage about France in Algeria highlighted atrocities and the 
injustice of colonialism, and de Gaulle’s “self-determination” speech was curiously timed 
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just after a visit of President Eisenhower to Paris.895 Although he sought to reassure the 
Army that the military effort was succeeding, visiting Algeria in the summer of 1959 and 
again in 1960 wearing his military uniform for a “mess hall tour,” President de Gaulle 
clearly desired a political solution to the conflict, and hoped to be able to negotiate with 
the FLN from a position of military strength.896  
 In a few short years, the Algerian War had turned “into a subject of interior 
French politics,” although Metropolitans had regarded it as a distant foreign affair a few 
years earlier.897 By 1961, the pro-French Algeria contingent was severely isolated in 
French public opinion.898 It became increasingly clear that the conflict required a political 
solution, even though the French Army had had the upper hand over the ALN on a 
military level since 1958.899 When de Gaulle’s referendum on Algerian national self-
determination came up in January 1961, the UNCAFN dismissed its political importance, 
still preferring a military solution to the conflict: “when a Country is disposed to undergo 
sacrifices during the time necessary to attain success, it wins. With or without a 
referendum.”900  
 However, the FNACA took hope from the discourse of self-determination and the 
opening of talks with the FLN. In summer 1961, some of its members traveled to Évian, 
where the negotiations with FLN spokesmen were beginning, “to demand a frank and 
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loyal application of self-determination.” The protestors were eventually kicked out of the 
Haute-Savoie, the FNACA blaming an “admirable governmental logic, according to 
which the Sahara becomes French and Évian a foreign land to citizens of our country.”901 
Despite the immediate failure of this mission, the FNACA would rely increasingly on 
such direct action in the years to come. 
 In response to the opening of negotiations with the FLN and the perceived 
governmental abandonment of the war effort, aggrieved generals André Zeller, Edmond 
Jouhaud, Maurice Challe, and Raoul Salan took control of the Algerian capital on April 
21, 1961. This crisis again made civil war seem possible, if not imminent. Although the 
mass of conscripts did not join the putsch, several regiments of paratroopers and of the 
Foreign Legion did, revealing a political split between conscripts and professional 
soldiers. This ultimate break with discipline posed a quandary to the UNCAFN, which 
likely would have supported another revolt to save French Algeria when it seemed that de 
Gaulle was ready to ‘abandon’ it, but felt bound to toe the line of republican legality.  
 Three days into the putsch, President Porteu de la Morandière sent a confidential 
memo to departmental leaders, urging prudence and seeking to maintain top-down 
control of the organization: “do not engage yourself anywhere without precise 
instructions from the National Steering Committee.”902 Although he acknowledged that 
he “would have preferred that these events did not happen,” Porteu de la Morandière 
reminded his cadres to be faithful to the Army, the only force “that [could] stop a civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
901“«Virtuellement» satisfaits,” L’Ancien d’Algérie 7 (July 1961): 1.  
 
902“Confidentiel: Présidents départementaux seulement,” UNCAFN archives, “UNCAFN” folder, 24 April 
1961, 1.  
 
	   213 
war and a Communist coup de force.”903 Publicly, as well, the association refused to take 
a stand against the instigators of the putsch: “it is infinitely painful to us to judge the men 
who were our respected leaders while we were in uniform. So we will say nothing.”904  
   In contrast to the nationalist veterans’ silence, the FNACA denounced the grave 
dangers it perceived in the generals’ putsch. The association took up the growing left-
wing discourse of a ‘fascist’ threat emerging in Algeria, the term applied broadly to 
denounce authoritarian militarism and intended to liken pro-French Algeria officers to 
Nazis in occupied France. The FNACA felt it had the support of public opinion, “against 
fascism and for the rapid opening of negotiations that should lead to peace in Algeria.”905 
The FNACA thus positioned itself against ‘fascism’ during a period of growing public 
opposition to the war, while the UNCAFN was tainted with the brush of Algérie 
française, which was daily becoming more distasteful to the public and much of the 
government. The putsch was put down in three days, de Gaulle again donning his military 
uniform to belittle the “handful of retired generals” in a televised appearance. The 
FNACA celebrated the fact that conscripts resisted the putsch, calling them “guardians of 
the honor of our Army,” and demanding a purge of all the putschist soldiers and 
officers.906   
 The putsch foreshadowed the reversal in the associations’ respective power and 
prestige. Because of the changing trajectory of de Gaulle’s Algerian politics, the 
FNACA, in opposing the putsch and supporting the President’s desire to negotiate with 	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the FLN, was de facto standing with the military strongman it had opposed just three 
years earlier. Meanwhile the UNCAFN, which had allied with right-wing revolutionaries 
to enable de Gaulle’s return, found itself marginalized once it refused to stand with de 
Gaulle against the putsch, because he had decided to open negotiations with the FLN.  
 By the fall of 1961, the UNCAFN was isolated, as some of its most powerful 
patrons had lost their political standing. The USRAF had disbanded soon after the events 
of May 1958, and Jacques Soustelle had been dismissed from the cabinet in 1960. The 
Ministry of Defense stopped supporting the UNCAFN in 1961 when it remained “too 
Algérie française” for the government’s taste, and because it refused to publicly support 
de Gaulle’s Algerian policy.907 In November of that year, the President of the nationalist 
group explained that the UNCAFN’s newspaper was not published for months since “we 
are very poor,” but the association would start printing a page in the UNC’s monthly 
newspaper.908 Henceforth, the UNCAFN could legitimately boast of its “independence 
from political formations and the Government,” but the association would have to fund 
its newsletter with advertisements for Catholic marriage, wine, and royal jelly.909  
 A few months before the generals’ putsch was launched, the fiercest remaining 
supporters of French Algeria including General Raoul Salan and activist Pierre 
Lagaillarde had assembled the clandestine OAS paramilitary group, which conducted 
murders, kidnappings, and bombings in a desperate last attempt to abort Algerian 
independence, or merely vent blind rage. The pro-French Algeria camp had always 
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claimed to support the “fraternity” of Muslims and Frenchmen, but in the grim final 
months of the war, the OAS sought only to provoke antipathy between the two 
communities.910 Neither the FNACA nor the UNCAFN would emerge unscathed as the 
OAS waged its scorched earth campaign in Algeria and the Metropole.   
 Because of their involvement in far right and nationalist networks, both the 
UNCAFN and its ally the UNC fell into varying degrees of complicity with the OAS. 
Jean-Yves Alquier, the co-founder and first President of the UNCAFN, was arrested in 
1961 on suspicion of belonging to an OAS network.911 Horace Savelli, who had just been 
named the UNC’s new National President after Alexis Thomas’ death in January 1962, 
became the leader of an important OAS cell in western France (OAS-Ouest) and was 
arrested in March 1962.912 He was imprisoned but would be amnestied in 1966.913 On top 
of these high level connections, many rank-and-file UNCAFN members living in Algeria, 
especially in cities like Algiers, Constantine and Oran, supported the OAS “in varying 
degrees,” as might be expected of recently demobilized soldiers fearing the loss of their 
settler colony.914 Although UNCAFN President Porteu de la Morandière acknowledges 
he “felt much sympathy” for the OAS because “their backs were against the wall,” and 
was solicited by several friends to join the paramilitary, he says he did not join because 
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he thought they were out of touch with reality and their revolution was futile.915 
However, his association never publicly disavowed the OAS. Porteu de la Morandière 
further reports having frequently received death threats in this period from the “Gaullist 
secret police,” who targeted him and other prominent nationalists to make sure they did 
not join the terrorist group.916  
 The FNACA loudly criticized the OAS, accusing the group of benefiting from 
“numerous complicities in the State.”917 In 1962, the Paris committee organized an anti-
OAS protest, in solidarity against a threat received by one of its members; several leaders 
including Maurice Sicart were arrested.918 And in February 1962, five days after eight 
French citizens had died during police repression of an anti-OAS and antiwar protest 
around the Charonne metro station, the FNACA declared the government’s emergency 
ban on all demonstrations to be “insane.” It called for France to “truly mobilize” against 
“the criminal maneuvers of the OAS,” and announced that President Servan-Schreiber, 
the National Office, and all members of FNACA-Paris would attend a follow-up 
demonstration at Place de la République.919 The events of “Charonne” and the protest that 
ensued remain one of the core memories of the French left from this era—a time of 
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antifascist union, helping to obscure the left’s earlier equivocation on the Algerian 
question—and the FNACA made good its democratic rhetoric by participating in this 
march.920  
 The cease-fire was official on March 19, 1962, but the war’s bloody wake was far 
from receding. At the end of the month, just after the cease-fire had gone into effect, and 
after almost a month of relative calm in Paris, the OAS bombed fifteen locations in the 
capital during a single night, including the FNACA’s headquarters, which also housed the 
local section of the Confédération générale du travail labor union.921 No one was hurt or 
killed in this night of plastique, but for the FNACA it was a near miss as the National 
Juridical Commission had just concluded a meeting in the building.922 Days after the 
bombing, the FNACA published a defiant editorial in its newspaper stating that the OAS 
had punished the group for its steadfast opposition to the war since 1958.923  
 The OAS aimed wide in its campaign of vengeance, however, and the same night 
it struck other personalities not known for their leftist allegiances or antiwar positions. 
Targets included the journalist Jean Lartéguy, famous for his dark 1960 Algerian War 
novel Les Centurions, UNC Vice President Paul Galland, and Doctor Jean-François 
LeMaire, a ‘man of May 13’ whose politics had evolved. LeMaire had recently quit the 
National Council of the UNC after President Savelli’s arrest, explaining he sought 
distance from “ ‘the activist orientation that some, who do not hesitate to participate in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 256.  
 
921“L’Action de OAS en Algérie et en Métropole,” Le Monde (30 March 1962): 1.   
 
922J. Martinet, “Le plasticage de notre siège: le prix de notre clairvoyance,” L’Ancien d’Algérie 11 (April 
1962): 1.  
 
923Ibid., 3.  
 
	   218 
subversion against the state, intend to give an association which should be apolitical.’ ”924 
Apparently the OAS sought to make an example of him. In the months surrounding the 
end of the war, the harrowing exactions of the OAS in mainland France created a strong 
public association between the pro-French Algeria camp and far right extremism, one that 
persists to the present day.925   
 The last year of the Algerian War saw the conflict’s direct appearance in the 
Metropole: the spectacular violence in the colony as well as events in the mainland were 
more memorable to average French citizens than the drawn-out progression of eight years 
of distant war.926 By 1962, after years of evolution in public opinion, there was nothing 
radical about de Gaulle’s decision to allow Algerian independence; it was reinforced by 
the French population’s growing desire for peace, as well as the alienation of most 
Algerians from France through the course of the war.927 Yet the fractures of this year 
would have profound effects on French society and politics in the coming decades.     
 The advent of Algerian independence in 1962 established the conditions in which 
the FNACA could rise, and the UNCAFN decline, reflecting political realignments 
throughout the country. Press releases, delegations, and laudable acts of mutual aid 
notwithstanding, the UNCAFN had largely rested on its laurels during the war; its elite-
based conservative political culture was only effective when politicians sharing its view 
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of the war were in power. As de Gaulle’s Algerian policies evolved, and it became clear 
he was seeking a political rather than a military solution to the conflict, the UNCAFN, 
along with much of the nationalist right and far right, felt bitterly betrayed by the military 
hero it had helped bring to power to ‘save’ French Algeria. The nationalist veterans 
lamented the futility of France’s sacrifices in the war; as President Porteu de la 
Morandière wrote, “We were told that there would be neither victor, nor vanquished, but 
we had gone to defend a French province.”928  
 The FNACA, which had strongly opposed de Gaulle’s return, exulted along with 
the anticolonialist left at the decolonization that he presided over. A FNACA editorial in 
March 1962 editorial proclaimed, “Our immense hope has finally been transformed into 
an explosion of joy.”929 After 1962, these associations continued the political methods 
they developed during the war, but as we will see in Chapter 6, the FNACA’s methods 
saw greater success after the war, as the anti-colonial narrative of the war grew in 
strength among the population, and as the hold of Gaullists on the government gradually 
lessened.   
 De Gaulle’s political trajectory, and the evolution through which he led public 
opinion, resulted in changed prospects for both veterans’ associations. By the end of the 
war, “the overwhelming majority” of France viewed Algerian independence “as a 
triumph” of de Gaulle’s regime, even though at the beginning of the conflict in 1954, 
French Algeria had been “the object of a national consensus.”930 This transformation in 
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political attitudes allowed the FNACA to present itself as a victor along with de Gaulle, 
for having opposed the war from the beginning. It also meant that the association would 
need to expend far less energy defending its anticolonial narrative of the war, and could 
devote its collectivist political culture and direct action tactics to fighting for veterans’ 
rights.  
 For decades after the war’s end, however, those who had supported French 
Algeria “felt like internal émigrés in the Fifth Republic,” and it was these aggrieved 
veterans who were most likely to join the UNCAFN, attracted by its emphasis on military 
pride and its narrative of a stolen victory in Algeria.931 This association would perpetuate 
the interpretation, widespread on the nationalist right, that de Gaulle had “sold off” 
Algeria and “duped” those who had supported him in 1958.932 And the traditional, honor-
based elite political culture of this association led the UNCAFN to perceive de Gaulle’s 
“abandonment” of Algeria almost as a personal insult. The following chapter will explore 
how these two associations’ political positions after the war influenced their campaigns 
for veterans’ recognition, and their reactions in the wake of “the events of May 1968.”
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CHAPTER 6: ELITE SPOKESMEN AND MASS ACTION: THE SECOND 
“DAYS OF MAY” AND THE STRUGGLE FOR VETERANS’ RECOGNITION 
 
 By the time of the Fifth Republic’s official recognition of veterans of Algeria in 
1974, the political fortunes of the two major Algerian War veterans’ associations had 
largely reversed. Although both associations share credit for major achievements in 
veterans’ legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, in this period the FNACA was on the 
ascendant, and the UNCAFN’s power was fading. Examining the reasons behind this 
reversal helps us understand the unforeseen consequences of the Algerian War in 
postcolonial France, and highlights the changing political currents in the first decades of 
the Fifth Republic. 
 To do so, we must situate Algerian War veterans’ politics between two moments a 
decade apart, both referred to in France as the “days of May.” Charles de Gaulle had 
returned to power on the wings of the May 13, 1958 revolt that civilians and soldiers, 
dismayed with the Fourth Republic’s handling of the Algerian War, had launched in 
Algiers. As detailed in Chapter 5, the UNCAFN’s leaders plunged headfirst into the 
movement to bring back Charles de Gaulle, believing him to be the only man who could 
‘save’ French Algeria. But many “men of May 13” in the UNCAFN and in society would 
be disillusioned by de Gaulle’s political evolution toward Algerian independence. And 
the decade between 1958 and 1968 saw deep political and social changes in France, 
which would work to the FNACA’s benefit, as greater numbers of French people began
to see the Algerian War as a mistake, and chafed at the monarchical political style of a 
leader whose return to power the FNACA had opposed ten years earlier. On May 13, 
1968, following student protests at the universities of Nanterre and the Sorbonne, a 
general strike began that would all but shut down the country, manifesting a widespread 
rejection of the Gaullist program. The protestors of 1968 were well aware of the mirror-
image symbolism of the “two Mays”: a common chant heard in demonstrations was, 
“‘Ten years is long enough!’”933  
 How did the two major associations for veterans of Algeria respond to this 
national revolt against the Gaullist order? Furthermore, what political lessons did these 
associations draw from “the events of 1968” as they worked toward their longtime goal 
of veterans’ recognition, finally achieved in 1974? The two organizations deployed 
divergent strategies toward political change—the UNCAFN, with its initial political 
access, relied on elite networking and incrementalism, while the FNACA, a political 
outsider in this period, deployed mass mobilization with a confrontational attitude toward 
the state. The fight for veterans’ recognition was a testing ground for these two strategies 
under Gaullism.  
 While social interest groups in modern France have tended to mobilize in reaction 
against government policy rather than promoting it, this is a rare case in which civic 
associations pressured the state to enact novel legislation.934 Moreover, the campaign for 
recognition of veterans of Algeria, although an important window onto the political 
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afterlife of the war in France, has never been studied.935 This chapter compares both 
associations’ activism toward official recognition of veterans, and will examine how this 
recognition—itself an initial state acknowledgment of the Algerian War—is one of the 
unexamined legacies of “1968” in France.  
  In the Gaullist period (1958-1974), the Fifth Republic had numerous reasons to 
avoid recognizing the soldiers who had served in North Africa. After 1962, the state acted 
as if Algeria had never happened, and its veterans were a reminder of a past the state 
wished would pass.936 There was also a generational obstacle: to the World War veterans 
and former Resistance fighters dominating politics in this period, the Algerian conflict, a 
counterinsurgency against a non-state adversary, did not always appear to have been a 
“real” war.937 Most concretely, recognizing the veterans of Algeria would require the 
state to promise a considerable sum in pensions and other benefits to the conscripts and 
reservists sent to fight the war, on top of the compensation and benefits owed to 
professional soldiers.  
 Regardless of one’s political interpretation of the Algerian War, it was a trauma 
for French society, and France’s desire to forget the war helped render its veterans 
invisible. Yet with a conservative estimate of 1.1 million conscripts who served in North 
Africa during the Algerian War—not even considering reservists, Legionnaires and 	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career military—surviving veterans of Algeria composed well over ten percent of the 
active male population in 1962.938 Returning to a society more interested in the growth of 
the economy and consumer culture than recalling the Algerian War, many veterans 
became politically active—to promote their views of the war, to serve their comrades in 
arms, and to achieve official recognition alongside the previous two combatant 
generations.  
 The movement for recognition of veterans of Algeria provided a test of the new 
strong executive model enshrined in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Placing 
executive power in the presidency rather than the legislature was unprecedented in 
French republican tradition, and it gave the President “wider powers than any other leader 
of liberal democracies in the world possessed” at the time.939 President de Gaulle 
regarded his Ministers as technicians who carried out his policies, rather than as 
advisers.940 Indeed, the chief political strategy of Gaullism was to “support the political 
objectives of the executive power” and to “neutralize Parliament and any potential 
obstacles it might present.”941  
 The “Copernican revolution” unleashed by the Gaullist victory and the creation of 
a new Constitution in 1958 gave an initial advantage to the well-connected UNCAFN.942 
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Under the new constellation of power in the Fifth Republic, Ministers held priority over 
deputies in the National Assembly and could veto their proposals for the day’s agenda.943 
This meant that a civil association would see greater legislative success if the President 
and relevant ministers already shared its political orientation.944 Accordingly, the 
UNCAFN had greater access to the government while Ministers of Veterans and War 
Victims who shared its nationalist, pro-French Algeria viewpoint were in office. This 
meant that the FNACA required a different strategy than simply appealing to the Minister 
in the name of the Algerian generation. 
 As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the two competing veterans’ associations bore 
markedly different political cultures, which combined with specific narratives of the war 
to guide their action. The FNACA’s political culture may best be described as collectivist 
mobilization, and its militancy reinforced itself with the narrative that all veterans of 
Algeria shared similar burdens, regardless of wartime experience, and could only defend 
their rights through the strength of numbers. Its leaders took a consistently 
confrontational attitude toward the state, assuming cynicism and pandering on the part of 
the politicians they encountered. The UNCAFN, however, drew on a traditional political 
culture based in private contacts and personal honor, and acted upon a narrative that 
veterans of Algeria formed an elite cadre of citizens with political acuity. Confident in 
their own respectability, its leaders held an accommodationist attitude toward the state, 
taking politicians to be men of their word unless proven otherwise, and appreciating 
incremental progress. 
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 Both associations claimed unique credit for the state’s official recognition of 
veterans of Algeria in 1974, when the Senate and the National Assembly passed a bill 
opening the carte du combattant (veteran’s card) to those who had served in North 
Africa.945 For the UNCAFN, this development “vindicated” its “perseverance.”946 
Likewise, the FNACA proclaimed the success “incontestably” its own.947 The carte du 
combattant, a legislative victory won in 1926 by veterans of the First World War, granted 
both material benefits and a weighty moral standing to veterans, in a society where 
bureaucratic categories almost seem to precede essence.948 But the generation of French 
veterans of Algeria only gained official recognition twelve years after their war ended, 
following years of militancy—their campaign for recognition lasted longer than the 
campaign to create the carte du combattant in the first place. Today, both the FNACA, 
and the UNC, which merged with the UNCAFN in 1985, claim predominant credit for 
winning the carte du combattant for veterans of Algeria, but the evidence does not 
clearly vindicate either self-aggrandizing position.949   
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 Despite fundamental enmity and divergent views of the war, these associations 
shared one conviction: the young Frenchmen who fought in Algeria were veterans. The 
UNCAFN’s parent association held this view before the FNACA had even formed. In 
1956, UNC President and World War I veteran Alexis Thomas explained to the Minister 
of Veterans and War Victims that “our young comrades [...] face the same risks [...] as if 
they were engaged in operations ‘of war’ [....],” and that his association demanded “[...] 
that they not be victims of a fiction imposed by [...] considerations of political 
opportunity.”950 The FNACA, however, although state recognition of veterans figured on 
its earliest platform, was a political outsider and did not have the confidence to make 
such direct demands of the government early on. Its appeals tended more toward pathos 
and irony, as in this 1966 editorial: “Since the end of the war, nothing has been done for 
us [...while] Algerian soldiers are recognized [...] by their government [...].”951 
 While both associations urged the recognition of veterans of Algeria, they 
invested their struggles for the carte du combattant with divergent meanings. For the 
UNCAFN, the veterans’ card would confirm the dignity of soldiers sent to fight a morally 
correct war, whose military victory had been betrayed by politics. As President Porteu de 
la Morandière reflected in 1965, “The Army is beyond reproach. [...] We obtained our 
victory ‘on the ground.’ ”952 Thus, the emphasis was on moral recognition for soldiers 
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who did their duty. Recognition of veterans was, in the eyes of the nationalist group, 
critical to their elevation in national politics. President Porteu de la Morandière felt that  
“our civic mission was not [...] credible if we were not real veterans.”953 Hence, veterans’ 
recognition was secondary to the ultimate goal of political prestige for members of the 
right wing association, a place at the national table in return for their service to the 
country.  
 But for the FNACA, the carte du combattant was the ultimate prize itself: it 
promised compensation for the state’s having “used us for many months,” an 
acknowledgement of “the damage caused” to veterans and their families.954 The emphasis 
was thus on reparation for the material and moral suffering caused by an unwanted war. 
A FNACA editorial early into its campaign excoriated the attitude of the Minister of 
Veterans, who, like Candide’s tutor, believed there was “no problem with veterans of 
Algeria and that everything is going for the best in the best of worlds.”955 The FNACA 
painted a picture of neglected citizen-soldiers who had earned rights because of their 
suffering on behalf of the nation. 
 Demographic differences in membership influenced the associations’ views on 
whether veterans’ recognition should be primarily symbolic, or material. The UNCAFN’s 
members and leaders—former reservists and career military predominating—had 
generally been in their mid-twenties to early thirties on deployment in Algeria, and were 
thus more likely to be established in careers that they could continue upon 	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demobilization.956 And the professional soldiers who were attracted to the UNCAFN’s 
rhetoric of military pride, nationalism, and colonial nostalgia already had the guarantee of 
material benefits for their service. The FNACA, on the other hand, was primarily 
composed of former conscripts, who had been in their late teens or early twenties on 
deployment, and would be more interested in the promise of material benefits—including 
professional retraining, loans, and a pension.957  
 Although many national leaders of both associations were already entitled to the 
veterans’ card, either for war injuries or for combat decorations, they came to opposing 
conclusions about who deserved the veterans’ card, and why.958 In a Congress meeting in 
1958, the UNCAFN President confessed it was “a bit of a symbolic gesture” to ask for 
the veterans’ card, but maintained that it was urgent to do so before left wing groups 
could take political advantage of the situation.959 The next year the UNCAFN 
“voluntarily renounced the pension attached to the carte du combattant,” seeking to deny 
the Minister any financial argument.960 The General Treasurer of the UNCAFN, Henri 
Bohly, proposed that veterans receive official status “without any particular claim 
attached,” in order to welcome veterans of Algeria into the fraternity of combat.961 The 
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group eventually formulated a request for a card specific to the Algerian War, and only 
for those who “merit it.”962  
 The UNCAFN President asserted that awarding the card to all veterans of Algeria 
“would devalue it,” since so many troops deployed had never seen regular combat, and 
recognition was only conferred to veterans of the World Wars who had seen three months 
of sustained combat.963 But regardless of whether individual conscripts had experienced 
combat, the FNACA maintained that all veterans of Algeria were victims of the state, 
subject to the perils of ambushes in North Africa, and silence and neglect back home in 
France. It thus demanded the same card held by veterans of earlier wars for all veterans 
of Algeria.964 It mocked the UNCAFN’s separate and meritocratic veterans’ card, which 
it disdainfully mocked as only recognizing “ ‘the true’ soldiers.”965 
 Following the logic of their positions, and drawing on their diverging political 
cultures, both associations pursued markedly different campaigns for the veterans’ card. 
The UNCAFN lobbied in its elite networks, expecting its nationalist credentials and 
support of the war to facilitate political access. In April of 1958, months before the return 
of de Gaulle and the formation of the FNACA, the UNCAFN National President 
addressed a letter to Loire deputy Georges Bidault, as well as other nationalist politicians 
including André Morice and Jacques Soustelle, asking them to “urgently” file a bill to 
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recognize veterans.966 The UNCAFN President claimed that “certain Mendésiste and far 
left groups” were preparing to write their own bill, looking to use it “to electoral and 
demagogic ends,” and thus he preferred that a proponent of French Algeria first depose 
the motion.967 He did add that the veterans’ card would bring “precious aid” to veterans 
who are “victims of peacetime legislation,” but material considerations were never 
foremost in his mind.968 This proposed law did materialize, but the UNCAFN continued 
its elite networking before the fall of the Fourth Republic. In July 1958, the association 
wrote to the Ministry of Veterans, suggesting that “this simple card would symbolize the 
Fraternity of Arms that unites the different combat generations.” By September 1958, the 
association was surprised to have received no response.969    
 Obtaining the veterans’ card under the Fifth Republic proved more difficult than 
the UNCAFN had expected. UNCAFN President François Porteu de la Morandière had 
the opportunity to privately petition the Fifth Republic’s new Minister of Veterans and 
War Victims, Raymond Triboulet, in late 1958, while they were traveling by airplane 
together.970 Not only was Triboulet an “active member” of the UNCAFN’s parent 
organization, the UNC, but he was a family friend and next-door neighbor of the 
UNCAFN President.971 Believing that these ties would give him a sympathetic audience, 	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Porteu de la Morandière insisted that the conflict in Algeria was a real war, and young 
Frenchmen were dying, but Triboulet never deviated from the official government 
position that Algeria was only undergoing “peacekeeping operations” and not a state of 
war.972 It was too much to ask Triboulet—a former Resistance fighter, ardent Gaullist, 
and newly appointed Minister of de Gaulle—to contradict his government’s position on 
the “events of Algeria,” and to recognize young men completing their mandatory national 
military service in North Africa as veterans.  
 The UNCAFN would eventually begin more visible political efforts, such as 
asking presidential candidates their positions on the veterans’ card, but did not follow up 
with concerted political campaigns.973 The UNCAFN was overly confident in its weight 
and pursued politics mainly from the top, considering itself the voice of an elite 
generation of veterans. Although it initially had high-level government support during the 
war, the UNCAFN’s “privileged contact” with Triboulet and other officials, and attempts 
to make its demands palatable to them, were not enough to overcome the state’s adamant 
refusal to acknowledge that Algeria had been a war.974 That would take a different kind 
of pressure. 
 Lacking privileged contacts itself, the FNACA needed to methodically build up 
“the pressure of numbers” both in its own membership and among elected officials to 
overcome governmental opposition.975 Because of the difficulty in disciplining and 
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mobilizing individual members, the associations with the largest and most cohesive 
memberships have tended to be the most successful in pushing policy in modern 
France.976  Although the Minister of Veterans and War Victims received its delegations 
as early as 1959, the FNACA was disappointed by repeated broken promises to study its 
concerns.977 While Minister Triboulet did eventually propose the creation of “a special 
distinction” that would grant veterans of Algeria access to services such as loans and 
professional education through the state veterans’ office (ONACVG), the FNACA 
refused to be diverted from its goal of full recognition through the same card as for 
veterans of earlier wars, and the pension, priority medical care, and loans that it 
promised.978 Although frustrated with constant obstruction by the Minister, FNACA 
leaders reassured themselves constantly that “a stronger FNACA will have even more 
weight in the eyes of deputies.”979   
 The FNACA’s militants did not overlook “any form of action likely to rapidly 
lead to its goals.”980 The association needed as strong a showing as possible in civil 
society to counter the power of the executive branch in blocking legislation. Early on, it 
built a network of support among other organizations on the political left. By 1961, 
unions such as the Confédération général du travail, the Confédération française de 
travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC), and the student association, the Union nationale des 	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étudiants de France (UNEF), had written letters supporting the FNACA’s veterans’ card 
campaign.981 Also in 1961, the FNACA launched its first of many national postcard 
campaigns, in which it asked members to collect signatures for a petition asking the 
government for the veterans’ card.982 After the war’s end, the association held frequent 
public information sessions throughout the country to sensitize the public to the plight of 
demobilized conscripts, and build awareness of its campaign for state recognition and 
material benefits.983 Its political efforts would become more vigorous, however, with the 
1965 departure of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber as National President. He was 
preoccupied with his work for the news magazine l’Express and his political organizing, 
and no longer interested in leading the association he had founded in 1958 principally to 
end the Algerian War.984  
 In a test of governmental attitudes in spring 1965, FNACA delegates delivered 
tens of thousands of signed petitions to the Ministry of Veterans and War Victims to 
demand the veterans’ card.985 Suggesting the association’s confrontational attitude, the 
delegates had apparently made no appointment, as they boasted of almost being ejected 
by security police. When they were finally invited to meet a delegate of Minister 
Sainteny, they were informed that the government had no intention of granting veterans’ 
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status, but “preferred instead to offer a diploma to which no material benefits would be 
attached.”986  
 Despite the Gaullist stonewalling, to which they were well accustomed by now, 
the FNACA’s leaders claimed that the Minister’s delegate had hinted “the government 
would give in, according to how our movement gains in power and size.”987 Accordingly, 
the association began more forceful campaigns for the veterans’ card, and even directed 
its members to request the card from departmental offices of the ONACVG, pressuring 
bureaucrats as well as policymakers.988 On numerous occasions through the 1960s and 
1970s, FNACA delegates personally delivered “tens of thousands” of signed petitions at 
a time to the President or the Minister of Veterans.989  
 While the FNACA sought to gain political weight to overcome the obstruction of 
Gaullist ministers, the nationalist association’s political access facilitated at least a 
preliminary recognition for veterans of Algeria. Although the UNCAFN had lost the 
financial support of the Ministry of Defense in 1961 for remaining “too French Algeria” 
for the government’s taste, it maintained the sympathy of those politicians who had 
supported French Algeria, and thus regretted the outcome of the war.990 In October 1966, 
Minister of Veterans and War Victims Alexandre Sanguinetti attended the UNCAFN’s 
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annual executive congress.991 The fierce right-wing World War II veteran had worked 
with the leader of the UNCAFN almost a decade before, toward the common goal of 
bringing back Charles de Gaulle.992  
 At the October congress, along with evoking their disgust for recent anticolonial 
works such as The Battle of Algiers and Les Paravents to demonstrate their nationalist 
credentials, UNCAFN leaders brought up the topic of veterans’ recognition, but 
emphasized that they “refused to be professional activists.”993 This was both a reminder 
that they were reasonable and sought accommodation with the government, and a not-so-
subtle jab at their rival FNACA, which took pride in its energetic militancy for veterans’ 
rights. Despite the fellow feeling he shared with the UNCAFN as a colonial nostalgist 
and former “man of May 13,” Minister Sanguinetti did not break ranks with his 
government’s position. He explained that the state could not grant veterans of Algeria the 
carte du combattant, since they had participated in a “‘civil war without a front of 
operations,’” rather than a war defending France against a foreign enemy.994 This 
suggests the strength of the Gaullist structure of government; the UNCAFN could no 
longer rely solely on its nationalist respectability, nor its ties with sympathetic elites in 
politics.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
991“Le Ministre des Anciens Combattants rend visite au siège national et participe à la magnifique réunion 
des cadres UNCAFN du 18 octobre,” La Voix du combattant 1321 (November 1966): 9.	  	  	  
992Christophe Nick, Résurrection: naissance de la Ve République: un coup d'État démocratique (Paris: 
Fayard, 1998): 207-8; Letter from Alexandre Sanguinetti to François Porteu de la Morandière, 3 February 
1958, UNCAFN archives, “Divers” folder.  	  
993“Le Ministre des Anciens Combattants rend visite au siège national...”, op. cit., 9.  
 
994“Communiqué de presse publié à l’issu de cette réunion,” La Voix du combattant 1321 (November 
1966): 9.  
 
	   237 
 Building on ideas developed by his predecessors, Sanguinetti did, however, 
propose a Titre de reconnaissance de la Nation (TRN), an ‘Award of the Nation’s 
Gratitude’, accompanied by a Croix de la pacification, a medal rewarding loyalty to the 
Republic and the sacrifices soldiers made while “pacifying” North Africa. Sanguinetti 
added that he would support allowing recipients of the TRN to access veterans’ services 
at the ONACVG, including loans, professional re-education, and mutual savings 
accounts.995 In a press release, the UNCAFN announced its interest in the creation of 
such an award, but insisted that the veterans’ card should still be available to veterans of 
Algeria, for the same criteria that applied to veterans of the World Wars.996  
 Seemingly in response to the UNCAFN cadres’ meeting, the Ministry of Veterans 
invited the leaders of the FNACA and the UNCAFN to a round table to discuss veterans’ 
recognition in February 1967.997 Minister Sanguinetti could not attend, and was 
represented by the leaders of his Cabinet and by the Director of the Veterans’ Office.998 
As this meeting was a month before the legislative elections scheduled for March, the 
leaders of the FNACA suspected that it had the “taint of electioneering” behind it, and 
even the UNCAFN wondered if anything would come of the talks, given the timing, right 
before the government was due to change.999 The FNACA’s statement reflects its 	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assumption of cynical pandering on the part of politicians, but also its confidence that 
veterans of Algeria and their supporters comprised an important voting bloc.  
 The UNCAFN, perhaps also recognizing the demographic weight of veterans, and 
certainly because of the vociferous militancy of its rival association, began to change its 
rhetoric toward the government around this time. The UNCAFN reported after the round 
table that its position on veterans’ recognition was “irreconcilable” with that of the 
government, since the Minister’s representatives would only discuss the Award of the 
Nation’s Gratitude and not the full veterans’ card. Nevertheless, it accepted the proposed 
Award as a “first step” toward recognition, saying the association was “open to any 
reasonable suggestion” going forward.1000 The FNACA’s response to the meeting was 
more openly critical, partly because it did not have the political access to the Minister that 
its rival association enjoyed. While it also held out for full veterans’ recognition, it 
castigated the Minister’s representatives for retracting public promises the Minister had 
made previously, about holders of the Award being able to access state veterans’ 
services.1001  
 The government elected in March 1967 did indeed seat a new Minister of 
Veterans, Henri Duvillard, a veteran of the Battle of France who had entered the 
Resistance in 1941.1002 He received a FNACA delegation in June and presented himself 
as sympathetic to the Algerian War veterans’ movement. But he reminded representatives 
that he could only go so far, since his policies were “‘subordinate to the decisions of the 	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Cabinet and, above all, the Head of State.’”1003 While he may simply have been evading a 
straight answer on the topic of veterans’ recognition, in principle Duvillard was right. 
Under the political structures established by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, there 
was only so much that an individual Minister could do to pursue policies that the 
President and the Cabinet refused to discuss. The Constitution enabled the government to 
be “very adept at maneuvering away from unwanted questions and in steering toward its 
own preferences,” in this case by giving plausible deniability to the Minister when faced 
with a question from the very category of citizens with whose care he was charged.1004   
 Duvillard also received a UNCAFN delegation in June, and signaled his favor for 
conservative veterans’ associations by promising to send a representative to the UNC’s 
upcoming congress.1005 The UNCAFN recounted to him the outcome of the round table 
with Minister Sanguinetti back in February before Duvillard’s election, and reminded 
him of the symbolic value of veterans’ recognition, which would “officially affirm [...] 
our fundamental belonging to the family of combatants.”1006 This moral appeal—
combined with the UNCAFN’s avowed disinterest in material benefits--seemed to sway 
the Minister. In October, the government backed a budgetary amendment bill proposed 
by Alain Griotteray, Républicain indépendant deputy of the Val-du-Marne, to create the 
Award of the Nation’s Gratitude for veterans of North Africa.1007 A distinguished 
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Resistance network leader during World War II, Griotteray was a member of the 
UNCAFN—although not a veteran of Algeria—and likely wrote this bill in consultation 
with the association.1008 He announced its success at a press conference at the UNCAFN 
headquarters.1009 Griotteray was a natural ally of the UNCAFN: a former “man of May 
13,” he had left the Gaullist party in 1960 because of his continued belief in French 
Algeria.1010  
 Griotteray’s bill passed the National Assembly in October 1967, and was declared 
law in March 1968. The Titre de reconnaissance de la Nation was created, in the words 
of the law, to “recognize the services rendered to the Nation by soldiers having 
participated in the operations of North Africa.”1011 Minister Duvillard, in his remarks to 
the National Assembly before the vote, had described the award as a fitting recognition 
for service in the Algerian conflict, which had a “special character without precedent in 
our national history,” but which was nevertheless “not service in war, because there was 
no war, in the international sense of the term.”1012  
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 The Award would be available on demand to all soldiers of French nationality 
who had served at least ninety consecutive days in Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia, during 
the periods of the respective decolonization conflicts, with the requirement of ninety days 
waived for those evacuated for illness or injury. However, recipients initially did not have 
access to veterans’ services through the ONACVG, until Minister Duvillard proposed an 
amendment to the law, which was passed in October 1969.1013 Thus, in its initial form, 
the Award of the Nation’s Gratitude was a moral, and not material, recognition. 
 In principle, this legislation should have satisfied the leaders of the UNCAFN, 
who prioritized symbolic and moral recognition, and displeased the leaders of the 
FNACA, who emphasized veterans’ need for material support. But the associations’ 
reactions were more ambiguous, reflecting their distinct political strategies toward 
gaining veterans’ recognition. The UNCAFN criticized the measure for not granting 
moral recognition widely enough. According to a press release, the UNCAFN regretted 
“that the status of combatant was not generously accorded to the last combat generation 
on the same level as for our elders.’”1014 Its main critiques were that the Award did not 
recognize the unique contributions of veterans of Algeria explicitly; it did not include 
harkis, colonial Tirailleurs, or other security personnel not directly incorporated in the 
Army, even though members of the Foreign Legion were qualified; and that the 
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requirement of ninety consecutive days in combat was the same criterion for the veterans’ 
card itself, lessening the distinction between the two documents.1015  
 While the UNCAFN concluded that the Award “presents some insufficiencies,” it 
reminded its members that Minister Duvillard was aware of these flaws, and that it “was 
no small feat that the President of the Republic signed this decree.”1016 Overall, the 
nationalist association was pleased with the incremental progress and preliminary 
symbolic recognition seen in this “friendly gesture of the Government,” while vowing to 
continue to fight for full veterans’ recognition.1017  
 Although opposed on principle to any separate recognition of veterans of Algeria, 
the FNACA was initially pleased by what it saw as a “first retreat of the government,” a 
de facto recognition of the unique experience of those who served in North Africa.1018 A 
FNACA newspaper headline exulted that “Action pays off!”, and claimed that the 
Award’s existence “was the result of our efforts.”1019 It prided itself on the presence of 
several criteria that it had originally proposed to the Minister, such as the requirement of 
ninety days in combat rather than a longer period, and the exclusion of non-military 
personnel—a category containing some political undesirables in the eyes of the FNACA, 
including the harkis, intelligence and psychological operations agents, and police. These 	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categories of combatants did not accord with the FNACA’s “malgré nous” narrative—
that soldiers served for France not out of patriotism, but against their will.  
 But the FNACA also accused the Ministry of going back on promises made at the 
round table in February 1967, where the FNACA felt it had been agreed that the Award 
would grant material benefits.1020 The association derided the measure as a “diploma void 
of any content,” since it recognized neither the “STATUS of veterans” nor their “right to 
reparations.”1021 It praised by name the deputies who had voted against the bill, since in 
the association’s view, the proposal was so flawed as to be unworthy of passing into 
law.1022 Hence, the FNACA, ever eager to boost its appeal in the eyes of potential 
members, criticized the government for seeking to pacify veterans of Algeria with a 
meaningless award, all while taking credit for this “first result,” which it had in fact 
refused to contemplate since at least 1961.1023 
 The Award of the Nation’s Gratitude was indeed a first step, although implicit, 
toward recognizing veterans of Algeria. The fact that two politicians adamantly opposed 
to acknowledging Algeria as a war—Minister Duvillard and President Charles de Gaulle 
himself—supported the bill, suggests that it was intended only to placate veterans in the 
hope that their activism would end. The FNACA’s confrontational strategy led it to take 
credit for this symbolic legislation while simultaneously criticizing it as meaningless. But 
the creation of the Award of the Nation’s Gratitude is more directly attributable to the 
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UNCAFN, whose incremental political strategy as well as sympathetic alliances with 
Veterans’ Ministers and colonial nostalgist politicians had allowed the idea of moral 
recognition to take root. The UNCAFN proved the importance it attached to this first step 
by ensuring that its leaders were among the first to receive the Award; the Minister had 
announced that he would present it personally to the “first hundred or two hundred” 
veterans who requested it.1024  
 At a ceremony at the Ministry of Veterans in February 1969, Minister Duvillard 
presented UNCAFN President François Porteu de la Morandière, Vice President Hugues 
Dalleau, and Secretary-General Jean Pézard with the Titre de reconnaissance de la 
Nation.1025 Individual members and regional leaders of the FNACA were also among the 
sixty-eight veterans in attendance awaiting awards, but no national official seems to have 
been there.1026 Henceforth, the FNACA would denigrate the Award of the Nation’s 
Gratitude as an empty half-measure—almost an insult—that demanded further efforts 
toward the veterans’ card, while the UNCAFN would draw on its good-faith acceptance 
of the Award to press for wider recognition of veterans from the government.  
 The nationalist association continued its politics of respectability and elite 
networks as it looked toward the fiftieth anniversary of the armistice of 1918. In 1967, 
the UNCAFN joined a commission of several large national veterans’ associations in 
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order to collaborate toward the 1968 commemoration.1027 Sponsored by the UNC and the 
Association générale des mutilés de guerre (General Association of Disabled Veterans, 
AGMG)—the oldest extant World War I veterans’ association in France, founded in 
1915—this commission had a venerable parentage.1028 It also included the far-right, 
colonial nostalgist Anciens combattants de l’Union française, and the anti-Gaullist 
Organisation de résistance de l’Armée (Resistance Organization of the Army, ORA). At 
the initial meeting of the commission, UNCAFN President Porteu de la Morandière 
suggested inviting the Veterans’ Minister to the joint Congress that was planned, but also 
stressed the need to define the distinction between “civic action” and “political 
action.”1029 However, national events would quickly disrupt the Commission’s plans, and 
provide the UNCAFN another opportunity to blur the line between civic duty and 
political activism. As we will see, the FNACA would mostly hold back from engagement 
on a national level during this turbulent time in France. 
 Nationalist veterans were alarmed when the flames of a recently radicalized 
students’ movement at the Université de Paris-X-Nanterre in April 1968 spread into the 
Sorbonne, eventually triggering sympathetic workers’ strikes.1030 Rumors of a 
particularly shocking insult to French nationalism would compel the UNCAFN and its 
nationalist allies to jump into the fray. On the evening of May 7, a detachment from a 
student protest led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit around the Arc de Triomphe was spotted 	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1028Prost, Les Anciens combattants et la société française, vol. I, Histoire, 29. 
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waving red flags and singing “The Internationale.” One of the students reportedly 
attempted the “crude gesture” of urinating on the “sacred tile” on the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier under the Arc de Triomphe, but his comrades discouraged him.1031  
 Despite the fact that this was an “imaginary event,” rumors of the supposed 
desecration of the “sacred tile,” especially on the eve of V-E day and months before the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Armistice of 1918, was too much for many nationalist veterans 
to countenance.1032 It presented an opportunity for veterans to bear witness, in the 
tradition of World War I veterans, and to intervene on behalf of the forces of patriotism. 
The very next day, the UNCAFN received word from Veterans’ Minister Duvillard that 
he would give them an audience in the coming weeks.1033 On May 10, the Vice-President 
of the UNCAFN sent a telegram to Duvillard, sharing the association’s “emotion to see 
the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier soiled, [...] and demanding that sanctions be taken.” 
The association also announced an upcoming “restorative ceremony,” inviting its own 
members as well as students to attend, in the hopes of demonstrating unity between the 
generations.1034 In apparent recognition for its rapid show of patriotism, the UNCAFN 
was selected to relight the Eternal Flame at the Arc de Triomphe on May 11. National 
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1032Antoine de Baecque, “L’épicentre,”  209-275 in dir. Artières and Zancarini-Fournel, op. cit., 244.	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President François Porteu de la Morandière and the recently widowed Madame le 
Maréchal Juin, a star in the pantheon of French nationalism, shared the honor.1035  
 The UNCAFN’s restorative ceremony took place soon thereafter on May 13, with 
a revival of the Eternal Flame at the Arc de Triomphe by Minister Duvillard. Attendees 
included the leaders of the UNC and the UNCAFN, those of numerous other nationalist 
veterans’ associations, as well as members of the far-right students’ association Occident, 
mostly composed of young nationalists who would have liked to serve in Algeria.1036 The 
General Touzet de Vigier and a representative of the Minister of the Army were also 
present.1037 The UNCAFN explained in an internal bulletin to cadres that the goal of the 
ceremony was “to remember that the three-colored flag must be respected, and remain the 
symbol of French unity.”1038 After the ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe, however, some 
demonstrators took it upon themselves to protest in front of the Chinese embassy, 
throwing stones and shouting, “‘The Vietcong are killers!’”1039 Although only several 
hundred demonstrators attended the ceremony, it prefigured attempts the state itself 
would make to frame the demonstrators as anti-French subversives seeking civil war.1040 
Indeed, a very Gaullist-sounding “Committee to Defend the Republic” had sent out tracts 	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advertising the ceremony, and warning against an impending “Communist revolution, 
following more and more violent riots.”1041 While the UNCAFN and the UNC indicated 
that the demonstration was intended to be apolitical, in the atmosphere of crisis rapidly 
unfolding across France, it could not be perceived as such.1042  
 While right wing veteran activists had been central to the events of May 13, 1958, 
the second “May 13” in Gaullist history is not remembered for the UNCAFN’s 
restorative ceremony. This day saw the beginning of a general strike called by the major 
national labor unions “against police repression” of student protests at Nanterre and the 
Sorbonne.1043 One million people are estimated to have marched in Paris that day, 
responding to calls to “‘question the State’” by “‘pursuing action through direct 
democracy.’”1044 The limited television coverage of the nationalist veterans’ ceremony at 
the Arc de Triomphe seemed to place it in opposition to the large populist march taking 
place that day between Place de la Bastille and Denfert-Rochereau, to slogans including 
“‘Goodbye, de Gaulle,’” and ‘“Ten years is long enough.’”1045 This narrative amplified 
popular perceptions that veterans were out of touch with modern society’s concerns, and 
worried leaders of other veterans’ associations that the government sought to foment 	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1042And indeed, at least one national leader quit the UNCAFN after the May 13 protest, feeling that the 
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division between veterans and students.1046 Indeed, the very same night, students 
occupied the Sorbonne.  
 A wave of student activism and workers’ militancy snowballed after the May 13 
general strike, beginning with the occupation of the Renault factory in Boulogne-
Billancourt on the 16th and quickly spreading to other factories in the Parisian suburbs. 
Contestation diffused even to the farthest corners of France.1047 By May 20, the country 
came to a standstill with a nationwide general strike.1048 It was in this atmosphere of 
rejection of the social, economic, and political status quo that Minister Duvillard 
privately received representatives from fifty-five national veterans’ associations, among 
them leaders of the UNCAFN, on May 21.1049 President Porteu de la Morandière, Vice 
President Hugues Dalleau, and Executive Committee member Claude Pèlerin discussed 	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with the Minister “the crisis sweeping the country, and the problems particular to” the 
Algerian generation.1050 The leaders explained the UNCAFN’s position on the Award of 
the Nation’s Gratitude—which, as the association had just declared in its newspaper of 
May 1968, was a positive first step, but should be accompanied with access to veterans’ 
services, and the creation of a medal.1051  
 Representatives of other veterans’ associations that met with Minister Duvillard 
that day requested a meeting in the coming days with President de Gaulle.1052 Two days 
later on May 23, Jean-Maurice Martin, First Vice President of the UNC, announced the 
creation of an “Action Committee of Veterans and War Victims for National Unity,” at a 
press conference at the Hôtel Lutétia.1053 The press assumed that the Action Committee 
was created with Minister Duvillard’s encouragement or at least approval, and this is a 
plausible explanation, given the penchant of Gaullist activists for seeding civic groups to 
demonstrate, or feign, popular support.1054 The group’s emergence was timely; the day 	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previous, ten million workers had struck nationwide, and there appeared no end in sight 
to the quickly worsening national crisis. The night of the 23rd, there were street battles in 
Paris, as students and other militants erected barricades and faced down riot police.1055  
 The UNCAFN’s presence on the “Action Committee” demonstrated its tactical 
reliance on elite nationalist networks, and its incremental, accomodationist approach to 
the state. The political context of May 1968 posed a double bind to far right 
organizations: should they oppose the peril of Communism, thus giving de facto support 
to a President whom they despised?1056 While the UNCAFN’s leaders were sincerely 
shocked by what they believed to be the desecration of a solemn national memorial, they 
also likely expected to receive greater political respect and access if they circled the 	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wagons of “national unity” when support for the government was at its nadir. Indeed, 
whether an interest group falls into the “preferred” or “disliked” category has tended to 
be the strongest indicator of political access to politicians and Ministers in twentieth 
century France.1057 Regardless of their opinions of President de Gaulle, and his 
“abandonment” of Algeria, it was not too bitter a pill for conservative veterans to show 
their support for law and order, and their distaste for the methods of the young 
revolutionaries.1058 
 Accordingly, the UNCAFN followed the Action Committee’s orders and appealed 
to veterans of North Africa to attend a “ceremony of Memory, rigorously apolitical, 
which places itself above all partisan action,” organized at the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier on June 7. The aging hero of Bir Hakeim and retired Gaullist politician, General 
Marie-Pierre Kœnig, presided over the ceremony, as the newly elected head of the Action 
Committee.1059 This ritual formed part of the state’s counterrevolution, which had 
included a massive demonstration organized on the Champs-Elysées on May 30, just 
before President de Gaulle announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and new 
elections.1060 The Executive Committee of the UNCAFN attended the ceremony, flanked 
by many rank-and-file members.1061 Their presence manifested the support of younger 
generations that the State and Nation still commanded. The State needed this show of 
support to justify itself before public opinion; that same day, workers and university and 	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high school students had confronted the police at the Renault-Flins factory, resulting in 
the death of one student. And in return for its show of support for the state, the Action 
Committee would soon be granted the most prestigious audience of all, as the meeting it 
had requested of Minister Duvillard with President Charles de Gaulle—“in his quality as 
first magistrate of the State”—was scheduled for the very next day.1062  
 At the audience on June 8, President de Gaulle informed the representatives of the 
Action Committee that he appreciated their efforts, and invited them to discuss “the 
moral problems” of the veterans’ community, as well as “problems of an entirely 
different nature.”1063 Jean-Maurice Martin of the UNC had received the UNCAFN’s 
mandate to speak on its behalf.1064 Martin brought up the topic of veterans’ recognition, 
noting that “the principle” of the Award of the Nation’s Gratitude “was appreciated since 
it gave our comrades of North Africa the sentiment of having led a useful action,” but 
that they still desired “substantial content.”  
 Martin continued with the two talking points that the UNCAFN leaders had 
provided: they wished for access to state veterans’ services, as well as “an insignia or a 
medal” which would indicate the amount of time served in Algeria, and thus “establish a 
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sort of hierarchy—bronze, silver, and gold—among the holders of the diploma.”1065 
Martin reports, although de Gaulle forbade him from “interpreting his words,” that the 
President began by emphasizing that he, “‘above all, respected’” young soldiers’ service 
in North Africa. However, the President seemed to fear that access to ONAC services 
might become “a foot in the door” to demands for veterans’ pensions, the largest 
financial impact on the State of veterans’ status. Minister Duvillard responded that “this 
was not the case,” and moreover that he supported bearers of the Award receiving state 
aid.1066  
 While UNC and UNCAFN leaders prided themselves on having “seized every 
occasion to bring up the material and moral rights of veterans” during May and June 
1968, very little of substance was accomplished for veterans of Algeria through this 
audience.1067 When the UNCAFN received the rare opportunity to privately petition the 
President of the Republic, it kept to its incremental line. It did not bring up the topic of 
full veterans’ recognition through the veterans’ card, which it had supported since at least 
1966.1068 It reiterated the same points to President de Gaulle that had previously been 
raised with Minister Duvillard; the only new measure it proposed was a differentiated 
medal to mark the length of time served in North Africa.1069 The UNCAFN’s 
accomodationist approach to the state meant that de Gaulle gained more from nationalist 	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veterans’ support during “the events of May 1968” than they gained in return for that 
support.    
 Regardless of the effectiveness of this audience, other veterans’ associations were 
jealous of the UNCAFN and UNC’s political access, and distrustful of their motives. The 
Association général des mutilés de guerre, co-sponsor of the 1918-1968 commemoration 
planning Commission with the UNC and UNCAFN, decided to leave the “Action 
Committee of Veterans for National Unity,” believing it to be a political tool of the State. 
The President-General of the AGMG alleged that the Action Committee had been 
transformed into the “only valid spokesman” for veterans and “immediately presented to 
the President of the Republic,” in return for “having demonstrated on the Champs-
Elysées” when the government needed nationalists to rally to its defense.1070 He 
concluded with his disappointment that Veterans’ Minister Duvillard continued to 
“discriminate between good and bad veterans’ associations,” but suggested this was 
because “we are in the full swing of the electoral season.”1071 The delegate-general of La 
Semaine du combattant, a loose confederation of World War I veterans’ associations 
founded in 1923, wrote to the President of the UNC, insisting that his organization had 
“at no moment agreed” to join the Action Committee; it had never even been asked.1072 
This is suggestive that the UNC and UNCAFN assembled the Committee rather 
haphazardly, and perhaps at the Minister’s behest.   
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 Other veterans’ associations questioned the Action Committee’s origins. Étienne 
Nouveau, President of the Fédération des Amputés de Guerre de France (Federation of 
War Amputees of France), intimated that the Action Committee was created only “at the 
initiative of the Ministry of Veterans and M. Duvillard.” According to Nouveau, despite 
the fact that the Comité National de Liaison (National Liaison Committee, CNL), an 
umbrella organization including the UFAC (l’Union française des anciens combattants) 
and other national veterans’ groups, had asked the government to “receive its qualified 
delegation of representatives of some 90% of the veteran community,” it was only the 
newborn Action Committee, “unknown to everyone,” which received an audience with 
the President.1073 The UFAC represented a diverse set of veterans’ organizations—
ranging from nationalist to socialist and communist ideologies—and it may be that 
Duvillard and de Gaulle snubbed it for this reason, feeling they would have an easier time 
handling veterans who self-selected into right-wing nationalist associations.1074   
 It appears that President de Gaulle outmaneuvered right-wing veterans in this 
period. On May 30, a massive march down the Champs-Elysées in support of law and 
order boosted its numbers by appealing to nationalist veterans.1075 On June 17, President 
de Gaulle amnestied General Raoul Salan, one of the putschist generals and a co-founder 
of the OAS, and on July 31, he amnestied all OAS members remaining in prison.1076 This 	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was a bid to receive electoral support from conservative and far right veterans as well as 
repatriated pieds noirs. These amnesties ended up erasing crimes of one of the darkest 
phase of the war, and the phase when it touched mainland France most directly.1077 
 As for the UNCAFN’s rival, on the day of the May 23 press conference, the 
FNACA declared by press release that it would not join the Action Committee. It warned 
its members not to follow any marching orders the Committee might issue, and launched 
an “urgent request” for its own meeting with Minister Duvillard, which would remain 
unanswered.1078 Furthermore, the FNACA refused to criticize the revolutionary aspect of 
“the events of May,” much as the UNCAFN had failed to disavow the generals’ putsch in 
1961—implying tacit support. In an editorial published in July discussing “the grave 
events that have shaken our country,” the FNACA disassociated itself as a whole from 
the violence and disorder. However, reminding readers that “our leaders, our members, 
are an integral part of the living forces [forces vives] of the nation,” the association 
explained that “they were thus led” to act in “domains other than that of the FNACA,” for 
their own “reasons” and “needs.”1079  
 The FNACA was a left-leaning association of former conscripts where workers 
predominated, and it could not have criticized strikes and other forms of militancy 
without alienating its base. The Algerian War formed a “negative reference point for a 
generation of young workers,” whose managers might have reminded them of the junior 
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officers who used to lord it over them in Algeria.1080 While it is too much to claim that by 
itself, “the Algerian War created a generation of militant workers,” the 
antiauthoritarianism and collective frustrations engendered by the war in many former 
conscripts, who were in their early 30s around 1968, certainly influenced individual 
veterans’ participation in labor militancy in 1968 and afterward.1081	  	   
 By emphasizing the central demographic importance of Algerian veterans, and 
continuing that, naturally, they would be involved in the political ferment of May and 
June, the FNACA normalized the nationwide revolt against ten years of Gaullism. The 
FNACA also recognized the general malaise through reprinting a protest written by the 
Comité National de Liaison, which represented several million members of various 
veterans’ associations. While the FNACA did not belong to the CNL, the association 
reprinted its press release in full, which lamented the “period of contempt” that the 
veteran’ community had been suffering under the current political regime.1082  
 The major lesson that the FNACA drew from “the events of May” was that its 
confrontational position would be stronger if amplified with other voices dissatisfied with 
the constraints of Gaullism. The FNACA’s political culture of collectivist mobilization 
had found confirmation in larger society during the national revolt. The left-wing 	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association had been planning the celebration of its tenth anniversary just as the disorders 
of broke out in May.1083 September 1968 would also be the tenth anniversary of the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which enshrined a strong executive role that seemed 
made to order for General de Gaulle. The FNACA had opposed the 1958 referendum to 
approve the Constitution, partly for fear of how executive supremacy would affect 
veterans’ politics.  
 Charles de Gaulle disdained veterans’ associations and their political 
engagements. In 1959, to explain the government’s decision to repeal the veterans’ 
pension established in 1930, de Gaulle said, “if veterans are made to take the place of 
honor, they are not made to make demands.”1084 In 1960, at the celebration of Bastille 
Day at l’Étoile, Charles de Gaulle reportedly asked François Porteu de la Morandière not 
to ally the UNCAFN with the UNC, because, Porteu de la Morandière reflects, “I believe 
he did not like the ‘demanding’ side of certain veterans.”1085 This manifest hostility to 
veterans’ politics explains why even associations representing veterans of the World 
Wars—including the CNL and the UFAC—felt so neglected by the most famous 
Resistant, who was himself a World War I veteran.  
 Since its founding, the FNACA had proudly maintained its position as an 
association unique to veterans of Algeria. But in September, the FNACA’s National 
President Jacques de Jæger published an editorial arguing that the association “must 	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participate concretely in the work of organizations which decide the grand actions to 
undertake to safeguard the rights of all generations” of veterans, and stated that the 
FNACA would seek to join the UFAC on a national level.1086 It finally gained admittance 
in 1973, and the national organization, representing some 2.5 million veterans and war 
victims, would support the FNACA in its veterans’ card campaign.1087 The FNACA 
rightly concluded that in its ongoing fight for veterans’ recognition, it could draw on 
widespread dissatisfaction among the public and older veterans’ associations with the 
Gaullist regime. 
 The UNCAFN for its part also sympathized with the national discontent with 
Gaullism, although it loathed the ideology it perceived behind the students’ revolt, and 
the forms it took. The association spoke for reservists and career military, who tended to 
be older on deployment than the conscripts, and it felt no compunction to sympathize 
with the revolting students or striking workers. The UNCAFN National President penned 
an acerbic critique of the violence and tastelessness of the students’ protests: “a bit like 
juvenile acne, it was perhaps inevitable, but it was not pretty.”1088 However, he conceded 
that the protests were founded in reality: “we know that there are problems, and that the 
government has no more understood those of the university than it has those of veterans 
of Algeria.”1089  
 In a press release at the end of May, the UNCAFN described the national 
disorders as “the logical result of a profound malaise that was neither foreseen nor 	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understood.” While refusing to sanction the revolutionary ferment as the FNACA did, the 
association nonetheless “deplor[ed] that it was on the heels of riots that the Government 
should be forced to consider the worry and the problems faced by the youth and a large 
part of the active French population.” Concluding by emphasizing the need for the calm 
and orderly pursuit of “vigorous reform measures in national education, the economy and 
social affairs, as well as in the methods of government,” this press release seemed to 
position the UNCAFN as a moderate civic force seeking democratic dialogue.1090  
 Privately, the UNCAFN President went further in his analysis, noting in a 
confidential memo to the Executive Committee that “if to govern is to foresee, we have 
been very badly governed for ten years.”1091 He located the long origins of the revolt in 
the fact that “the current government has done everything to destroy intermediary forces” 
such as legislators, moral authorities, and local and regional government, in order to “let 
the Head of State dialogue with the crowd.” But instead of political engagement, he 
continued, the crowd expressed its discontent through “the street.”1092 The right-wing 
UNCAFN President felt that the young revolutionaries were “too spoiled,” lacking in 
“discipline” and “ideals,” and had been “skillfully led” into their revolt by ideologues 
“acting as good technicians of revolutionary war.” Yet his assessment that “the long 
absence of dialogue, of which we have been the victims as veterans of North Africa, has 
created an identical discontentment in other domains,” was more or less the same 
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conclusion that the left-wing FNACA had drawn.1093 Both associations agreed that the 
nationwide revolt was understandable and natural, given the political constraints on the 
country for a decade.  
 Another important lesson for the UNCAFN was the demographic and political 
importance of the generation it claimed to represent, which it manifested by its presence 
at nationalist ceremonies in May and June. In the words of Vice President Dalleau, the 
men who served in North Africa were now “the transitional generation” between those 
who had lived through World War II as adults, and the young revolutionaries, who had 
known neither ration cards in childhood nor national military service in adolescence. By 
comparing the hard-earned wisdom of the generation of veterans of Algeria with the 
impatience of the young “contestataires” of May, the leaders of the UNCAFN reinforced 
their narrative of elite respectability, elevating themselves and their members as “the 
leaders of industry and the politicians of tomorrow.”1094  
 It is noteworthy—but in the end unsurprising—that two competing associations 
for veterans of Algeria with fiercely opposed politics agreed that “the events of May” 
were symptomatic of a decade of political stalemate in France. Historians attribute much 
of the explosive contestation in France in the late 1960s to a postwar “crisis of consent 
and of authority relations” engendered by the “refusal to acknowledge social conflict” 
under the Fifth Republic.1095 Both the FNACA and the UNCAFN sought impact in a 
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society where Charles de Gaulle’s monarchical style had largely reduced citizens’ 
political participation to referenda and the “bipolar logic of the institutional game.”1096 
Many sectors of society were displeased with de Gaulle’s centralized, technocratic 
system, and the heightened power that the government—specifically the executive branch 
and the Cabinet—had over elected officials, who were in principle direct representatives 
of the Nation.  
 These very conditions made it difficult for both the FNACA and the UNCAFN to 
function, in a period when neither the President nor his Minister of Veterans wanted to 
hear about young men who had fought in a war they did not even consider as such. Both 
associations had been engaged in what the French call a dialogue des sourds (dialogue of 
the deaf) with the state—a metaphor that can be extended to much of French society in 
the 1960s. The second “days of May” hardened both associations’ convictions that they 
were uniquely positioned to speak for a forgotten generation of veterans: the FNACA, 
through mass mobilization and confrontational protest of Gaullist constraints, and the 
UNCAFN, through setting an example of elite, incremental leadership despite Gaullist 
constraints.  
 Both associations had the chance to test their newly confirmed strategies when 
two separate Senate bills for veterans’ recognition came up for discussion in fall 1968. In 
October, Antoine Courrière, president of the group of Socialists and allies, and Jacques 
Duclos, president of the group of Communists and allies, submitted a bill to give 
veterans’ status to those who had simply served three months, consecutive or not, in 
recognized units in North Africa. The bill may have been partly intended to garner public 
enthusiasm for the Communists and Socialists after both lost seats in the legislative 	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elections in June. It was unanimously backed by the Commission of Social Affairs, and 
written with the cooperation of the FNACA. In presenting the bill, Courrière and Duclos 
used the association’s rhetoric to describe the insufficiencies of the Award of the 
Nation’s Gratitude as a “diploma void of any content,” and referring to veterans of 
Algeria as the “third combat generation.”1097 The proposed law was meant to show 
support for an identical bill submitted a year earlier.  
 The earlier bill had been presented in June 1967 by centrist Republican Martial 
Brousse—a veteran of both World Wars and President of the Club of Veterans in the 
Senate—after meeting with leaders of the FNACA.1098 It was backed by a wide coalition 
of populist Republicans, left democrats, and Independent Republicans.1099 While Brousse 
had submitted a bill identical to one written by the FNACA and submitted by the 
Socialists and Communists, he attempted to make it more acceptable to conservative 
colleagues by emphasizing in his speech the “moral interest” of veterans’ recognition, 
and the fact that conscripts “did their duty where they were assigned by the 
Government.”1100 The existence of two bills submitted by opposing contingents of 
Senators should have convinced the government of the wide bipartisan support for 
recognizing veterans of Algeria.   
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 Nevertheless, Minister Duvillard rejected both bills according to article 40 of the 
Constitution, which allows the government to challenge proposed laws based on negative 
financial impact, since the propositions attached material benefits to the veterans’ 
card.1101 But in the same speech Duvillard also cited article 41, suggesting that the bill 
was not in the domain of the law, since, as he argued, awarding the veterans’ card 
without any material benefits would make it no different from the recently created Award 
of the Nation’s Gratitude.1102 This is thus the clearest evidence that Minister Duvillard 
and the government he represented had no intention of recognizing veterans of Algeria, 
with or without material benefits!  
 The President of the Senate, Alain Poher, called for the proposition to pass under 
review by the Conseil constitutionnel. In November 1968, this body decided that 
veterans’ status did fall under the realm of legislation.1103 The bill passed the Senate in 
December 1968 with a resounding 242 votes against 3, to the FNACA’s great joy.1104 
However, the battle still remained to enter the bill on the agenda for the National 
Assembly, and to pass a vote there.1105 The government tasked Gaullist deputy Marcel 
Béraud with writing a report on the proposition. However, he delayed submitting his 
report, and eventually the government was able to rally a weak majority of 245 deputies 	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to reject discussion of the bill, so the bill never made it out of the Senate and into the 
National Assembly.1106 In the Senate in particular, it was relatively easy to make 
electorally-minded gestures in favor of veterans “without much actual consequence on 
government policy.”1107 
 Naturally, both veterans’ associations observed these proceedings with interest. 
The UNCAFN’s cautious, incremental approach can be seen in the insistence of Vice-
President Hugues Dalleau that “our readers know well that we will not ask for impossible 
things, or things that are undesirable for them and for the country.” He continued by 
urging “our leaders to put themselves at the disposition of the state and legislators, to 
have them better understand our point of view,” proposing more patient dialogue between 
elites.1108 President Porteu de la Morandière wrote of his hope that the National Assembly 
would “follow the beautiful example of the Senate,” and wished “much courage and 
independence of mind” to the deputies, while urging the UNCAFN’s sections “much 
energy to remind [the deputies] of this little problem of ours.”1109 However, the 
UNCAFN did not back up these wishes with effective political campaigns. Just a few 
months later, Dalleau wrote an article regretting the lack of organizational structure in 
departmental and local chapters, and urging that “the multiple activities of the veterans of 
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North Africa of a department be truly coordinated by a departmental commission.”1110 
The UNCAFN, long accustomed to a sympathetic ear in the government, may have 
shown too much “aloofness” at the very time it was critical to “exercise influence in 
order to sway government decision-making.”1111 
 The FNACA, on the other hand, was fully aware of the necessity of focused 
political action, and possessed the internal organization to undertake it. In October 1968, 
the leaders of the local committee of Bordeaux had met with Mayor Jacques Chaban-
Delmas, President of the National Assembly and the third most powerful politician in the 
country, securing his agreement that veterans of Algeria deserved the veterans’ card, and 
his word to bring it up with Minister Duvillard.1112 And rather than losing heart following 
the stillbirth of the bill in the National Assembly, the FNACA launched a “militant 
trimester” of intensive activism in February, March, and April. It declared March 9 a 
“national day of petitions,” on which local and departmental committees would collect 
signatures from the public to transfer to the national headquarters, to bolster delegations 
to the Veterans’ Ministry.1113   
  After Charles de Gaulle’s resignation from the presidency in 1969 following a 
failed referendum, the climate became somewhat more conducive to the cause of 
Algerian War veterans’ recognition.1114 The FNACA asked the main presidential 
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candidates their stances. The results were more promising than they had been in 1965, 
when the only candidate on the left, François Mitterrand—who had supported veterans’ 
recognition and criticized the way “the executive [took] no account of the will of 
Parliament”—was narrowly defeated in the second round by incumbent President de 
Gaulle. Unsurprisingly, de Gaulle had never responded to the FNACA’s request for a 
statement.1115 But in 1969, Socialist Gaston Defferre, center-right Centre démocrate 
Alain Poher, and Communist candidate Jacques Duclos all went on record in favor of 
veterans’ recognition, promising to consult with “qualified representatives of the third 
combat generation” on a law project.  
 However, both Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and, strangely enough, Parti 
socialiste unifié (PSU) leader Michel Rocard, who had militated against the Algerian War 
a decade earlier, refused to meet with the FNACA.1116 The association continued its 
pressure once the election was over, making “several attempts” to send a delegation to 
President Pompidou, who finally consented to allow a representative to receive them in 
September 1969. Although the chargé de mission, Michel Bruguière, would not make 
any firm commitments on veterans’ recognition, even when reminded of Pompidou’s 
documented commitment earlier in the presidential campaign, he perceptively noted that 
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the whole matter revolved around whether the government could acknowledge the events 
of Algeria as having been a war.1117 
 Pressuring presidential candidates was important for public relations with their 
members and the general public, but FNACA leaders knew that the real battle lay in 
confronting the Ministry of Veterans.1118 Although Veterans’ Ministers Raymond 
Triboulet, Jean Sainteny and Alexandre Sanguinetti had resisted state recognition of 
veterans of Algeria from 1958 onwards, Minister Henri Duvillard was the fiercest 
opponent, and his tenure, 1967 to 1972, overlapped with a period of energetic political 
action for the Federation. He openly regretted the outcome of the Algerian War, telling 
FNACA delegates during a rare audience that the Accords of Évian “represented the end 
of a great hope: that of French Algeria.”1119 Moreover, the FNACA had refused to 
sanction veterans’ ceremonies for ‘national unity’ in May 1968, and this seemed to earn it 
Duvillard’s personal enmity. He snubbed the association in February 1969 by failing to 
invite it to the “traditional reception organized at the start of each year” to welcome 
veterans’ associations, and by 1971 would only have invited the FNACA to two out of 
four of these receptions held during his tenure.1120 On several occasions, Duvillard mailed 
letters and documents to all deputies in the National Assembly, dismissing the 
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representativeness of the FNACA and denigrating its militancy as “inspired by political 
considerations” on behalf of a certain “party,” by which he doubtless meant the French 
Communist Party.1121  
 Not only did Duvillard discredit the FNACA in writing, but he also may have 
attempted to sabotage its local organization. Michel Sabourdy, Editor in Chief of the 
FNACA’s newspaper since 1970, reports that the Minister paid 500,000 Francs to René 
Poujaud, a member of the National Committee and President of the FNACA Committee 
of the Creuse, to switch allegiances to a right-wing group allied with the UNC, possibly 
the UNCAFN.1122 Whether or not this anecdote is true, Duvillard’s documented punitive 
campaigns indicate that the FNACA’s strategy of mass mobilization to garner the support 
of the population and elected deputies seemed to pose a threat to the Gaullist balance of 
power. While the UNCAFN was not completely in the pocket of Minister Duvillard, he 
certainly bestowed his good graces on the association. For example, a working lunch visit 
from Minister Henri Duvillard in 1970 revealed that “the path leading to a perfect 
accord” would not be “traversed in a single step,” although the UNCAFN did feel it was 
faced with a man of “good will.”1123  
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 In late 1969, the FNACA’s National Committee had asked all local leaders to 
“intensify their efforts” in lobbying elected officials, to overcome government 
opposition.1124 The association sought to make veterans’ rights a campaign issue among 
deputies, noting in an internal directive that “in this [electoral] period, they are more 
sensitive to our demands.”1125 FNACA National Secretary Wladyslaw Marek 
corresponded with all deputies regardless of political affiliation, appealing to them by 
pointing out the political constraints of Fifth Republic institutions. For instance, in form 
letters condemning Minister Duvillard’s “categorical decision” to refuse veterans state 
recognition, Marek denounced, with Gallic sarcasm, the tight reins that the government 
held over elected officials: “We are persuaded that all parliamentarians [...] will duly 
appreciate how little their opinion is taken into account, before they are even able to 
express themselves.”1126 Marek also made sure that elected officials knew they were 
being watched specifically. For instance, he wrote to Gaullist deputy David Rousset—a 
Résistant, former déporté, and anticolonialist militant—thanking him for his recent 
intervention on the topic of the Veterans’ Ministry budget, but urging him to explicitly 
address the recognition of veterans of Algeria as soon as possible.1127  
 In this lobbying campaign, the FNACA received responses from over one 
hundred and ninety deputies, or just over forty percent of the National Assembly.1128 The 
rates of favorable responses from the main parties were 30% for the Gaullist Union 	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démocratique républicaine (81 out of 269), 34% for the center-right Républicains 
indépendants (20 out of 58), 68% for the Socialists (38 out of 56), and only 19% among 
the Communists (6 out of 32).1129 This reveals support distributed widely across the 
political spectrum, as well as a distinct lack of Communist support for an association 
whose detractors had accused it of PCF domination for a decade. And the approximately 
equal support for veterans’ recognition among the Gaullist party and the Républicains 
indépendants indicates an important split between elected officials and the government. 
Although conservatives of various stripes—including Gaullists—were in favor of 
veterans’ recognition, the steadfast refusal of the President and the Veterans’ Minister 
prevented them from being able to discuss the question.    
 The FNACA turned to local politics in this period as well. In 1970, the association 
launched a campaign to request town and departmental councils to pass resolutions in 
support of veterans’ status, reminding its cadres that “the massive and oh! how precious 
support of our local elected leaders cannot help but aid us in gaining our rights.”1130 This 
campaign met with rapid success; by summer 1972, the FNACA had collected nearly 
5,500 such resolutions throughout the country.1131 Perhaps the greatest success of the 
FNACA’s campaign in this period, however, was impressing a certain deputy, 
Républicain indépendant Louis Joanne, with the energy of the local FNACA chapter in 
the Charente-Maritime. In December 1970, Joanne submitted a bill for the recognition of 
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veterans of Algeria.1132 However, the bill failed to be listed in the National Assembly’s 
agenda for years, while the FNACA continued its vigorous efforts to rally elected 
officials to its position.1133     
 By the early 1970s, the Federation had attained the power in numbers that it 
hoped would achieve its goals. It had close to 200,000 members nationwide in 1972.1134 
This would be a propitious year, as some governmental obstacles fell, allowing a 
strengthened FNACA a more sympathetic audience. The new Minister of Veterans that 
year, André Bord, immediately showed himself more open to dialogue than his 
predecessors. A former Resistance fighter from Alsace, he was the President of the 
UFAC organization in the Bas-Rhin, and in June 1972, he had convinced his 
departmental chapter to pass the FNACA’s resolution in support of veterans’ 
recognition.1135 On meeting with a FNACA delegation in September, he promised to 
create a commission to study the question of veterans’ recognition, the first Veterans’ 
Minister to commit himself thus.1136 In November of 1972, Bord announced before the 
National Assembly that the government would no longer use the administrative argument 
that the Algerian War “was a simple matter of peacekeeping operations” to deny veterans 
of North Africa veterans’ status. Furthermore, he denounced previous governments, 	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“especially those of the Fourth Republic,” for having erected this barrier in the first 
place.1137 The commission Minister Bord created was ecumenical, comprising about sixty 
representatives from various ministries and from every generation of veterans’ 
associations.  
 The twenty-one-person working group formed to report to the commission gave 
equal representation to the two competing Algerian veterans’ associations, seating 
Secretary General Maurice Sicart, and National Secretary and Legal Council Guy Ramis 
of the FNACA; and National President François Porteu de la Morandière and Executive 
Committee member Claude Pèlerin of the UNCAFN.1138 Along with representing 
associations for veterans of the World Wars, the working group included some nationalist 
veterans’ groups of the Indochina and Algerian generations, including the far-right 
Anciens combattants de l’Union Français, and the right-wing Union nationale des 
anciens combattants d’Indochine, des théâtres d’opérations en Afrique du Nord 
(UNACITA). Finally, the working group sat one delegate from the ONACVG, three from 
the Ministry of Defense, and four from the Veterans’ Ministry.1139 The working group 
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first met on January 17, 1973, which suggests that it was an “absolute priority” for the 
Minister, as the Minister’s chargé de mission noted.1140  
 But the chief dispute between the FNACA and the UNCAFN persisted in the 
working group, as UNCAFN President Porteu de la Morandière held fast to his ideal of a 
separate, symbolic card unique to veterans of Algeria, while the FNACA leaders 
demanded “a chamois-colored card identical to those held by our elders” with all the 
material benefits it entailed.1141 Sicart and Ramis gained the upper hand in this conflict by 
categorically refusing to participate in any discussion of a separate card, which, they 
claimed, “would do nothing but definitively amplify the divisions in the world of 
veterans.”1142 Eventually, after about ten meetings, the working group came to agree 
unanimously that soldiers who served in the Algerian conflict deserved veterans’ 
status.1143  
 However, its report concluded that it was “imperative” to keep the criteria of “the 
notion of combat” and “minimum presence in a fighting unit,” given that many men who 
fought in Algeria had not seen combat for three consecutive months, which was a 
criterion for recognizing veterans of the World Wars.1144 Indeed, no more than 10% of 
French forces saw sustained combat during the war, although all troops deployed were 
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exposed to the dangers of ambushes and bombings.1145 The commission urged legislators 
to “preserve all of the moral and civic value of the veterans’ card” by keeping the criteria 
as close as possible to those for veterans of previous wars, “all while taking into account 
the specificity” of combat in Algeria.1146  
 In acknowledgement of the irregular nature of combat in the North African 
conflict, the commission defined “fighting units” as “those units implicated in at least 
three distinct actions of fire or combat over the course of thirty consecutive days.” A 
veteran would have to prove his presence in a “fighting unit” for at least three months, 
not necessarily consecutive, to qualify for the veterans’ card.1147	  This compromise likely 
pleased veterans of earlier wars, because it did not extend the veterans’ card for lighter 
criteria than they themselves had faced. But this framework also restricted the total 
number of veterans of Algeria who would have access to the card, which might have 
made this proposal more acceptable to the state.  
 The sudden death of President Georges Pompidou in April 1974 marked the end 
of the Gaullist era of the Fifth Republic. After the closest presidential election in French 
history that May, Républican indépendant President-elect Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 	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sought to distinguish himself from Gaullism as well as win over constituents of the new 
Socialist-Communist coalition under François Mitterrand whom he had just narrowly 
defeated.1148 Giscard d’Estaing presented himself as a consensual leader desirous of 
social reform, in part because he had failed to attract widespread support from young, 
urban, and blue-collar voters.1149 He desired to “transcend the traditional clash between 
Gaullists and communists that had defined French politics since 1945,” offering himself 
as a modern, third way to lead France out of the shadow of 1968.1150 And recognizing 
veterans of Algeria was one way for Giscard d’Estaing to move beyond de Gaulle’s 
legacy in order to pursue his own agenda.  
  Although a National Assembly bill to recognize veterans of Algeria had been 
proposed in 1970 by Républicain indépendant deputy Louis Joanne, the government had 
used various devices to block the National Assembly from discussing it for years.1151 On 
April 5, 1974, however, between Pompidou’s death and Giscard d’Estaing’s 
inauguration, the Cabinet itself proposed a law to recognize veterans of Algeria, 
following the recommendations of Minister Bord’s commission.1152 Minister Bord 
presented the bill in the National Assembly on June 28, and it passed unanimously, 
among those deputies who had not yet left on vacation.1153 This led to one of the earliest 	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laws passed under President Giscard d’Estaing. He had pronounced himself in favor of 
recognition of veterans of Algeria before the presidential election in May, and his Prime 
Minister, Jacques Chirac, was even a FNACA member.1154 As opposed to Charles de 
Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, President Giscard d’Estaing had openly supported French 
Algeria to the end, and had even been suspected of OAS sympathies; he was thus more 
inclined to support recognizing veterans of the war, especially if nationalist veterans 
made the case.1155 Even before the final law on the veterans’ card passed in December 
1974, Giscard d’Estaing had amnestied all those convicted of crimes during and after the 
Algerian War.1156  
 The terms of the veterans’ card law were a compromise between the goals of the 
two associations that had been fighting for veterans’ recognition, but they aligned more 
with the nationalist veterans’ position.1157 The UNCAFN was satisfied with the law 
because it “maintained the essential [...] notions of intensity of combat and of fighting 
unit,” criteria that appealed to leaders’ sense of military tradition and hierarchy.1158 As 	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the association had informed its cadres leading up to the law’s passage, “[r]egardless of 
the number of beneficiaries [...] it is an entire generation which will be recognized as 
veterans, and that is what matters.”1159 The UNCAFN was also pleased that harkis were 
qualified to receive the veterans’ card, if they had served in auxiliary units recognized by 
the state.1160 As for the FNACA, it exulted in this symbolic recognition of the Algerian 
generation, but its fight was not over.  
 Determined that all conscripts who had served in Algeria be recognized, 
regardless of their war experience, the Federation vowed to loosen numerous restrictions, 
such as minimum number of days in a “combat unit,” in order to “obtain the veterans’ 
card for the largest possible number among us.”1161 For instance, the law excluded 
veterans who had never served in operational units; despite the risks they faced in 
ambushes, mines, and bombings, logistics personnel who could not prove six “combat 
actions” did not qualify.1162 Thus, the opening of the veterans’ card to veterans of Algeria 
was initially a symbolic recognition, since these administrative barriers would remain in 
place blocking access to the card for many veterans for years to come. While the final 
version of the law followed the FNACA’s vision in offering the same veterans’ card as 
for veterans of earlier wars, with the promise of material compensation, the initial combat 
restrictions as well as the inclusion of harkis came from the UNCAFN’s vision. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1159“La carte du combattant...partie remise!” Les Cahiers du djebel 9 (February 1974): 2.  
 
1160Claude Pelèrin, “Commission spéciale UNCAFN,” La Voix du Combattant 1400 (November-December 
1974): 8. 	  	  
1161Jacques de Jæger, “La carte du combattant,” L’Ancien d’Algérie 120 sup. (October 1974): 1.  
 
1162Jauffret, 348.  
 
	   280 
However, the clear success of the FNACA’s single-minded activism for over a decade 
proved a major recruiting boon after 1974.1163 
 This story of the fight for the veterans’ card illustrates the constraints of party 
politics on civic activism in Fifth Republic France. Only in the post-Gaullist era could the 
state be persuaded to recognize veterans of Algeria. The two warring veterans’ 
associations could not have been more different, in terms of political orientation, culture, 
and tactics—not to mention, of course, the fact that they pursued diametrically opposed 
visions of “recognition.” Regardless of the UNCAFN’s connections in elite nationalist 
circles, and its sympathetic ties with pro-French Algeria politicians, and despite the 
FNACA’s successes raising public awareness and support among elected officials, 
neither association was able to achieve its goal under the presidencies of Charles de 
Gaulle or Georges Pompidou.  
 This deadlock demonstrates the early Fifth Republic’s allergy toward the memory 
of Algeria, and the general impenetrability of executive power to the demands of civil 
society, which made the unrest of 1968 seem inevitable to many observers. Similar to 
how, from 1958 through 1969, President de Gaulle successfully “pushed through 
decolonization, subsidies for private schools, major structural changes in agriculture, 
regional governments, social security, and medical insurance reforms, and a major 
overhaul of higher education, all of which went against the positions of the groups most 
directly affected by these changes,” the highly centralized state and strong executive 
power allowed him to resist years of pressure from veterans’ associations and their 
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supporters in Parliament.1164 The relationship between President de Gaulle and veterans 
in this period offers a case study of how Gaullism constrained civic dialogue by removing 
power from intermediaries, such as elected deputies, and ignored constituents’ appeals 
through associations. From 1958 to 1968, Charles de Gaulle had used his 
unprecedentedly strong executive powers to lead France on a trajectory of his own 
choosing, and civil society could only adapt in response.  
 This story also illustrates the symbiotic relationship of civil society movements 
working from within and outside of the political system. Although institutions remained 
the same, the new political context after Gaullism provided the conditions wherein the 
FNACA and the UNCAFN achieved their legislative victory. Once a government was in 
power whose self-image did not rely on obscuring the nature and impact of the Algerian 
War, it was the political and tactical competition between these two associations, rather 
than the perseverance of either one alone, that led to the success for which they both 
claim unique credit today. The UNCAFN’s political access and nationalist moral standing 
eventually rendered symbolic veterans’ recognition palatable to conservatives and 
colonial nostalgists in the government, while the FNACA garnered widespread support 
for material recognition of veterans among citizens and elected officials, who were less 
likely than the government to scorn the sacrifices of a generation of conscripts.  
 By 1974 the UNCAFN had lost much of the prestige it had known since its 
founding, whereas the FNACA was near the height of its power. The UNCAFN had been 
born during the death-throes of the Fourth Republic, and followed a traditional political 
culture based in honor and elite personal contacts, whose currency would fade with the 
advent of popular democracy under Gaullism. The FNACA, however, had been born in 	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opposition to the establishment, and thus was forced to learn how to mobilize the wide 
support that would allow it to succeed under Gaullism and popular democracy. The 
FNACA’s success winning over the French population and elected deputies to its 
campaign owes certainly something to the events of May 1968, which reactivated 
memories of anti-fascist opposition kindled during the Algerian War, and demonstrated 
the power of coalitions in national politics, as diverse sectors of society realized they 
shared similar grievances against the government.   
 Paradoxically, the French Fifth Republic had recognized veterans of Algeria—in 
1967, with the Award of the Nation’s Gratitude, and in 1974, with the veterans’ card—
decades before the state would acknowledge the Algerian War itself, in 1999.1165 Already 
by the war’s end in 1962, a “positive” national consensus on the memory of the Algerian 
War was impossible.1166 Owing to the long cult of the veteran in France and the 
“‘emotional debt’” that society felt toward veterans, it was simpler to build consensus on 
the recognition owed to veterans of Algeria than it was to decide how to confront the 
memory of the war itself.1167 Although the French state would only term the events of 
Algeria a “war” in 1999, the veil had been parted with the close of the Gaullist era, and 
thanks to the unwitting but symbiotic collaboration of two veterans’ associations born 
from the same war as the Fifth Republic itself, the government could at least 
acknowledge that the young French citizens sent to fight in Algeria were real veterans.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 During my year of research in France, I received frequent reminders of the 
continuing weight of the Algerian War, and how disputed its memory remains. Peers 
sometimes recoiled on learning of my dissertation topic, expressing their discomfort by 
saying things like, “Oh, that dirty war—we were nothing but torturers down there.” When 
the volunteer paratrooper and former OAS member turned far-right ideologue Dominique 
Venner shocked France by shooting himself in Notre-Dame-de-Paris, National Front 
President Marine Le Pen saluted what she called his “eminently political gesture” in 
protest of immigration.1168 These and other incidents reflect the deep legacy of the 
Algerian War in the French political imaginary. Such examples suggested to me the great 
divide between popular memories of this war on the Left and the Right, which make 
national commemoration so difficult to this day. 
 In an era of increasingly palpable “cultural insecurity” in France, it is important to 
understand the origins of the memorial divide over France’s colonial legacy, for which 
the Algerian War frequently stands in by synechdoche.1169 Since mainland France only 
became directly affected by the Algerian War in the phase of OAS violence at the end of 	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the war, popular memories of the war tend to project the political context of 1961-1962 
backward in time, as if a multi-racial republican empire had only ever been a reactionary 
project, and decolonization an historical inevitability.1170 But fuller examination of the 
Algerian War, the evolution of the political context, and soldiers’ experiences reveals 
how deeply implicated French society was in the conflict, and how profoundly French 
Republican values and national identity had been undermined by the final phase of the 
war.  
 This dissertation speaks to this broader discussion about the legacy of 
colonialism, and what decolonization did to France. In the period under examination, the 
main image of veterans of Algeria in broader society was as torturers. Revelations of the 
Army’s systematic use of torture shook French national self-conceptions, as the self-
proclaimed “nation of the rights of man” was itself recovering from the traumas and 
martyrdoms of World War II. The fact of widespread torture belied the benevolent 
“civilizing mission” narrative that France had told about itself for a century. Moreover, 
the state’s recourse to torture was a dramatic indication of its failure to convince subjects 
that they were in fact French, a project the Third Republic achieved within mainland 
France itself by the close of the nineteenth century.1171 While decolonization did not 
begin with Algeria, because the land had been administered as integral French territory, 
the end of French Algeria in 1962 suggested the death of the ideal of universalism.1172 
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 Although both major veterans’ associations examined here only represented a 
small fraction of the generation of veterans of Algeria, their sharp rivalry illustrates the 
limits of the possible for France’s memory of the war in the Gaullist period. The 
memorial debates between the FNACA and the UNCAFN centered on what the Algerian 
War had done to French soldiers, the direct embodiment of the nation. These associations 
could only agree that French soldiers were victims—either of a state that had sent them to 
fight an unjust war, or of a state that had negotiated away a military victory that was 
within reach. While most French veterans of Algeria did not immediately the veterans’ 
movement, these two competing narratives offered them frameworks for thinking about 
their relationship to the state and their place in society. The silence of the last French 
conscript generation in the twentieth century, as well as the vociferous demands of the 
associations acting in its name, both reflected a growing sense of alienation between the 
nation and the state.   
 Indeed, the founders of the Algerian War veterans’ movement addressed this 
alienation—the idea that the nation had been betrayed by its leaders—with their 
respective political programs developed after the war’s end. Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber’s inclusive village-style republicanism, calling for citizens to vote far more 
frequently on the issues that affected them most directly, and François Porteu de la 
Morandière’s depoliticized corporatist representation and his promotion of veterans as a 
new elite, represented attempts to reconceptualize the Left and the Right in a new period 
of mass democracy. While neither veteran’s political program succeeded, suggesting the 
strength and conservatism of Fifth Republic institutions, they both reflected the political 	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discontent and disillusionment that can occur on the homefront at the conclusion of a 
divisive, unconventional war in which citizens have been asked to serve for ever-
changing war aims. Both men felt betrayed by the politicians that led France through the 
war, and abandoned by the nation they were supposed to represent.  
 More than fifty years since the end of the Algerian War, historians have made 
great strides in moving beyond polemic to uncover the many complexities and traumas of 
this conflict for Algeria and for France. And recently, the veterans’ movement itself has 
seemed less divided. In 1987, for instance, the FNACA, the UNC, and three other 
associations representing veterans of Algeria launched a “United Front,” organizing a 
massive march of 50,000 veterans in Paris in October 1988 to demand the government’s 
attention to long held concerns, including broader access to the veterans’ card.1173 With 
retirement on the horizon and concrete benefits of utmost importance, perhaps it was 
finally possible for militant veterans to set aside political divisions.   
 But for many among the generation of veterans of Algeria, whether they are 
within or outside the veterans’ movement, the lack of an inclusive collective memory of 
the war in French society remains painful. Most veterans whom I interviewed seemed to 
hope I would tell the story of “their” Algerian War, an impossible task within the 
confines of historical objectivity. The crystalization of the Algerian War veterans’ 
movement into two mutually exclusive memory communities suggests the impossibility 
of recounting any universal story of veterans beyond their shared suffering in a war that 
some either did or did not believe in, and that most of them did not understand. And 
indeed, the state’s very belated official acknowledgement in 1999 that Algeria had been a 	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war only seemed to underscore “the idea that these soldiers were, or had been, 
victims.”1174  
 Even aside from their long and calculated neglect by the state, French veterans 
could think of themselves as victims of the Algerian War because of political 
complexities that most had little chance of understanding. The mass of conscripts was 
apolitical and ideology was foreign to them; they often felt that “they were the toys of a 
history that was writing itself simultaneously with them and without them.”1175 Those 
politicized veterans who opposed the war suffered from the raison d’état that allowed 
Charles de Gaulle to use the Army until it served his own political aims, which he 
conflated with those of France. And those soldiers who had truly believed in the mission 
to defend French Algeria fell victim to the reality of the “exterior maneuver,” since 
France was defeated through factors external to the battlefield itself.1176 The convergence 
of these two abstract processes does much to explain the impossibility of a single 
interpretation of the war within the veterans’ movement, especially when each soldier 
had experienced “his own” war. And of course, the traumas of the Algerian War for 
France go well beyond the community of veterans—Benjamin Stora estimates that by the 
close of the twentieth century, four to five million people possessed a painful “living 
memory” of the Algerian War—including pieds noirs, harkis, and veterans and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1174Raphaëlle Branche, La guerre d’Algérie: une histoire apaisée? (Paris: Seuil, 2005), 103. 	  	  
1175Ludivine Bantigny, Le plus bel âge? Jeunes et jeunesses en France dès l’aube des Trente Glorieuses à 
la Guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Fayard, 2007), 381. 
  
1176André Beaufre, “Indirect Strategy in the Nuclear Age,” 1023-1049 in ed. Gérard Chaliand, The Art of 
War in World History from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 
1026. Incidentally, it seems that Gérard Chaliand joined up with former FNACA co-founder Georges 
Mattéi in his work supporting the FLN during the Algerian War. Martin Evans, The memory of resistance: 
French opposition to the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 87-89.   	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families, making a bitter narrative of the war such a powerful mobilizing force for the 
National Front.1177   
 The divided memory of Algeria remains a politically potent reference in France to 
this day. To the far right’s chagrin, the FNACA, after decades of lobbying, achieved in 
2012 its long-term goal of elevating March 19 as an official day of commemoration of 
the end of the Algerian War. At the first official ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe that 
year, Paris mayor Bertrand Delanoë, Senate President Jean-Pierre Bel, and Minister-
delegate of Veterans Kader Arif—the son of a harki, an overtly symbolic appointment—
all attended, reflecting the Fifth Republic’s consecration of the FNACA narrative that the 
end of the Algerian War was a victory for France and for peace.1178 On the eve of the 
March 19 commemoration in 2016, and amid protests from certain politicians on the right 
including Marine Le Pen and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French Minister of Veterans urged 
French citizens to “overcome this ‘war of memories’” and cease to “cultivate the rancors 
of the past.”1179    
 Attempting to understand and to see beyond the seemingly inescapable “memory 
wars” has been an enjoyable challenge of this research project. But these political 
divisions do not explain the whole story of Algerian War veterans’ experience in France, 
since most of this generation did not join associations for decades. For many veterans, the 
“duty of memory” goes beyond any question of ideology. As General Marcel Bigeard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1177Benjamin Stora, Le transfert d’une mémoire: de «l’Algérie française» au racisme anti-arabe (Paris: 
Découverte, 1999), 82.  
 
1178“Première commémoration officielle du 19 mars,” FNACA website, April 2012, 
<http://www.fnaca.org/actualites/142-premiere-commemoration-officielle-du-19-mars>. 
  
1179Jean-March Todeschini, “Commémorer le 19 mars pour dépasser les rancœurs de la guerre d’Algérie,” 
Le Monde (18 March 2016), <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/03/18/jean-marc-todeschini-
commemorer-le-19-mars-pour-depasser-les-rancœurs-de-la-guerre-d-algerie-4885853_3232.html>.  
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stated, echoing the sentiments of many veterans I interviewed, “‘I go everywhere there 
are ceremonies for the dead. I don’t give a damn if they are on the right or the left. I just 
think of all our men fallen in Algeria...’”1180 If this dissertation could not hope to convey 
the “Algerian War” of each individual veteran I interviewed, perhaps it can at least serve 
to reflect the feelings of invisibility and betrayal that their generation experienced, and 
locate their overlooked engagements in some of the central events of the early Fifth 
Republic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1180General Marcel Bigeard, quoted in Georges Durand, “Anciens combattants d’Algérie: du Lobby à 
l’Association Cultuelle,” 75-80 in dir. Bruno Benoît and Marc Frangi, Guerres et associations: actes du 
colloque de Lyon, 29 septembre 2001 (Lyon: Presse universitaire de Lyon), 80. 	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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO FNACA MEMBERS (ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION) 
 
[NB: The official assisting me at the FNACA edited the French version of the questionnaire I composed, 
intending to render it more comprehensible to the subjects, and more useful to me. I am grateful for his 
help, but this arrangement meant that I did not have full control over the final version of the questionnaire 
that was sent out. For instance, I would not have chosen to pose questions in multiple parts in sentence 
fragments, and I think this might have confused some of the subjects. In addition, the official completely 
excised any mention of the Award of the Nation’s Gratitude, perhaps because his association thought so 
little of it.] 
 
Department: 
Surname: 
First name: 
Address: 
 
Family status: 
Studies accomplished: 
Diplomas obtained: 
Profession(s): 
Dates of military service: 
Locations of military service: 
Unit served in: 
Rank at the end of military service: 
Town of residence when drafted: 
Town of residence on demobilization: 
Did you receive the veterans’ card? 
If so, which year? 
Do you belong to a veterans’ association? 
If so, which one? 
Since what year? 
 
Did your military service influence to an important extent your experiences in France 
after the war? 
Why or why not? 
How did you experience your return home? 
What were your relationships with your family like? 
Relationships with your friends? 
Relationships with colleagues? 
Relationships with your neighbors? 
 
Do you think that the State and politicians showed recognition/gratitude for your service? 
Granting of rights? 
Commemoration of the ceasefire? 
 
Did your military experience and your status as a conscript influence your professional 
life? 
Your return to civilian life, even much later? 
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Did your military experiences and your conscript status influence a political engagement? 
A social engagement? 
An associative engagement? 
Would you be interested in participating in an interview with a Ph.D. student in History 
at UNC (United States)? 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO FNACA MEMBERS (FRENCH 
ORIGINAL) 
 
Département: 
Nom: 
Prénom: 
Adresse: 
 
Situation familiale: 
Études effectuées: 
Diplômes obtenus: 
Profession(s) exercée(s): 
Dates du service militaire: 
Lieux du service militaire: 
Unité d’affectation en Algérie: 
Grade à la fin du service militaire: 
Ville d’habitation au moment de la mobilisation: 
Ville d’accueil au retour: 
Avez-vous obtenu la carte du combattant? 
Dans l’affirmative, précisez l’année: 
Appartenez-vous à une association d’anciens combattants? 
Si oui, laquelle? 
Depuis quelle année? 
 
Votre service militaire a-t-il influencé d’une manière importante vos expériences en 
France après la guerre? 
Pourquoi ou pourquoi pas? 
 
Comment avez-vous vécu les conditions de votre retour? 
Relations avec vos proches (parents, épouse, enfants): 
Relations avec vos amis: 
Relations avec vos collègues de travail: 
Relations avec votre voisinage: 
 
Pensez-vous avoir bénéficié de la reconnaissance de la part de l’État et des hommes 
politiques? 
Attribution des Droits? 
Commémoration du Cessez-le-feu? 
 
Votre expérience militaire, votre Statut d’appelé ont-ils influencé votre carrière 
professionnelle après la libération de vos obligations militaires? 
À votre retour à la vie civile, voire plus tard? 
 
Votre expérience militaire, votre «Statut» d’appelé ont-ils influencé: 
Un engagement politique? 
Un engagement social? 
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Un engagement associatif? 
Sériez-vous intéresser [sic] d’avoir un entretien avec un Doctorant en Histoire de 
l’Université de la Caroline du Sud [sic] (États Unis)?  
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO UNC/AFN MEMBERS (ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION) 
 
Name: 
Surname: 
Dates of military service in Algeria: 
Branch(es) and arm(s) of service: 
Rank at the end of your service: 
The town or village you lived in before being conscripted: 
Your work before your military service: 
Your family situation when you were drafted: 
The town or village you returned to after your military service: 
In several words or phrases, how was the welcome that you received in your town or 
village when you returned? 
Did you receive an Award of the Nation’s Gratitude or a veterans’ card? If so, in which 
years? 
After your return, what kinds of civic engagement did you do (unions, associations, 
political parties, sports clubs, volunteering, etc.)? 
In your opinion, did your military service have an important influence on your career 
prospects after the war? 
When did you sign up for the UNCAFN? 
Does it interest you to meet the researcher to give an interview? 
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO UNC MEMBERS (FRENCH 
ORIGINAL) 
 
Nom: 
Prénom: 
Dates de service militaire en Algérie: 
Branche(s) et arme(s) de service: 
Grade militaire à la fin de votre service: 
La ville ou le village où vous habitiez avant d’être appelé en Algérie: 
Votre emploi avant de votre service militaire: 
Votre situation familiale lors de votre (r)appel sous les drapeaux: 
La ville le village [sic] où vous êtes rentré après votre service militaire: 
En quelques mots ou phrases, comment est-ce que c’était, l’accueil que vous avez reçu 
dans votre ville ou village une fois rentré de votre service? 
Avez vous obtenu un titre de reconnaissance de la nation ou une carte de combattant? Si 
oui, en quelle année(s)? 
Après votre retour, quelles sortes d’engagements civiques avez-vous fait (syndicats, 
associations, partis politiques, clubs sportifs, du bénévolat, etc.)? 
À votre avis, est-ce que votre service militaire a eu une influence importante sur vos 
perspectives de carrière après la guerre? 
En quelle année vous êtes-vous inscrit à l’UNC/UNCAFN? 
Est-ce que cela vous intéresse de rencontrer le chercheur pour faire un entretien? 
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APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORIES 
 
 
 [NB: Because of slight discrepancies between the questionnaires edited and sent out by the UNC 
and FNACA officials, I have not included some of the categories of responses here, including ‘civic 
engagements’ and ‘commemoration of the cease fire.’] 
 
 
Professionals versus conscripts: 
 Career soldier: 1. Conscripts: 18. 
 
Region of origin:  
 Brittany: 16.    Île-de-France: 2.   Normandy: 1. 
 
Employment at time of mobilization:  
 Trade/industry: 9. Student/white collar: 3. Agriculture/work on family 
         farm: 5. 
 Other (fishing/itinerant vendor): 2. 
 
Year of mobilization: 
 1955-56: 3.  1957-1958: 6.   1959-1960: 7. 
  
 1961-1962: 3. 
 
Rank by the end of service: 
 Private 1st class: 7. Private 2nd class: 3.  Sergeant: 5. 
 
 Sub-lieutenant: 1. Lieutenant: 1.  “Junior officer”: 1. 
 
 Adjutant chef: 1.      
 
 
Return to civilian life: 
 Positive: 3.  Negative: 3. Mixed: 2. Neutral/‘Normal’: 10. 
 
 No reply: 1. 
 
 
Impact of military service on career: 
 Positive: 3.  Negative: 3. Mixed: 2.  No impact: 10. 
 
 No reply: 1. 
 
Association membership: 
 FNACA: 5.  UNC/UNCAFN: 12.  Both at some point: 1. 
 
 Never joined: 1. 
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Year of joining an association: 
 Before veterans’ recognition (Nov. 1974): 9. After recognition: 8. 
 
 Never joined: 1.     No reply: 1.  
 
Position in veterans’ association: 
 Official: 7.  Rank and file: 11.   Never joined: 1. 
 
Era of receiving veterans’ card: 
 1970s: 10.  1980s: 5.   No response: 4. 
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APPENDIX F: BREAKDOWN OF INTERVIEWEES BY CATEGORIES 
 
[NB: The categories of data presented here are quite different from those in the questionnaires, because I 
had intended the questionnaires as a preliminary step to collect quantitative data before conducting more 
qualitative interviews. However, my veterans’ association contacts sent the questionnaires out at the same 
time as they were organizing interviews for me, resulting in two separate bodies of data.] 
 
Total count: 25 
 
Geographic origin: 
 Île-de-France: 10. Brittany: 10. Haute-Savoie: 3. North Africa: 2. 
      
 
Conditions of entry into military: 
 Conscript/reservist: 21.  Professional: 1 (Foreign Legion). Volunteer: 3.  
 
 
Association membership: 
 FNACA: 4.  UNC/UNCAFN: 17  None: 1.  UDC: 3.1181 
 
 
Position in association: 
 Official: 13.  Rank and file member: 11.  None: 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1181The UDC or Union départementale des combattants is a proudly regional veterans’ association founded 
in the Haute-Savoie in 1963. I was informed by its founder (whom I will not cite here, to preserve his 
anonymity) that no UNC branch had existed in the region before the Algerian War. The UDC has had ties 
to the UNCAFN since its foundation, but was more centrist than either the UNCAFN or the FNACA, and 
does not seem to have as much institutional enmity with this latter association.  
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